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Introduction 
European integration is a process where states decide to act together in some 
policy areas, either through transferring some competences to supranational institu-
tions or through institutionalizing stronger cooperation. This process has certain bene-
fits for the member states: not only in economic terms (as a common internal market) 
but also in terms of security and foreign policy. It strengthens the position and the 
voice of European states in global politics, potentially enabling them to influence the 
global agenda. Therefore, through recognising and institutionalizing their interde-
pendence in the EU, the member states can actually increase their independence and 
gain an opportunity to enhance the effectiveness of domestic policies. 
All the member states of the European Union (EU) represent democracies, 
where political and participative rights of their citizens are consolidated in national 
constitutions. In light of the growing challenges of globalization, European integra-
tion can potentially enforce the democratic quality of its member states because it en-
ables the projection of national interest beyond the state, protecting the domestic so-
cio-economic models and increasing a state’s capacity to act (Habermas 2011; 
Dingwerth et al. 2011). 
Yet the willingness of national elites to integrate and subject policies to com-
mon regulation in the EU varies significantly across policy fields. The most sensitive 
areas remain ‘sovereign’ or dominated by the intergovernmental mode of cooperation. 
An especially interesting case in this regard is the case of the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU). In this case we observe how monetary policy has been completely in-
tegrated and transferred to a supranational institution, the European Central Bank, 
while the economic policy has been left under the authority of each individual mem-
ber state. In fact, there is no other example of such separation of these two closely re-
lated policy areas. On the contrary, there are good reasons to implement economic 
policy on the EU level, especially after introduction of the common currency 
(Beetsma/Debrun 2004; Bell 2003; Crouch 2000a; De Grauwe 2009; Fatas 1998; 
Wessels/Linsemann 2002). Both economic and monetary policies are crucial for the 
redistributive capacity of the state, and they both correspond to the functional logic of 
integration, as described above. It is therefore puzzling why some states are still high-
ly reluctant to formally transfer competences in economic policy to the European lev-
el. The status quo must be beneficial for some actors who profit from divergence and 
preservation of certain competition among the European economies. This factor has 
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certainly proved its negative implications on democracy in the member states, espe-
cially during the crisis from 2010 on (Bieling 2011; Bratsis 2010; Scharpf 2012; 
Scharpf 2013).  
The issue of democratic sovereignty in a two level polity of the EU depends 
on the clear definition of the scale and the depth of decision-making on each level. 
The requirement of citizen participation is determined by this definition because the 
inclusion should be provided on the level of the real decision-making. The democratic 
deficit of the EU has been discussed on numerous occasions, especially within the 
academic research (Schimmelfennig 1996; Schaefer 2006; Karlsson 2001; Schmitter 
2000; Calliess 2005; Höpner et al. 2010; Majone 1998; Follesdal/Hix 2006). While 
supranational institutions and negotiations strongly influence and sometimes even 
shape the domestic policies of a nation state, the room for effective participation of 
the citizens shrinks. Simultaneously, some interest groups, strongly present on the 
domestic level, do not have equal capacity to influence the agenda on the European 
level (Crouch 2008).  
Economic policy is defined as governmental activity with the purpose of in-
fluencing the economy. It is comprised of a number of instruments, including those of 
monetary policy. It is a highly controversial policy field, as it does not only directly 
effect the distribution of welfare but also concerns the alignment of social forces. It is 
not a secret that the choice of the path of economic development as well as the 
framework of taxation and budgetary policies are often regarded to be the core of the 
sovereign statehood. Public compliance in this policy area requires an especially high 
level of legitimacy (see Scharpf 2012). Monetary policy is the part of economic poli-
cy that is focused on the regulation of a currency (its volume and value). It is im-
portant to emphasize that monetary regulation as part of economic policy embodies a 
political implementation of values. Within a democratic rule both are embedded in 
institutions that reflect traditional values of justice and legitimacy (see Scharpf 2012). 
In the EMU, we observe the common market and de-nationalization of the 
member state currencies combined with the strong formal protection of national sov-
ereignty in the field of economic, budgetary, and labour policies.  
„That European integration as we know it amounts in its core to eco-
nomic liberalization is closely associated with its constitutive mis-
match between the institutional range of political sovereignty and the 
size of the integrated market; with decentralization of politics coincid-
ing with centralization of market-making; and with the embedding of 
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national political institutions in an international market which exposes 
them to pressure of regime competition, both forcing and enabling na-
tional governments to push back demands for political „distortion“ of 
that market” (Streeck 1999: 161-162, translation S.M.). 
Although in the EMU economic policy formally still belongs to the member state 
competences, it does not mean that it remains untouched by the dynamic of integra-
tion. The launch of the EMU changed the overall context of economic policy in the 
member states, whereas the costs of adjustment were different across them (Schmidt 
2003; Becker 2014; Van Esch 2014; Wessels/Linsemann 2002). Regime competition 
increased by both globalization and European integration re-shaped the conditions of 
economic activity, resulting in higher pressures on national economic and re-
distributive policies (Bell 2003; Overbeek 2012; Pierson 2001; Rodrik 2000; Rodrik 
2011; Zohlnhoefer 2009). Liberalization as an attractive option for the supranational 
policies due to its requirement of a minimal consensus (negative integration) clashes 
with the post-war model of the European welfare state, which was designed to be the 
shock absorber, providing a balance between the economic and the social.  
Moreover, the project of common currency set the priority of macroeconomic 
stability and exclusively nominal convergence over social policies (Bell 2003; Blyth 
2013; Fitoussi/Creel 2007; Forder 2004; Radice 2014; Underhill 2002). The frame-
work of the EMU ignores the aspect of economic divergence across the member 
states; some of them strengthened their leading exporting positions since the launch of 
the EMU, and the others gained access to a cheaper credit but failed to adjust, facing 
both policy competition and competition among the European enterprises. These cir-
cumstances increase the chances of an economic downturn in some parts of the EMU 
(asymmetric shocks) (Alesina et al. 2010; Beetsma/Debrun 2004; De Grauwe 2013; 
Fatas 1998). The problem in the construction of the EMU is that, while eliminating 
sovereign currencies and having anti-inflationary mandate, it leaves open only the op-
tion of internal devaluation of wages and cuts of the welfare spending, which is the 
definition of austerity. The latter policies cause insecurities and unemployment, lead 
to social tensions and political instability, and shake the fragile structures of the EMU, 
endangering the project of European integration. 
This problem is especially well illustrated by the circumstances of the crisis. 
The events after the financial crisis of 2008, revealing neglected divergence and fail-
ures of the EMU construction, resulted in lasting control over member state budgetary 
and fiscal policies. The latter restricts the democratic right of a population to define 
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both its budgetary strategy and priorities based on internally set procedures. A de fac-
to European economic constitution (Bieling 2011) has been established exclusively in 
terms of austerity and a stabilization state with inadequate involvement of national 
parliaments (see Auel/Hoeing 2014; Benz 2013), without inclusion of social partners 
and despite internal disagreement within the Council of the European Union. This cri-
sis does not only illustrate a de-democratization process, especially due to increased 
pressure on the member state democratic institutions and strong acceleration of re-
forms but is also a period where economic agenda became fixed on certain type of 
economic policies, excluding other policy options from the discourse.   
   
Literature review  
Two branches of research that scrutinize the questions of democracy are espe-
cially relevant for this thesis: first, the research on European integration with a focus 
on democratic deficit and normative requirements for a democratic European Union; 
second, the research on consequences of economic globalization, especially the Euro 
zone crisis, for the democracies in the EU member states. 
There are numerous scientific publications on the topic of the democratic defi-
cit in the EU, which is often linked to the debate on finality of the European integra-
tion (supranationalism versus intergovernmentalism). Zielonka fairly notices that a 
democratic deficit partly results from the unclear arrangements, as it is not only hard 
to control the EU decision-makers but also difficult to interpret the depth and course 
of integration, especially for the ordinary citizens (Zielonka 2006: 5). Pointing out the 
democratic deficit, scholars refer to weakness of the European Parliament and simul-
taneosly decreasing powers of the national parliaments (Pollak/ Slominski 2012; Benz 
2013; Auel/Hoeing 2014; Sotiropoulos 2015; Wiesner 2016), the unelected character 
of the European Commission, poor participation in the European elections, weak Eu-
ropean political parties, remoteness of the Union’s decision-making, and lack of polit-
ical competition within and among elites etc. (see Lord 1998; Schaefer 2006; Hix 
2005; Haltern 2005; Anderson 1999). A participating government gets some space to 
avoid the democratic procedures, and the technocratic supranational institutions are 
not directly legitimized. Some authors point out the fact that the European decision-
making structurally withdraws from the critical and evaluative public scrutiny 
(Schmalz-Bruns 2002: 291; Karlsson 2001; Schmitter 2000; Calliess 2005; Bickerton 
et al. 2015).  
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Additionally, there is a scientific discourse on the challenges that national de-
mocracies generally face under the conditions of globalization where international or 
supranational institutions and negotiations strongly influence and sometimes even 
shape domestic policies of a nation state. Scholars often argue in favour of democrati-
zation of international and supranational governance (Archibugi/ Held 1995; 
Dingwerth/ Blauberger/ Schneider 2011; Neyer 2013; Rodrik 2011; Sbragia 2005; 
Schmidt 2003; Habermas 2011). James Caporaso fairly pointed out serious failures of 
‘no-demos’ argumentation (Caporaso 2005: 59) that focuses on the lack of the lowest 
degree of political trust, loyalty, and solidarity in the EU (Kielmansegg 1996; Grimm 
1995). According to some scholars, instead of a transnational demos, that is unlikely 
to appear anytime soon, one should count with and consider a plurality of transnation-
al demoi (Abromeit/Schmidt 1998; Nicolaidis 2012; Cheneval/Schimmelfennig 
2013).  
However, there is neither a general agreement among scholars on the demo-
cratic deficit in the EU nor on the ways of fixing it. The arguments vary from necessi-
ty and possibility of a comprehensive democratization within the EU (Karlsson 2001) 
to there being no need for the further democratization, as legitimacy of a regulatory 
state is provided through its effectiveness (Majone 1998). Some scholars argue in fa-
vour of a gradual and incremental democratization of the EU, generally, after a nation 
state’s institutional pattern but with regard to the sui generis nature of the EU 
(Schmitter 2000; Calliess 2005). Other authors refuse to acknowledge democratic def-
icit in the EU and regard its democratization as undesired, threating the efficiency 
(Moravcsik 2002; Majone 1998). Such a position clearly ignores that the concern is 
not only about the democratic structures of the EU but also about the democratic pro-
cedures within the member states, which are transformed through their involvement in 
European integration (Kohler-Koch/ Conzelmann/ Knodt 2004: 200). This transfor-
mation then results in the losses in democratic quality that are not absorbed on the 
EU-level (Kohler-Koch/ Conzelmann/ Knodt 2004: 200). Additionally, Follesdal and 
Hix argue that many EU’s regulatory policies in fact have redistributive consequences 
and are therefore not Pareto improving. Once winners and losers can be identified, the 
claim of efficiency becomes relative (Follesdal/Hix 2006).  
At the same time, there is a growing scepticism among the authors that demo-
cratic deficit in the EU can be resolved through the creation or strengthening of dem-
ocratic institutions of a nation state on the EU level (Cain 2005; Schmidt 2006). In 
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other words, the introduced elements of participative democracy have so far failed to 
secure democracy in the EU (Kohler-Koch/ Conzelmann/ Knodt 2004: 224). There-
fore, some research underlines the necessity to search for a non-parliamentary legiti-
mization strategy (Kohler-Koch/ Conzelmann/ Knodt 2004: 224). This approach is 
also supported by the general criticism of the contemporary state of democracy and 
effective participation of citizens reflected in configuration (Mitgestaltung), protest, 
and the explicit authorization of decision-makers, who must justify the decisions in 
front of the public (Abromeit 2004: 78). Some scholars claim that in a democracy the 
idea of representation alone (when fair elections of representatives are considered as 
the core of a democratic process) are not able to provide the sufficient level of legiti-
macy (Held 1995; Crouch 2008; see also Mouffe 2008). 
Deliberative models of democracy gained some recognition within the scien-
tific debate, as these models appear to suit the most regarding the specific of Europe-
an integration. Influenced by the language theory (Austin 1985; Cavell 1979; Witt-
genstein 2001), the idea of deliberative democracy is strongly rooted in the concept of 
popular sovereignty, understood as a radically democratic idea of the mass engage-
ment in politics and an active civil participation in shaping of the political context 
(Habermas 2011; Habermas 1992; Tully 2013; Schmalz-Bruns 2002; Gut-
mann/Thompson 2000, Elster 1998; Eriksen 2007; Cohen/Sabel 1997; Neyer 2006; 
Fishkin/Laslett 2003). Eriksen and Fossum argue on the topic of democracy model for 
the EU that the “requirements must be sufficiently broad to encompass the possibility 
of non-state-based democracy, and the most relevant forms of state-based democracy” 
(Eriksen/Fossum 2012). The functional representation appears to be essential in a 
highly heterogeneous polity (Cohen/Sabel 1997). While ignoring diversity and vola-
tility, the existing institutions of rule by majority can block important problem-
solving possibilities through their uniform approach (Cohen/Sabel 1997). Governance 
within the EU cannot be based on a command and control but has to operate with ar-
gumentation, convincing power, and understanding (Joerges/Neyer 1998: 230). 
Additionally to the discussion of democracy and European integration general-
ly, there is research attempting to reveal the democratic deficit in certain policy fields, 
especially where the EU and a member state government share the competences. Such 
research also exists in the case of the EMU, arguing mostly in institutional and eco-
nomic terms. The criticism has been expressed regarding the institution and the man-
date of the European Central Bank (Andersen 2004; Scharpf 2012), transparency and 
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accountability of the monetary policy as well as its parliamentary overview (Jabko 
2009; Heine/Herr 2004; Eichengreen 2010; Fitoussi/Creel 2007; Forder 2004; Brown 
2010; Hueglin 2002), and finally, the neoliberal paradigm of the ECB (Fitoussi/Creel 
2007; Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2003; Höpner et al. 2010). 
The discussion on democracy in the EMU intensified during the crisis of the 
Euro zone in 2010. As historically steps forward in European integration have often 
resulted from some crisis, the current crisis also sets the dynamic and defines the fu-
ture of European integration in the long term (Bieling/Huettmann 2016; see Ep-
pler/Scheller 2013). The current dynamic of the crisis constitutionalism, meaning re-
definition of an earlier arrangement in societal relations through introduction of the 
new European institutional and political instruments in the period of crisis manage-
ment (Bieling 2011; see Oberndorfer 2016), evidences in favour of both integrative 
and disintegrative tendencies. Although the decisions have been made in order to 
strengthen the integration within the EMU, the capacity to solve the root cause of the 
crisis, the effectiveness of those measures, and their lack of legitimacy rather set a 
disintegrative trend (Scharpf 2013b; Schwarzer 2013; Meyer-Rix 2013; Puntscher 
Riekmann 2016; Schmidt 2013; Börzel/Risse 2018). 
Some authors attempt to draw some attention to the tensions between capital-
ism and democracy, especially during the periods of economic crisis (see 
Schaefer/Streeck 2013; Scharpf 2013; Mair 2013; Schaefer 2013). Mair defined it as 
an acute tension between the demands of responsiveness and the demands of respon-
sibility (Mair 2013: 141). In these circumstances the policy-making routine of the 
governments is situated simultaneously under the pressures of citizens and of markets 
(Schaefer/Streeck 2013: 19; Scharpf 2013). 
The Euro zone crisis management and the legacy of those measures represent 
a serious constraint for the current and the future governments (Scharpf 2013; Mair 
2013). These constraints can be identified in different important aspects of democra-
cy. They resulted not only in the weakening of the European Parliament but also in 
the growing power asymmetries among the national parliaments, almost turning some 
of them into ‘second class’ parliaments (Benz 2013; Auel/Hoeing 2014; Sotiropoulos 
2015). Simultaneously, the European Council gained power in a predominantly inter-
governmental mode of the process of crisis management (Wessels/Schaefer 2016; 
Bickerton et al. 2015). Both one of the most powerful constitutional courts in Europe 
– the German Constitutional Court – and the European Court of Justice failed to en-
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sure more openness, inclusion or even simply provide clear criteria of the legitimacy 
of the crisis management measures (Everson et al. 2016; see also Wimmel 2014; 
Höing 2015). Comparing the results of the public debates on the Euro crisis with the 
other debates on European integration, Grande and Kriesi came to the conclusion that, 
despite the sensitivity of the issue (having redistributive significance) and high sali-
ence, the debates on the Euro crisis were clearly not the broadest and the most inten-
sive debates on integration (Grande/Kriesi 2015: 493). Dominance of the executive 
elites in the highly salient public debates on the Euro crisis prevented polarization and 
stronger politicization (Grande/Kriesi 2015), failing to include societal actors and 
concealing the real differences in the approaches to the crisis management. The simul-
taneous elitization and irrelevance of national elections for implementation of austeri-
ty have serious implications for democracy in the member states, tying hands of the 
newly elected government and blocking the policy change (Schaefer/Streeck 2013:1; 
Urban 2011). As scholars fairly argue “democracy depends on choice. Citizens must 
be able to influence the course of government through elections. If a change in gov-
ernment cannot translate into different policies, democracy is incapacitated” 
(Schaefer/Streeck 2013:1). 
The previous research in this field is mainly based on the formal and institu-
tional aspects of crisis management without due consideration to discursive factors for 
the long-term legitimacy of the EU policies in economic and monetary spheres1. It 
also does not provide an answer to the questions of how it was possible that certain 
measures were adopted and how the idea of austerity could be established as a guid-
ing principle of the crisis management. 
The approach in this thesis aims to draw attention to the unequal dynamic 
among the EU member states. It especially casts serious doubts on the view that, if 
decisions are made in the intergovernmental mode where each country has a repre-
sentative and a formal veto power, those decisions are automatically legitimate and 
democratic. Recently, the case of the EMU displayed how an attempt to make deci-
sions through an intergovernmental approach further increases asymmetries, instead 
of providing a base for convergence. Also, in my opinion, the focus on discourse in 
this research supports and further extends the democratic criticism of the monetary 																																																								
1 The existing research on discourse under the circumstances of the Euro crisis by Grande and 
Kriesi is limited to the credit-providing countries and focused on public debates 
(Grande/Kriesi 2015). 
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part of the EMU, which so far dominates by the institutional aspects (see De Grauwe 
2013; Benz 2013; Mulhearn/Vane 2008; Beetsma/Debrun 2004). Summing up, the 
approach here would provide a different perspective on democratic deficit in the EU, 
locating the source of the deficit in-between the European and national levels of poli-
cy-making. Strong divergence in discourse would evidence the differences in eco-
nomic policy realities and explain the lack of compliance and legitimacy as well as 
sometimes higher hurdles to the implementation of European norms. It provides a 
deeper look at the process of de-democratization in the EU beyond formal structures 
and institutions, but where the dominating discourse on the EU level drastically limits 
the possible policy options on the member state level without taking the full responsi-
bility for the policy outcomes.  
 
Research objectives and definitions 
This thesis has two objectives. The first one is to reveal the mechanism and 
nature of asymmetric power in the European Union through scrutinizing the case of 
the EMU. The second objective is to identify the effects of such an asymmetry on 
democracy and popular sovereignty in the member states. So, the main question of 
this research is: how do the shift of authority, which is expressed in the realignment of 
some competences between the EU and its member states, together with simultaneous 
recognition of sovereignty undermine democracy? 
According to the first hypothesis of this research, democracy in the EMU has 
been undermined through the establishment of structures of the EMU, which ignore 
different economic and monetary policy dynamics in the member states. These struc-
tures have neither been the result of societal consensus nor do they provide channels 
for such consensus in future. My second hypothesis claims that the dominating EU 
discourse failed to naturalise itself and was resisted in some parts of the EMU. The 
consequence of such failure is distrust and the loss of legitimacy. It contains an ele-
ment of coercion, when the existing antagonisms do not find a resolution through ar-
ticulation, but some meanings are forced upon some groups. It increases an asym-
metry of power and further enforces the centre-periphery relations among the member 
states. 
In this research, the conceptualization of the EU as an empire of a new type is 
adopted (Cooper 2002; Posener 2007; Zielonka 2006; Bieling 2010). In this context, 
empire means a polycentric polity, employing non-hierarchical modes of governance 
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and recognizing its member states’ sovereignty (Bieling 2010). It is a complex form 
of rule that governs its peoples by a combination of informal and indirect means while 
simultaneously recognizing these peoples as self-governing sovereign states. The lat-
ter implies that an empire often does not formally carry responsibility in the case of 
negative policy outcomes. The interaction among actors within an empire happens on 
the basis of constitutional equality, yet within the unequal relations of economic, po-
litical, and legal power. That is why it is described as an asymmetry. The latter means 
an unequal constellation where an unequal capacity of the member states to influence 
and push through the agenda on the European level can be observed. Through the Eu-
ropean modes of governance, which coexist together with those of the member states, 
it is possible for empire to achieve the desired degree of policy harmonisation or di-
vergence. 
In this research, democratic sovereignty is understood as the ultimate location 
(act of locating) of final decision-making authority in the citizens on the principles of 
human self-determination and co-decision. Democracy can be broadly defined as the 
governance of people, governance through people, and governance for people 
(Schmidt 2006; Neyer 2013: 28ff). It is not something stable, being set once forever, 
but rather dynamic, depending on institutions, events, and discourse. As two closely 
linked ideas, both democracy and democratic sovereignty locate the competence to 
decide about the content of policies in the mass population. Yet, while the concept of 
democracy provides an institutional and procedural framework for application of 
democratic sovereignty, the latter represents a broader concept relating legitimate rule 
to the deliberate exercise of political freedom and human self-determination. 
The European Union is certainly a special case for the democratic theory, and 
the academic discussions on the features and requirements of democracy in this case 
continue (as mentioned above). From my point of view, the democratic problem in the 
EU should not be reduced to institutional and procedural aspects. In this thesis, demo-
cratic governance is understood as a peaceful proceeding of differences with legiti-
mizing outcomes. Moreover, democracy preserves its vitality out of these differences 
in opinions, which also represent the creative element of the democratic process (Co-
hen/Sabel 1997; Neyer 2006; Gutmann/Thompson 2000). Therefore, plurality of opin-
ions and the decisions emerging from such plurality represent the cornerstone of de-
mocracy. The latter depends on the will expression through an open discussion. 
Through democratic process the communicative exchange within the plurality ends in 
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a decision, which should represent a consensus or at least a compromise (Thaa 2007; 
see Schmidt/Radaelli 2004; Gutmann/Thompson 2000). The difference is supressed if 
a discourse is closed for the new elements. In this case it usually dominates, claiming 
to present the only universal truth. Then the decisions are not made by people any-
more but are forced upon them (by politicians, negotiations etc.). 
Due to the historical and cultural differences, the European Union will remain 
a space of discursive diversity, which should be channelled within a political system. 
Moreover, I think that the economic policy field deserves a special attention in regard 
to the democratic aspects. It is harder to identify democratic deficit in this field clearly 
from a formal or institutional point of view. Dyson underlines: 
“As a multicultural phenomenon the EMU embodies a set of 
common beliefs about what is a ‘state’, what does ‘sovereignty’ 
mean, and what is to be understood under ‘to make Euro zone a 
success story’ and how should ‘power’ be exercised. Without 
consideration of this cultural dimension it is impossible to en-
tirely capture the constitutive manner, in which the EMU influ-
ences the member states” (Dyson 2003: 463).  
Following the logic of deliberative democracy, it is argued here that some type 
of deliberation among communities rather than individuals could potentially take 
place within the EMU. An attempt to assess the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the 
discourse on the EU level in terms of responsiveness to the ideas, values, and percep-
tions in the member states is undertaken in this thesis, using the criteria of representa-
tiveness and contestation of the discourse on the EU level. 
So, the democratic process as recognition of democratic sovereignty would 
ensure the integration and proceeding of differences within the decision-making, aim-
ing at reaching a consensus. In order to check the hypotheses above, two case studies 
– of Germany and of Greece – are undertaken in this research. The case studies ana-
lyse both the established modes of governance and the legitimating discourses over 
time as two main elements of economic policy embeddedness. It is necessary to un-
derstand the modes of governance because they contextualize discourse, helping to 
identify the main actors and stakeholders as well as their relative formal power. In its 
turn, discourse analysis informs us about the traditional values and the dominating 
concepts of justice. It can also signal either value transformation (and naturalisation of 
certain concepts as “right”) or continuity. Additionally, the case of the EMU repre-
sents the framework on the European level, which is necessary for the analysis. The 
case studies and their contextualization within the framework of the EMU provide a 
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base for comparison both between each other and between the national and the Euro-
pean dimensions. This analysis enables the assessment of whether or not the contested 
realities enjoy equal channels of representation on the EU level. It is also expected 
that the cases display differences, which are neglected in the institution of the EMU, 
making compliance and legitimacy lower in some cases than the others. As mentioned 
above, the imposed implementation of one policy vision, despite the conflict and dif-
ferences, would further reflect the asymmetric power and the centre-periphery rela-
tions among the member states. 
 
Structure of this thesis 
This thesis consists of an introduction, seven chapters, and a conclusion. After 
this introduction, chapter one is intended to provide a brief overview about the main 
approaches to the European integration phenomenon and to specify the approach 
adopted in this research. In parallel, the issue of democracy in the EU is discussed 
there. The chapter proceeds from the classical theories of European integration (part 
1.1), which describe the EU in terms of supranational or intergovernmental organiza-
tion, to more recent approaches, departing from state-centred approaches and attempt-
ing to describe its nature with the focus on consistent multiplicity (1.2). The second 
half of this chapter is focused on the conceptualization of the EU as an empire of a 
new type, describing its features, modes of governance, and democratic aspects. 
In the second chapter, the concept of popular sovereignty is discussed, includ-
ing its origins, functions, and forms. The main purpose of this chapter is to provide 
the definitions and explain the links between the central concepts of this thesis – 
democratic sovereignty, democracy, and legitimacy. It also explains why certain crite-
ria of democracy were identified as crucial on the EU level. Part 2.1 shows different 
facets of sovereignty and proves the dependence of the meaning of popular sovereign-
ty on the context of its usage. In the part 2.2, the concepts of legitimacy, democracy, 
and democratic sovereignty are discussed. That part outlines how these concepts re-
late to one another in a political system. Part 2.3 grasps the understanding of democ-
racy as proceduralized popular sovereignty in the concept of deliberative democracy. 
Chapter three presents the methodology implemented in this research. Two 
case studies and an analysis of the EMU are conducted in this research, whereas each 
of them is based on two pillars: the context of governance and discourse (both are 
considered essential for the legitimacy). While the section on context of governance 
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analyses main actors, their interactions, and the balance of power in the economic pol-
icy-making field, it outlines the political context that is important for policy (non-) 
adaptation. The context is also crucial for a better understanding of the discourse. In 
its turn, the discourse analysis gives us an idea about the ‘regime of truth’ in two na-
tional and the European discourses. 
The fourth chapter focuses on the integration within the European Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU). First, the challenges to economic policy under condi-
tions of globalization and the overall transformation of this policy field due to global-
ization are described (4.1). Globalization and liberalization put an immense pressure 
on the regulative and redistributive policies of a government (Sassen 2008; Rodrik 
2011; Held/Koenig-Archibugi 2003). As a result, it also transforms the social rela-
tions in a state. It is important to mention here that globalization is as much externally 
driven as internally, by the domestic actors. Second, the financial dimension of glob-
alization is considered closely as well as the question of why the European states de-
cided to unite in the EMU (4.2). Third, the institutional dimension and the mandate of 
the EMU are presented briefly (4.3), before the final part of the chapter presents the 
analysis of the European discourse on EMU (4.4). It is argued that the democratic 
problem of the EMU lies not only in the lack of accountability of the ECB, its isola-
tion from the development of the real economy and from the socio-economic context 
but also in its fixing of an agenda in exclusively neoliberal terms, which are claimed 
to be universally ‘right’. 
Chapters five and six are the case studies of Germany (Chapter 5) and of 
Greece (Chapter 6). These cases are considered as most different cases, which is ex-
emplified in that since the launch of the EMU Germany has been policy “giver”, 
while Greece has been “receiver”; their previous monetary policy experience is often 
described as “success” and “failure” correspondingly. Moreover, the two countries 
differ in their economic structures and, consequently, concepts of economic policy 
and the degree of intervention by the state. Therefore, these cases possess the poten-
tial for conflict and antagonism, grounded in their historical and socio-economic ex-
perience. Both case studies regard the conduct of economic policies before the EMU 
as well as the modes of governance and the dominating discourses within two periods, 
1997 to 2000 and 2010 to 2015. 
In the seventh chapter, the findings from the case studies are compared and 
further discussed from a democratic perspective. First, the chapter attempts to com-
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pare the discourses, showing the main points of tension. Second, it locates democratic 
deficit in the power asymmetries. This chapter elaborates on how responsive and con-
tested the discourse on the European level is, and if it is able to ensure sustainable 
levels of legitimacy in the long term.  
Finally, the last chapter presents the main conclusions from the analysis. It at-
tempts to place this thesis within the existing scientific research on the subject, identi-
fying its main contribution and limitations. 
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Chapter 1: Approaches to European integration 
1.1. Supranationalism vs. Intergovernmentalism and the debate on democracy 
in the EU 
 European integration refers to the process of legal harmonization and transfer 
of certain competencies to supranational institutions completely or partly. Due to its 
structure and functions, it is not possible to classify the EU either as a nation state or 
as a classical international organization. On the one hand, usual state structures can be 
identified as its corpus. But, on the other hand, their functioning is seriously trans-
formed, and a group of supranational institutions appear with their functions, logic, 
actors, power potential, etc. Consequently, the picture of what a member state exactly 
is and of scale and depth of integration becomes blurred and hard to interpret. 
 There are a number of approaches that have been developed for the study of 
the European integration phenomenon. Generally, they can be divided into suprana-
tional and intergovernmental theories, depending on whether or not an approach un-
derlines the importance and potential of supranational institutions or state actors. In 
the following, some central assumptions of the dominating approaches to the analysis 
of European integration and some attempts to assess democracy in the EU, based on 
these approaches, are briefly presented. 
 The supranational approach supports the argument that the EU authority un-
dermines state sovereignty. According to the literature on European integration, su-
pranationalism is either a common term for neo-functionalism, institutionalism, and 
other approaches that underline the supranational nature of the EU or it is specifically 
associated with the work of Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholz, representing a 
fusion of mainly two theories – neo-functionalism and the historical institutionalism 
(see Stone Sweet/Sandholz 1997). In the neo-functionalist tradition, supranational ac-
tors are regarded as autonomous and possessing self-interest. Integration starts in cer-
tain policy fields, where the resistance would be weaker and increasingly spills over 
into other policy areas due to the functional linkage (Rosamond 2000). Some policy 
areas are regarded as rather technical and are easier to integrate because of their low 
politicisation. The neo-functionalist spillover hypothesis suggests that integration was 
a linear, progressive phenomenon: once it is launched, the dynamics would be set in 
place to continue the momentum (Rosamond 2000: 63). Some scholars claim that su-
pranational governance happens not necessarily accompanied by the shift in identifi-
cation within various interest groups, but rather as supranational authorities acquire 
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competencies and governing capacities in some policy fields, they also become capa-
ble of limiting the space for action of other actors, including the member state gov-
ernments themselves (Pollack 2003). This argument claims that, especially in the are-
as where the EU-institutions possess competences, they are able to push their agenda 
through, despite the resistance from the member states. Moreover, the role of the 
transnational non-governmental actors, such as interests groups, enterprises, and think 
tanks, is taken into consideration within supranationalism from the following perspec-
tive: they have not only the option to influence their national governments but can 
also engage with the supranational actors directly (Pollack 2003). Thus, integration 
process is believed to develop self-dynamic, especially through the path-dependency 
claim, which originally emerged within the historical institutionalism. According to 
the path-dependency, an earlier decision strongly influences the later ones, and “once 
a country or a region has started down a path, the costs of reversal are very high” 
(Pollack 2003: 140). Postfunctionalism differs from neofunctionalism, as the former 
foresees backlash of integration to result from the feedback processes rather than a 
spillover and path-dependence (Schimmelfennig 2018; Hooghe/Marks 2009). The fo-
cus of postfunctionalism is placed on politicization of integration and the public dis-
course, which have capacity to put pressure for less integration. This approach espe-
cially drew attention of scholars in the course of the EMU crisis. However, the as-
sessment of the achieved degree of politicization and its outcomes differ significantly 
among the scholars (compare Börzel/Risse 2018 and Schimmlefennig 2018). 
 Stone Sweet and Sandholz agree with the argument that the national govern-
ments have their own ideas and interests in the integration process but also claim that 
the latter cannot control the integration anymore, as some processes are put forward 
by the supranational actors (Nölke 2006: 145ff). Supranationalism implies either pool 
or (partial) transfer of national sovereignty, understood as state’s independent law-
making capacity grounded in the popular authorization, and raises the question of le-
gitimacy of the policies driven by the supranational actors. 
 According to intergovernmentalism, integration remains an inter-state matter 
where governments fully control the process and, thus, preserve national sovereignty. 
The basic assumption of the classic intergovernmentalism (represented among others 
by Stanley Hoffman) is that European integration is not shaped either by the interests 
of the transnational elites or by the supranational actors but by the national interests 
and policies of the national governments, which protect the core of the sovereign pol-
	 17	
icy-making. This approach describes state as willing to reduce its relative uncertain-
ties and choosing its strategies depending on the historical context (Bieling 2006: 94-
98). In these terms, European integration is considered to be just a better-
institutionalized form of international relations, which is actually aimed at ‘reproduc-
ing’ national sovereignty (Bieling 2006). Therefore, this perspective strongly margin-
alizes the supranational institutions. 
 Particularly, the liberal intergovernmentalism associated with the ideas and 
research of Andrew Moravcsik is interesting in this regard. Moravcsik poses a ques-
tion in The Choice for Europe: why have sovereign governments in Europe repeatedly 
chosen to coordinate their core economic policies and surrender the sovereign prerog-
atives within an international institution (Moravcsik 1998: 1)? The liberal intergov-
ernmentalism integrates the idea of international interdependence, which demands 
integration and “delegation to supranational organizations capable of acting against 
the short term preferences of governments” (Schimmelfennig 2003: 80). Simultane-
ously, European integration provides the state executives with institutional and infor-
mational resources, which help them to weaken parliamentary control and loosen the 
grip of powerful domestic interest groups such as trade unions (Schimmelfennig 
2003: 81). From this point of view, integration is necessary for strengthening the 
state. According to Moravcsik, national interests are not defined through geopolitical 
concerns of a state but rather through the process of domestic preference-bilding in a 
state. Thus, the relevance of the domestic politics and issue-specific preferences of the 
domestic interest groups represent the main difference between the classic intergov-
ernmentalism and the one in the liberal interpretation of Moravcsik (Schimmelfennig 
2003: 80, see also Pollak/Slominski 2012: 62). 
 Although Moravcsik does not neglect the other factors that certainly contribut-
ed to support for integration, he underlines the primacy of economic interests (see 
Moravcsik 1998). More specifically, his hypothesis focuses on two reasons that pro-
vide support for integration: the commercial interests of the powerful economic pro-
ducers and the macroeconomic preferences of the ruling governmental coalitions 
driven from the changing structures of the global economy (Moravcsik 1998: 3). 
Therefore, economic elites are seen as the key actor in European integration, especial-
ly within the established economic organization, representing three biggest sectors – 
industry, agriculture, and services (Steinhilber 2006: 179). 
	 18	
 The relative power of the nation states is reflected in asymmetrical interde-
pendence and is significant for the negotiation process. Moravcsik locates his expla-
nation of integration in series of rational choices made by the national leaders: 
“There were important distributional conflicts not just within states but 
among them. These interstate conflicts were resolved only through 
hard interstate bargaining. <..> The outcomes reflected the relative 
power of states – more precisely, patterns of asymmetrical interde-
pendence” (Moravcsik 1998: 3). 
Recognizing the need to constrain and control each other, governments opted for in-
creased credibility of commitments through the pooling and delegation of national 
sovereignty to international institutions (Moravcsik 1998: 9). 
Recently, scholars have attempted to update the intergovernmentalist theory 
including the features of European integration that became especially prominent in the 
circumstances of the EMU crisis. The new intergovernmentalism is conceptualized as 
a distinctive phase of European integration since Maastricht where integration is pur-
sued through intensified policy coordination between the member states, and power 
transfer to the traditional supranational bodies (mainly, the Commission and the 
Court) is avoided (Bickerton et al. 2015: 704). The authors highlight “an absence of 
supranational decision-making as typically framed by the Community method”, and 
that certain behavioural norms, namely deliberation and consensus-seeking, became 
ordinary operative norms for the EU (Bickerton et al. 2015: 706). It is argued that 
“preference formation and EU integration are not neatly separated in space and time”, 
but E integration “has become increasingly shaped by pressures occurring within the 
processes of preference formation, creating a more dynamic and unstable set of rela-
tionships between domestic constituencies, member state governments, and EU poli-
cies and institutions” (Bickerton et al. 2015: 707). Additionally, the separation be-
tween high and low politics becomes blurred (Bickerton et al. 2015). 
Bickerton, Hodson, and Puetter point out the de facto expansion of EU activity 
despite its formally stable constitutional features (Bickerton et al. 2015: 703). The 
central thesis of their collective work is that “member states pursue more integration 
but stubbornly resist further supranationalism” (Bickerton et al. 2015: 705). Attempt-
ing to explain this “integration paradox”, the scholars consider the differences in the 
political economy before and after the Treaty of Maastricht. According to them, dif-
ferent political bargains between competing social forces on the national level result-
ed in rigid and implacable intergovernmental relations on the European level in the 
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1950s and 1960s, and the increased intra-European competition led to more defensive 
positions of the member states in the 1970s. The abandonment of the postwar eco-
nomic consensus and convergence of the member states’ preferences in economic pol-
icy aspects in the beginning of the 1990s resulted in the Treaty of Maastricht (Bicker-
ton et al. 2015: 708). The second part of explanation of the “integration paradox” by 
the new intergovernmentalism recognizes the constraints and challenges faced by the 
elites, mainly due to the crisis of representative politics (Bickerton et al. 2015: 709ff.). 
It is argued that the “post-Maastricht political developments, particularly the growing 
fragmentation of societal interests and the demise of the permissive consensus, have 
led to an uncoupling of policy-making from national politics which often leaves na-
tional elites at odds with the wishes of their domestic constituencies” (Bickerton et al. 
2015: 716). Such circumstances pushed the EU towards “executive federalism” and 
“made governments wary about their involvement in pan-European policy-making” 
(Bickerton et al. 2015: 710). Therefore, the new intergovernmentalism clearly recog-
nizes the issue of legitimacy. The scholars claim that “de novo bodies” increasingly 
emerge because the member states, facing the difficulties in terms of public justifica-
tion and legitimacy, avoid the delegation of authority to traditional supranational in-
stitutions such as the Commission and the Court (Bickerton et al. 2015: 716). Gener-
ally the new intergovernmentalism points out the growing influence of informal poli-
cy-making that allows an escape from “many of the legislative frameworks that char-
acterized supranational lawmaking beyond the nation state” (Bickerton et al. 2015: 
717). 
Supranationalism is not convincing in the cases where, for instance, a measure 
was blocked in the Council despite the support for this measure from the side of the 
Commission and other supranational actors2. Neither does supranationalism explain 
the stop-and-go character of European integration. Intergovernmentalism (both classic 
and liberal) fails to explain the full dynamics of the integration process because it ig-
nores the development in the first pillar3, especially the power of the European Court 
of Justice (Schimmelfennig 2003: 82). Also, the new intergovernmentalism deserves 
some criticism. First, although it is true that the European Commission was not signif-																																																								
2 This was the case when the Council of Ministers refused to put sanctions on Germany and 
France for their violations of the Stability and Growth Pact in 2003 that was followed by 
amendment of the Pact in 2005.	
3 The pillar system was formally dissolved with the Treaty of Lisbon. 
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icantly empowered as a result of the EMU crisis management, this fact alone does not 
evidence in favour of the decreasing significance of supranationalism. In other words, 
the fact that supranational institutions, especially the Commission, have been weak-
ened, does not necessarily mean that the EU as a whole became more intergovern-
mental (Schimmelfennig 2015: 724). Schimmelfennig points out that the so-called de 
novo bodies generally are not less autonomous than the Commission, and they com-
bine both intergovernmental and supranational features (Schimmelfennig 2015: 724). 
In fact, it is possible that we are observing a new type of supranationalism where a 
coalition of supranational actors rather than the Commission alone decide on the poli-
cies in all member states. Such a coalition could potentially include both supranation-
al actors (such as the Commission and the ECB) as well as some member state gov-
ernments (which are simultaneously domestic and European actors). 
Second, the claim of the new intergovernmentalism that the intensified policy 
co-ordination “has been possible because of the deliberative and consensual quality of 
EU decision-making” (Bickerton et al. 2015: 704) is highly controversial. Bickerton, 
Hodson, and Puetter further argue “deliberation and consensus-seeking have long 
been taken to be the behavioural hallmarks of supranationalism, but in the post-
Masstricht period they imposed themselves as dominant norms regulating the rela-
tions between national actors. We see this in the pre-eminance of the European Coun-
cil – a deliberative and consensus-building body par excellence” (Bickerton et al. 
2015: 704). Although the authors do not explain in detail what exactly is understood 
under “deliberation” in their article, in my opinion, the example of the EMU crisis 
management over time illustrates a lack of deliberation and consensus-building capac-
ity, mainly due to the existence of stronger and weaker actors or coalitions and 
asymmetric co-dependency among the member states. In fact, the authors’ claim of a 
decreasing significance of vetoes and opt-outs since the Maastricht because of the “at-
tachment to deliberation and consensus” (Bickerton et al. 2015: 704-705) seems to be 
misleading, too, as it might not be due to deliberation but due to asymmetric co-
dependency – a veto or an exit come at a higher cost for some actors and, therefore, 
represent the less attractive option. In reality, deliberation and consensus always co-
exist with veto, exit, and exclusion threats throughout the post-Maastricht era 
(Schimmelfennig 2015: 726). 
Moreover, if the authors are right about deliberation and consensus-building as 
a behavioural preference why then does any aspect of Keynesianism quickly become 
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a tabu on the European level in the case of the EMU? For example, Schimmelfennig 
draws attention to the “considerable intergovernmental conflict about the institutional 
design of monetary union” and “the role that asymmetrical intergovernmental bar-
gaining power played in shaping the institutional design of monetary union (and fiscal 
policy)” (Schimmelfennig 2015: 728). Therefore, both the formulation of the “inte-
gration paradox” and the claim of deliberation as a policy-making preference within 
the new intergovernmentalism ignore the existing difference across the member states 
and substantive (ideological) aspects of a concrete policy field. Finally, Schim-
melfennig points out that “national executives are differentially constrained by Euro-
sceptic publics and parties depending on the country and policy; this has equally dif-
ferential implications for their institutional preferences and bargaining power at the 
EU level” (Schimmelfennig 2015: 728). 
Concerning the democratic deficit in the EU, this topic is mainly focused on 
the criteria of accountability and representation. There are a variety of opinions on its 
existence, location, and the ways of solving it. The definition of democratic deficit 
really depends on how a scholar understands the European Union, its nature, and its 
goals. 
Summarizing the academic debate on legitimate rule in the European Union in 
the 1990s, Schimmelfennig pointed out the main dilemma between the requirements 
of social legitimacy (input legitimacy) and of policy efficiency (output legitimacy) 
(Schimmelfennig 1996: 6). However, often within the framework of European inte-
gration both principles cannot be implemented at the same time. The debate generally 
has a strong focus on the criteria and features of democracy known from the model of 
nation state; those authors who consider democratization as desirable also recognize 
the lack of a common European identity, solidarity, and civil society as the main ob-
stacles to the democratization of the EU (Schimmelfennig 1996: 38). 
Schaefer provides an overview of the debate on democratic deficit in the EU 
by attributing the authors to one of four positions according to two criteria: the real 
possibility and desirability of democratization of the EU (Schaefer 2006; see table 1). 
According to the optimists’ position, democratic deficit in the EU is located 
mainly in the lack of input legitimacy. The scholars here focus on the necessity and 
the real possibility of collective search for solutions, including public debate and scru-
tiny (Karlsson 2001; Schmitter 2000; Calliess 2005).  
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Table 1: Approaches to democratic deficit in the EU 
   
Democratization possible 
  yes no 
Democratization 
desirable 
yes optimists pessimists 
no apologists fatalists 
Source: Schaefer 2006: 351 
 
For example, democratic deficit on the EU-level is real because the EU undermines 
democratic processes and interests in the member states (Haltern 2007:136ff). Ac-
cording to Haltern, first, the parliamentarism and legislative power are weakened for 
the benefit of executive brunch of power. Second, the national judicative control is 
also weakened through the European regime. Third, it undermines substantial political 
interests when through the majority voting a member state can be subordinated to a 
majority of the conservative governments, although its people voted for a left gov-
ernment (Haltern 2007: 140). Additionally, the control capacities of the European Par-
liament in spite of several reforms remain moderate (compared to the other suprana-
tional bodies) (Pollak/ Slominski 2012: 182). Especially, during the period of the 
EMU crisis the European Parliament has been excluded from intergovernmental deci-
sion-making when crucial decisions have been made (Wiesner 2016). An attempt to 
strengthen the parliaments through the Lisbon Treaty has ambiguous results (see for 
example, Höing 2015; Sotiropoulos 2015). Due to institutional barriers, the negative 
integration and de-regulation certainly dominate in the EU, creating an asymmetric 
bias against the positive integration. Moreover, the strength of the ECJ and the Euro-
pean case law extends the gap between negative and positive integration, leading not 
only to imbalance between the European and national policies but also between social 
and liberal policy goals (Höpner et al. 2010: 345; see also Fitoussi/Creel 2007; Dyson 
2003; Schmidt 2003). 
The pessimistic view recognizes the existence of democratic deficit but ques-
tions the possibility of democratization, mainly due to lack of common identity that 
would enable solidarity. Integration within the EU does not re-create the chain of 
identity-solidarity-democracy on a European level (Schaefer 2006: 354; see also 
Kielmansegg 1996; Grimm 1995). In fact, empirical research has proven national 
identity to remain strong and resistant; European identity remains weak compared to 
national, regional, and local identities (Schaefer 2006: 366). 
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Apologists consider democratization of the EU on the input side undesirable, 
as the requirement of passing through all democratic and legitimising channels could 
damage the effectiveness of policies on the EU level (Schaefer 2006). These authors 
describe national politics as full of obstacles and blockades, which hinder implemen-
tation of necessary reforms. For example, Majone advises against evaluating demo-
cratic deficit of the EU according to nation state standards, claiming that non-
majoritarian standards would be more suitable in this case (Majone 1998). From his 
point of view, the delegation to independent regulatory authorities would be suffi-
ciently justified under the conditions in which the assigned tasks are precisely and 
narrowly defined, and non-majoritarian sources of legitimacy such as expertise, pro-
cedural rationality, transparency, and accountability by results are fulfilled (Majone 
1998: 28). Andrew Moravcsik generally regards the changes connected to integration 
as incremental and not touching upon national sovereignty (Moravcsik 2002: 603ff). 
He lists a row of constraints that integration and EU-institutions must face day-to-day 
(Moravcsik 2002: 607ff). First, he points out the restricted competencies of the EU by 
treaties and its focus on the cross-border economic activity. Second, he mentions the 
lack of fiscal, administrative, and legal authority of the EU as a significant restriction 
to the expansion of its policies. Third, he outlines certain procedural constraints such 
as unanimity, multi-level decision-making structure, and plural executive. Moreover, 
the EU-activities are democratically legitimized through control of integration by the 
democratic governments. His last argument to this point: “some, finally, maintain that 
the EU lacks democratic legitimacy not so much because it stifles political participa-
tion, but because its policies are biased against particular interests consensually rec-
ognized as legitimate” (Moravcsik 2002: 617). Here, he reacts to the criticism of a 
neo-liberal bias in the EU policy-making by explaining: first, there is little evidence 
of a race to the bottom concerning the welfare spending because “the level of social 
welfare provision remains relatively stable” (Moravcsik 2002: 618). Second, even if 
such a race to the bottom would take place, there is no evidence that it is the EU driv-
ing the social protection downward (Moravcsik 2002: 618). These arguments were 
proved wrong in course of the Euro zone crisis, when implementation of the reform 
programs demanded by the actors on the European level directly influenced the wel-
fare provisions in the member states affected by these measures. Moravcsik then con-
cludes that additional democratic and legitimizing mechanisms are not only unneces-
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sary but even undesired because they would slow down the decision-making and de-
crease the efficiency (see also Merkel 1999: 45). 
Finally, in the perspective of fatalists more participation would not only en-
danger the efficiency of the EU but also the project of integration as a whole. These 
authors regard the EU as a concordance democracy based on consensus and negotia-
tions rather than decisions made by majority. Democratic deficit would therefore be 
existential for the EU (see Schaefer 2006). 
The positions of apologists and fatalists obviously ignore the danger of de-
democratization of the national political institutions. They often refer to the veto 
rights of the EU-member governments as an important tool, enabling the control over 
integration, and legitimacy of the EU derived from democracy within the member 
states. However, this argument is disputable as on the EU level the decision-making 
by a simple majority in the Council procedurally would be more democratic. Reacting 
to Moravcsik’s neglect of democratic deficit in the EU, Kohler-Koch, Conzelmann, 
and Knodt argue that the issue is not about democracy in the EU compared to the 
member states. It is in the fact that the democratic procedures in the member states are 
undermined through their involvement in European integration, and that these losses 
in democratic quality are not absorbed on the EU-level (Kohler-Koch/ Conzelmann/ 
Knodt 2004: 200). The latter argument is supported by more recent research on the 
role of national parliaments in the times of Euro-zone crisis (Auel/Hoeing 2014). Alt-
hough with the Lisbon Treaty the control of the national parliaments over integration 
has been formally strengthened, the decision-making in the circumstances of the Eu-
ro-zone crisis in fact undermined the position of the national parliaments 
(Auel/Hoeing 2014; see also Benz 2013). Decrease in power of the national parlia-
ments was accompanied by strengthening of the executive. 
Moreover, scholars argue that the normative changes in the institutional design 
of the EU, such as direct election of the Commission or increase in power of the EP, 
will not be capable of solving the democratic dilemma. Therefore, these scholars 
highlight the necessity to search for a non-parliamentary legitimization strategy 
(Kohler-Koch/ Conzelmann/ Knodt 2004: 224). In other words, the introduced ele-
ments of participative democracy on the EU level so far have clearly failed to make 
the EU more democratic. Despite the growing influence of the European Parliament, 
citizen participation has remained low. Therefore, the focus of scholars in search for 
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the forms of democracy suitable for the EU slowly shifts away from the institution of 
the European Parliament (Schaefer 2006: 364). 
Regarding the output legitimacy and the necessity to preserve the capacity of 
the regulatory institutions to remain efficient through their isolation from the societal 
pressures, the question must be raised of how should efficiency be defined and meas-
ured, if reaching the goals in one policy area limits the chances to succeed in another 
one. For example, Schaefer demonstrates that the case of unemployment concerns cit-
izens across the member states, but the EU is seen as a threat rather than a problem-
solving framework (Schaefer 2006: 369). Majone’s focus on the output legitimacy 
would be correct if it is assumed that policies on the EU level are exclusively Pareto 
improving (meaning that everyone is better off as a result), with no re-distributional 
effects (Follesdal/Hix 2006). Follesdal and Hix argue that in praxis it is hard to distin-
guish between efficient and redistributive policy decisions, as both features can often 
be observed simultaneously (Follesdal/Hix 2006: 542). A number of the EU regulato-
ry policies have redistributive effects where winners and losers can be identified 
(Follesdal/Hix 2006: 543). The dynamic of the Euro-zone crisis especially shows how 
controversial the issue of efficiency actually is. Schaefer argues that:  
“Also no-decision that has redistributive effect must be legitimated. 
The dilemma of the EU is that it does not possess enough legitimacy 
for the positive integration but the status quo is already beyond distri-
butionally neutral regulation” (Schaefer 2006: 370, translation S.M.).  
Follesdal and Hix underline that even the ‘thinnest’ theories on democracy consider 
both contestation for political leadership and argument over the direction of policy 
agenda to be essentially important (Follesdal/Hix 2006: 533). Therefore, the authors 
consider competition for control over political authority as the lowest requirement of 
popular rule that is yet absent on the EU level. 
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1.2. The new polity approaches – demoicracy vs. re-conceptualized empire 
 1.2.1. European demoicracy 
The debate on the requirements and framework for democracy in the EU is 
closely linked to the understanding of the nature of the EU as a polity. While in the 
1990s observers still believed in a possibility of the EU becoming a type of federation 
in the near future, these expectations started disappearing since the failure of the Con-
stitutional Treaty in two referenda in 2005. Again, scholars were puzzled by the ques-
tion of how to provide accountability and representation in a multi-level system with 
diversity and little (or no) perspective of emergency of a strong common European 
identity. In the current debate, we observe a departure from the state-centric democra-
cy models towards more de-centralized new models of democracy. There is a tenden-
cy to conceptualize the EU beyond the concepts of nation state or some type of feder-
ation: agonistic pluralism (Mouffe 2008), compound democracy (Fabbrini 2011), 
transnational democracy (Bohman 2004), directly deliberative polyarchy (Co-
hen/Sabel 1997; Sabel/Zeitlin 2012), or multilateral democracy (Cheneval 2011). 
Moreover, there are attempts to conceptualize the EU as a new form of statehood with 
certain specifics. The following part of this thesis is focused on the concepts of dem-
oicracy and empire, as the latter is central for this research. These concepts have simi-
larities and are both based on the assumption of the EU being a polity of multiple 
demoi (nations) with multiple identities. Nevertheless, there is also crucial difference 
between these two concepts, and the reason why one of them has been adopted in this 
research lies in this difference. 
So, the central characteristic of demoicracy is diversity. Nicolaidis defines 
demoicracy as follows: 
“European demoicracy is a Union of peoples, understood both as states 
and as citizens, who govern together but not as one. It represents a 
third way against two alternatives which both equate democracy with a 
single demos: as a demoicracy-in-the-making, the EU is neither a Un-
ion of democratic states as ‘sovereigntists’ would have it, nor a Union-
as-a-democratic state to be as ‘federalists’ would have it. A Union-as-
demoicracy should remain an open-ended process of transformation 
which seeks to accommodate the tensions inherent in the pursuit of 
radical mutual opening between separate peoples” (Nicolaidis 2012: 
254).  
While the EU remains “fragmented in terms of collective identity, public spheres and 
intermediary political structures” (Cheneval/Schimmelfennig 2013: 337), the EU poli-
ty should be based on accommodation of differences rather than homogenisation 
	 27	
through harmonization (Nikolaidis 2013: 351). Demoicracy represents a horizontal 
transfer of sovereignty between the demoi and their representative institutions and, 
therefore, promotes transnational opening of democratic systems to each other 
through “sharing, pooling, enmeshing, but not unifying” (Nicolaidis 2012: 252). It 
stands for constitutional pluralism and constitutional tolerance through mutual recog-
nition of popular sovereignty by peoples (Nicolaidis 2012: 248; 
Cheneval/Schimmelfennig 2013: 340). Nicolaidis mentions three core norms of dem-
oicracy: transnational non-domination (respect of mutual autonomy), mutual recogni-
tion (“referring to the entire realm of social interactions” and based on citizens’ “in-
formed curiosity about the opinions and political lives of their neighbours”), and in-
ternal/external consistency. In his later article, Nikolaidis further introduced ten tenta-
tive guiding principles for demoicracy: collective autonomy of peoples; safeguards 
with the goal to protect the equality of peoples as states and eliminate the danger of 
soft domination of some member states; decisions based on pluralities (preference of 
non-aggregative, non-majoritarian decision-making); priority status of transnational 
rights and obligations as well as protection from coercive assimilation; all shared 
community projects should be based on minimal compatibility and maximal recogni-
tion; mediation by national state and non-state institutions for ensuring democratic 
sustainability; empowerment of lower levels of governance; complementarity of di-
rect accountability on the national level and indirect on the EU level; European and 
national co-citizenship; and diversity (Nikolaidis 2013). 
The concept of demoicracy leaves many questions open. First, Nicolaidis him-
self mentions that in practice the model would be unstable due to its highly demand-
ing nature (Nicolaidis 2012: 250). How to ensure mutual recognition and tolerance 
among the peoples, especially under the conditions of economic hardship and inequal-
ity? Second, Nicolaidis recognises the difficulty of fulfilling the non-domination crite-
rion: 
“And indeed freedom as non-domination in a transnational context 
calls for practices in the EU which are far from embedded in the politi-
cal culture of some of the larger Member States, often subject to a per-
vasive Gulliver syndrome. Instead, we are witness to the fact that the 
EU can easily become prey to new patterns of what we could call soft 
domination” (Nicolaidis 2012: 264). 
Even if a non-domination principle is formally established, how can one be sure that it 
is actually implemented in practice over time? Nicolaidis points out that it would be 
	 28	
crucial “for each ‘demos’ to defend itself against domination through various repre-
sentative, deliberative, and participatory channels” (Nicolaidis 2012: 265). But how 
do we know that these channels really work? While regarding the national democra-
cies as cornerstone of demoicracy, the influence of the European level beyond formal 
aspects of governance is neglected, for instance in the domain of discourse. Demoic-
racy strongly depends on the state and ‘health’ of the national democracies (Nico-
laidis 2012: 273; Cheneval/Schimmelfennig 2013: 334). How can the democratic 
quality of the EU be guaranteed if on the EU level there are no instruments of evalua-
tion and enforcement of democracy in the member states? On the other side, granting 
the EU level such instruments would be against the principles of autonomy and mutu-
al recognition.  
Finally, it is questionable how efficient the EU-as-demoicracy actually is in 
reaching its policy goals. Nicolaidis recognises the difference in the models of capital-
ism and state-society relations in the member states but claims that “there is no neces-
sary tension between the preservation of pluralism and a common purpose expressed 
through common projects (be it a single market or a single currency): the question is 
how such projects are implemented to respect the plurality of peoples” (Nicolaidis 
2012: 258). If the mutual recognition should be preferred to harmonization, it would 
mean mutual recognition of nineteen national currencies in the case of the common 
currency project. This would not only be technically difficult, but this project repre-
sents the case where harmonization was the only way to achieve the policy goals (see 
Chapter 4). A member state theoretically has an option to opt out, which is often con-
nected to high economic costs and, finally, depends on the economic power of a state 
willing to opt out. Moreover, concerning the economic part of the EMU, what origi-
nally has been designed according to the principle of mutual recognition due to the 
lack of consensus turned into harmonization through domination in the course of the 
Euro zone crisis. The design of the EMU did not emerge from deliberation on the top-
ic but resulted from negotiations behind closed doors. Even in the Euro-zone crisis, 
deliberation could not take place due to the previously negotiated norms and estab-
lished power asymmetries. From my point of view, although the concept of demoic-
racy provides some useful insights as a normative and a benchmarking concept, it is 
isolated from the current state of the Union, and there are no reasons to think that it 
would radically change in the near future. Therefore, it does not provide tools for as-
sessment and potential treatment of the democratic challenges the EU currently faces.  
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1.2.2. Europe as re-conceptualized empire 
The idea of a modernized empire originates from the philosophy of Michel 
Foucault and was further developed by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (see 
Hardt/Negri 2002). Analyzing the Carolingian Empire, Foucault argued that in terms 
of internal policy the empire guaranteed freedoms and, unlike monarchy, represented 
less power and less governmentality (Foucault 2010). Hardt and Negri describe the 
triple imperative of empire as incorporate, differentiate, and coordinate: including 
(shows universal inclusion); distinguishing (describes differences as natural but 
good); and coordinating (represents organizational structure based on difference) 
(Hardt/Negri 2002: 209). „The linguistic, cultural, and ethnical differences within 
every operation unit or stratum prove to be stabilizing“ because they limit the issue-
specific association of the civil society actors and enable better control over them 
(Hardt/Negri 2002: 209, translation S.M.). 
A part of scientific literature assumes that empire is exclusively “about control 
by the metropolis of various peripheral actors through formal annexation or various 
forms of economic and political domination” (Zielonka 2006: 11). Empire is usually 
understood as a relationship of political control imposed by some political society 
over the effective sovereignty of another political society (Doyle 1986: 19). But such 
general definition does not bring to the forefront the quality and scale of control, its 
mechanism (coercion or incentives), and specific characteristics of the peripheral sta-
tus. In practice these relationships can be formal or informal, achieved by force, by 
political collaboration, by economic, social, or cultural dependence etc. (Doyle 1986: 
45). Empires combine the aspects of both domestic and international politics and rep-
resent less-than-full integration of social interaction and cultural values (Doyle 1986: 
36). Similar to demoicracy, it is more than a union of fully independent states but less 
than a state (federation). 
The later research promoted development and re-conceptualization of empire 
(Cooper 2002; Posener 2007; Zielonka 2006; Bieling 2010). For example, Robert 
Cooper analyses the features of the global politics, pointing out the increasing de-
mands for a new type of imperialism that would be compatible with human rights and 
cosmopolitan values. According to Cooper, the main characteristics of the postmod-
ern world is disappearing distinction between domestic and foreign affairs, mutual 
interference and surveillance, rejection of force as a means of dispute resolution, and 
a new security policy concept based on transparency and interdependence (Cooper 
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2002). Determined by the new global conditions, the framework of empire adopted in 
this thesis has no historical example, yet shares certain features with the empires 
known from the history. In this context, empire is not understood as a “superstate pro-
jecting its ever greater power all over Europe and beyond” but a polycentric polity, 
penetrating rather than controlling its environment (Zielonka 2006: 1). A ‘postmod-
ern’ or ‘neomedieval’ understanding of empire is offered here. It is a complex form of 
rule that governs its peoples by a combination of informal and indirect means, while 
simultaneously recognizing these peoples as self-governing constitutional states. The 
interaction among actors within an empire happens on the basis of constitutional 
equality, yet within the unequal relations of economic, political, and legal power. That 
is, as Tully put it, “an interactive mode of governance among unequal sovereigns ra-
ther than the unilateral domination of formal colonialism” (Tully 2008: 464).  
The following part centers around the main characteristics of an empire as a 
polity and its perspective on European integration. First, an empire has neither a clear 
power centre nor a hierarchic structure. On the contrary, multi-level and polycentric 
governance describes its core characteristic where authorities overlap in multiple, 
functionally specific policy regimes. Further features include divided national sover-
eignty with no single continent-wide jurisdiction, diversified institutional arrange-
ments with different cross-cutting policy networks operating without a straightfor-
ward division of power, and multiple identities (Zielonka 2006: 121). An empire and 
a nation state can coexist, without necessarily eliminating or substituting each other 
(Bieling 2010: 223). Cooper defined the EU as a transnational organization: 
“The postmodern EU offers a vision of cooperative empire, a common 
liberty and a common security without the ethnic domination and cen-
tralised absolutism to which past empires have been subject, but also 
without the ethnic exclusiveness that is the hallmark of the nation state 
– inappropriate in an era without borders and unworkable in regions 
such as the Balkans” (Cooper 2002).  
A uniform internal structure is substituted by multi-layered, multi-centred, and heter-
ogeneous nature of European governance distinguished by socio-cultural diversity, 
flexible division of power, and competences outlined by negotiations and bargain.  
“Depending on the policy area, its borders are often unclear, fluid and 
variable. Instead of a unitary and nationwide legal and social order it is 
marked by obvious power and integration asymmetries as well as by 
pronounced socio-cultural differences“ (Bieling 2012: 176). 
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In fact, diversity remains to be a persistent feature of the European Union, whether it 
comes to identities, political cultures, modes of governance, or the overall political 
context. This diversity is also guaranteed by the member state constitutions and is be-
ing protected by the respective constitutional courts. According to the Maastricht 
judgement of the German Constitutional Court (BVerfG), neither the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) nor any other EU-institution has the competence to decide about its 
own competences. According to the national constitutional courts, the EU-law has an 
exclusively derived nature and is linked to the national constitutions because the 
transfer of competences followed on their base (Frenz 2009: 300). Moreover, in the 
Lisbon judgement, while generally accepting the supremacy of the EU-law, the 
BVerfG emphasizes that the EU-policies must correspond the constitutional identity 
and introduces a special mechanism to protect the latter. Consequently, the transfer of 
certain limited competences to the supranational institutions must proceed under con-
ditions that the sovereign constitutional statehood remains untouched (respecting the 
principle of conferral and the constitutional identity of each member state), and simul-
taneously, the member states do not loose their capability to shape political and social 
conditions autonomously (Streinz 2009: 478). However, in spite of its defensive ac-
tions and rhetoric, which still remain rather exceptional among the member states, 
BVerfG generally accepts the authority of the EU and the ECJ. 
  There is no universal principle that would allow dividing the competences be-
tween the levels of governance. Even the principle of subsidiarity is not universal and 
is rather a matter of interpretation (for a critical approach to subsidiarity see Wind 
2001: 176ff). As an empire does not have a fixed centre, decision-making depends on 
a coalition of actors, which can vary from issue to issue and can include both national 
and supranational actors. 
  Second, both external and internal borders (within the empire) are preserved, 
but their nature transforms. The external borders become fuzzy and dynamic, co-
existing with the soft internal borders between the constituting entities of empire 
(Bieling 2010). 
  Third, within a postmodern empire, we describe states as operating under de 
facto or de jure constrained sovereignty (Zielonka 2006: 14). Although the concept of 
sovereignty was introduced significantly later, medieval power was shared between 
territorial authorities and an emperor or pope, which means that the perception of na-
tional sovereignty has not been absolute even then (Zielonka 2006: 11). 
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  Fourth, one of the central features of any empire is the ability to influence its 
peripheries. It is a practice in which asymmetrical influence and power are expressed 
in a manifested or implicit way (Doyle 1986: 34). As Doyle describes it, “power is a 
subset of influence” that can be considered as the “ability of the powerful actor to 
achieve effects that the influenced actor would not choose to have occur” (Doyle 
1986: 34). In fact, asymmetric power is the key feature in identifying the centre and 
periphery in a de-centralized, polycentric polity. Asymmetric power can be defined as 
the higher capacity of a member state to implement its agenda (partly or completely) 
compared to another member state (despite postulated equal positions of both). For-
mally equal member states do not in fact posses the same power potential because 
they are de facto not seen as equal and, thus, have different influence capacities 
(Zielonka 2006: 14). For example, the discourse of enlargement illustrates structural 
asymmetries that are characteristic for an empire:  
“The EU was providing decisions and expected compliance and obedi-
ence from the applicant states. The Union was providing models and 
the applicant states were supposed to copy or imitate them. It was of-
fering teaching and training, and the applicant states were expected to 
socialize and learn. The EU proposals and solutions were to be taken 
over by virtue of their place of origin and not necessarily by virtue of 
their substance” (Zielonka 2006: 57). 
Fifth, the asymmetric power is rooted in unequal sensitivities and vulnerabili-
ties between the constituents of empire that are determined by significant socio-
economic differences which are likely to increase without consistent patterns (Bieling 
2010)4. In the EU, the initial differences between states and regions on a geographic 
scale, production, and natural resources are quite significant, making the relation be-
tween them rather asymmetric than balanced. Hueglin described it as  
“a multi-level system of governance characterised by centre-periphery 
relations in overlapping concentric circles of power and influence 
among dominant and dependent member states, among strong and 
weak regions within member states, and among newly established in-
dustrial parks and neglected hinterlands within regions” (Hueglin 
2002: 259).  
 Sixth, the characteristics of periphery and its relationship with the centre are 
decisive in the description of the postmodern empire. Generally, a network relation-
ship can be recognized between the centre and periphery, which are connected in the 																																																								4	Claudia Wiesner supports this argument, focusing on asymmetries and imbalance of power 
in the EMU, especially under the circumstances of the crisis (see Wiesner 2016).	
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form of overall social structures (Münkler 2005: 75). Yet the centre or core of empire 
can never control the decisions and processes in the periphery absolutely and must 
rely on the local actors. The degree of peripheral autonomy is significantly higher 
than it was the case in the Middle Ages because the postmodern empire formally rec-
ognizes states as sovereign constitutional entities. However, the effective control of 
the peripheral sovereignty is exercised if enough of the articulation of interests in a 
peripheral state can be influenced because the aggregation of coalitions will then be 
controlled, and if aggregation is thoroughly shaped, sovereign decisions will be con-
trolled (Doyle 1986: 37). In any case, the output of imperial administration is essential 
for both the centre and its periphery, especially taking into consideration the demo-
cratic nature of the imperial constituents. As population is constantly able to judge the 
policy outcomes, democratic empires are less capable to go through the long periods 
when the imperial politics brings more burden than benefits. Münkler argues that this 
aspect creates a stronger pressure for an indirect exploitation (Münkler 2005: 240). 
 Finally, communication and discourse are of a great importance for sustaining 
empire (Münkler 2005; Tully 2008; Doyle 1986). Coercion and hierarchy fail as in-
struments to provide the compliance within a postmodern empire. In a flexible politi-
cal system compliance can only be reached through persuasion. Moreover, an empire 
communicates its own description, declares its ‘mission’, and exercises its influence 
through discursive articulation. It represents the mechanism through which “collabo-
rators begin to accept metropolitan values” (Doyle 1986: 42). For instance, promises 
of freedom or prosperity have been given as rationalization of an empire quite often 
throughout history (Münkler 2005: 157,128). 
 From my point of view, the empire approach accurately describes the main 
features of the EU status quo. It recognizes diversity and multiplicity of identities as 
well as the necessity of the EU to remain a de-centralized polity. As the previous at-
tempts of centralization and constitutionalisation have failed and currently face re-
sistance, a complex governance structure of the EU is likely to remain. Moreover, the 
concept of empire raises an important issue of asymmetry in the relations between the 
member states. As Schmidt fairly noticed, “while intergovernmentalists and suprana-
tionalists differ over whether the key actors are unitary or multiple, imposing or im-
posed upon, constraining or constrained, they both tend to assume that their generali-
zations apply uniformly across the member states” (Schmidt 2006: 224). On the con-
trary, the empire concept emphasizes the existing difference among the EU member 
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states, which implies different results of integration. From my point of view, the con-
cept of empire is especially useful, as it enables the comparison within the EU and 
presents an alternative to both the ‘sui generis’ thesis as well as the nation state think-
ing. 
Nevertheless, the concept of empire leaves important questions open. How can 
domination and asymmetric power be proved in the case of the EU? What is the 
mechanism of domination, and how is an empire capable of penetrating its environ-
ment? An empire as a de-centralized polity recognizes the sovereignty of its elements 
and people. What are the implications that this recognition has on democracy and le-
gitimacy? To what extent is the sovereignty of periphery undermined through the 
power asymmetries in a concrete policy field? If able to provide answers to these 
questions, this research can contribute to the debate or even provide a different per-
spective on the democratic deficit in the EU.  
  
1.2.2.1. Empire and modes of governance 
The concept of empire emphasizes the transformation of statehood and policy-
making within the member states, embracing all three dimensions – polity, politics, 
and policy. The transformation within the polity dimension has been discussed in the 
previous part, and it inevitably influences the aspects of politics dimension and modes 
of governance. It includes the whole of institutional and group relations, which consti-
tute a part of democratic process (when considered legitimate) and have distinctive 
features within each member state. A mode of governance provides a framework of 
direct or indirect communication between the main actors, balancing their interests 
and legitimating the final policy decisions. Empire does not substitute the modes of 
governance in the member states but rather introduces additional, flexible, and effec-
tive framework of policy-making and implementation in order to reach the targeted 
degrees of policy homogeneity and diversity. It is important to point out that the con-
vergence of policy goals, guidelines, or principles does not lead to convergence in the 
modes of governance among the member states. 
In the literature, the transformation of the framework within which politics 
takes place, and policies are adopted is described in terms of government versus gov-
ernance (Treib et al. 2007) or positive state versus regulatory state (Majone 1997). 
The latter differentiation does not contradict the former but rather has a stronger focus 
on the macroeconomic function of a state. These are theoretical models that are in-
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tended to emphasize the distinctive features. Although it is not possible to equalize a 
nation state with any specific framework, it is argued here that the changes in the 
member states of the EU in the direction of the regulatory state are linked to or at least 
enforced through their membership, as the polity of empire lacks initiatives and in-
struments for government or the positive state. Therefore, the EU level is character-
ized by its specific mode of governance, shifting from pluralism, corporatism, and 
statism towards more flexible network governance.  
The concept of government is characterized by a hierarchic structure where 
parliament is usually the central locus of authority, although community and associa-
tions are involved in the policy-making, and bureaucracy carries the function of poli-
cy implementation within the public administration (Treib et al. 2007). Therefore, 
government is distinguished by a stronger command and control, presuming a strong-
er role of state in society and domination of public actors. Government is more insti-
tutionalized and indicates rigid approach, binding decision-making, strong enforcea-
bility, and hard legal revision (Treib et al. 2007). The main modes of governance in 
this case are statism, pluralism, and corporatism (Treib et al. 2007). While corporat-
ism has a consensus-oriented and inclusive essence, statism excludes societal interests 
from the policy-making. In its turn both statism and pluralism are defined by antago-
nistic interaction between state and societal interests, “which enhances politicisation 
and discourages mutual trust and co-operation” (Pagoulatos 2002: 202). In the macro-
economic policy, the government concept is associated with the positive state that in-
cludes redistributive and macroeconomic stabilization functions (Majone 1997). Mac-
roeconomic stabilization aims to achieve and sustain the satisfactory levels of eco-
nomic growth and employment through the instruments of fiscal and monetary policy 
combined with labour market and industrial policy (Majone 1997: 141). The charac-
teristic features of the government model slowly emerged in the member states 
throughout their history and anchored after the World War II. It is less flexible, time-
consuming, and might lead to decision-making deadlocks but legitimizes policies and 
is recognized as a fair political framework by the domestic actors. 
On the contrary, governance in the narrow sense is defined as “types of politi-
cal steering in which non-hierarchical modes of guidance, such as persuasion and ne-
gotiation, are employed, and/or public and private actors are engaged in policy formu-
lation” (Heritier 2001:2). Governance is closer in its structure to a market than to a 
hierarchy because it is based on coordination, information, deliberation, and persua-
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sion in the circumstances of dispersed authority and domination of the private actors 
(Treib et al. 2007). It represents a weaker role of state in a society, whereas expert 
networks gain on influence (Treib et al. 2007). The end-results of policy-making take 
form of revisable, soft law, and open-textured norms with flexible implementation 
and weak enforceability (Treib et al. 2007). The new modes of governance as “modes 
of public policy-making which include private actors and/or public policy-making by 
public actors occurring outside legislative arenas, and which focus on delimited sec-
toral or functional areas” (Heritier/ Lehmkuhl 2011: 126) reflect the characteristics 
mentioned above. The open methods of coordination, standard setting by industry, 
comitology, independent regulatory agencies, tripartite decision-making, and private 
dispute resolution are all attributed to the new modes of governance. Although the 
network governance in the EU co-exists with the other modes of governance (Eis-
ing/Kohler-Koch 2002: 272), the EU itself represents a network where European and 
national actors interact. The network governance is identified through policy networks 
as “autonomous interaction of multiple interdependent action units of organizations or 
individuals, horizontal, informal, decentralized relations, and lack of central steering 
by the state” (Pagoulatos 2002: 190).  
The new modes of governance are associated with the regulatory state that 
“implies a shift from a model in which government plays a strong role in the provi-
sion of public services to a model in which government limits itself to being the ena-
bler and regulator of the provision of public services by private actors” (Heritier/ 
Lehmkuhl 2008: 13). The governance model is, thus, more flexible and is better suit-
ed to a large heterogeneous polity, such as an empire. It also claims to be more effec-
tive and resistant to specific interests, as it is rooted in ‘science’ and ‘expertise’. In 
some policy fields of the EU, the new modes of governance are seen as more im-
portant than in the others (Heritier 2001). For example, they dominate the economic 
and social policies on the EU-level where the Commission identifies the “best prac-
tices” for a policy issue, which should be introduced in those member states with “dif-
ferent practices”.  
Generally, through their involvement in European integration, member states 
are being pushed to modernisation, meaning de-centralization and the governance ap-
proach. However, as the member states differ in their (historically established) domi-
nating modes of governance, they go through different adjustment processes. Schmidt 
argues that all modes of governance can be presented on a scale where statism and 
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network governance would be the two extremes (Schmidt 2002). Hence, for domestic 
actors from the states with the corporatist tradition, it is easier to adapt to the network 
governance of the EU, securing their involvement in the EU decision-making. On the 
contrary, in the countries with the statist tradition, as the societal actors have been 
constantly cut off from the decision-making process, the adaptation to the network 
governance is uneasy and requires a longer period of time (Schmidt 2002). As a re-
sult, states with the fewer adjustment costs are generally strengthened because they 
implemented reforms earlier and already have elements of the ‘correct governance 
model’. On the other hand, the states with little or no experience of de-centralized 
governance and traditionally stronger role of government face both an enormous ad-
justment and competition pressures at the same time (Schmidt 2002). While corporat-
ist states faster adapt to the European modes of governance, the more statist states, 
oppositely, often strengthen statist elements being under pressure of reforms. Moreo-
ver, Hueglin argues that some governments are more vigorously pressing for the regu-
latory Europeanization than the others because they not only expect benefits for their 
economy but also get stronger autonomy from the powerful domestic groups such as 
trade unions and regional representation (like Länder in Germany) (Hueglin 2002: 
261).  
Scholars point out a number of other difficulties concerning the network gov-
ernance and the new modes of governance. It is questionable if network governance is 
legitimate, and if it can be democratic at all (see Follesdal 2011). For example, the 
legislation resulting from the new modes of governance is usually formulated broadly 
enough to leave sufficient space for the member states to decide about how exactly its 
norms should be enforced. Therefore, one can argue that there is no need for addition-
al channels of democratic legitimation in this case, as the new modes of government 
combine “centrally agreed targets with decentralized implementation that allows for 
economic and political variegation” (Jessop 2014: 251). The product of the new 
modes of governance is a soft law, which is legally binding but does not have direct 
application. Yet a soft law can pre-determine the policy-making, too, especially 
through discourse promoted by epistemic communities, which are not ideologically 
neutral. Moreover, the policy-making is being taken beyond the general public with-
out the involvement of parliamentary representatives. These modes of governance 
“lack equal representation as well as powerful control competences and are not open 
to agonistic debates through which different viewpoints can be made transparent” 
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(Borras/ Conzelmann 2007: 545). It is especially contradictive in a market-driven en-
vironment when policy decisions have redistributive consequences, unavoidably cre-
ating (relative) winners and losers. While, for example, the open methods of coordina-
tion are commonly employed in employment, social, health, and gender policies, “la-
bour organizations were weakened through neoliberalism and decisions of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, it proved harder to defend citizenship and welfare rights 
through this method of governance” (Jessop 2014: 251).  
Several authors have analysed how inclusive governance really is. As Smis-
mans argues, “more horizontal and heterarchical governance does not mean automati-
cally more participatory governance in terms of involving civil society actors and all 
stakeholders” (Smismans 2008: 874). Caporaso and Wittenbrick conclude, “despite 
considerable promises, the new modes of governance have not delivered a substantial 
increase in the meaningful participation of social actors” (Caporaso/ Wittenbrinck 
2006: 474). Also, private actors are concerned by the selective involvement of private 
actors in the policy formulation, advocating regulation in order to provide balance in 
participation (Heritier 2001: 18). Moreover, there is danger of unfair control over 
agendas, as “labour unions, consumer groups and social movements in particular, will 
be able to exert influence within their specialised policy committees but hardly over 
the Community agenda as a whole”, unlike the large corporate interests that have the 
capacity to be present at all stages and levels of decision making (Hueglin 2002: 260). 
A ‘modernisation coalition’, composed of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ in the Commission, 
managers of multinational corporations, and the governments of economically strong 
member states are able to set and control the agenda because the numerous functional 
networks are hard to oversee (Hueglin 2002: 260).  
In my opinion, the combination of the aspects of empire and the new modes of 
governance reveals serious implications for political inclusion and democracy. The 
EU recognizes its member states as sovereign, meaning that the final source of legiti-
macy is located on the member state level, in the domestic political process where 
traditional modes of governance dominate. The recognition of the member states’ 
sovereignty formally eliminates the need for both legitimation of European policies 
and inclusion of social partners on the EU level. On the other hand, introduction of 
the new modes of governance represents a mechanism of domination and channelizes 
asymmetries in power, especially through the control over discourse. The new modes 
of governance and the policy discourse on the EU level reflect integration bias to-
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wards negative integration. They create the environment of exclusive deliberation, 
which does not represent an open debate, and claim its decisions to be based on the 
only true facts, expertise, or in other words, universal and absolute knowledge. Can 
any individual, organisation or any group possibly possess this kind of knowledge at 
all? This approach on the EU level disregards the necessity to balance power and in-
terests in the conditions of social conflict. 
Michel Foucault’s ideas are focused on the relations of power, discourse, and 
the construction of the subject. In his early work, Foucault insisted that, at any given 
time, there is an order of things that makes the social functioning of that time possi-
ble. While operating within the fundamental codes of culture (in language, perception, 
values, etc.), this order establishes the premise on which knowledge and theory be-
come possible; certain ideas, perceptions, values, and distinctions can appear (Schrift 
2010). Foucault’s philosophy encourages study of truth claims “for their production 
of social and cultural (and political) effects and thereby for their inductions of regular 
effects of power” (Sondergaard 2002). Similarly, Derrida called for deconstruction of 
a text with the aim of revealing values and interests concealed in it (Agger 1991: 
113). 
According to Foucault, discourse is a channel for objectification of technolo-
gies of power such as knowledge, discipline, and punishment which are in fact present 
in the everyday lives of any citizen but are not obvious (Foucault 2008: 1019). There-
fore, discourse makes implementation of technologies of power possible. It produces 
the domain of the object and the subject. O’Leary argues that “this production consti-
tutes what Foucault calls the “power of affirmation” of discourse: its capacity to gen-
erate objects about which one can then produce true or false propositions” (O’Leary 
2010: 77). Also, subjects emerge through and within the discursive power, whereas 
“subjection” means the process of becoming subordinated by power as well as the 
process of becoming a subject (Sondergaard 2002). Moreover, power-knowledge rela-
tions do not only produce the subject but also provide “the very condition of its exist-
ence and the trajectory of its desire”, acting on it at least in two ways: “first, as what 
makes the subject possible, the condition of its possibility and its formative occasion, 
and second, as what is taken up and reiterated in the subject’s “own” acting” (Sonder-
gaard 2002). In Discipline and Punish, Foucault insists on the necessity to consider 
the close relation between discourse and forms of power: “there is no power relation 
without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that 
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does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (Foucault 2014: 
39, translation S.M.). According to O’Leary’s interpretation, “it is these newly de-
fined power-knowledge relations, rather than the individual knowing subject, that de-
termine both the forms and the domains of knowledge” (O’Leary 2010: 78). A con-
crete discourse in Foucault’s understanding represents power-knowledge regime or 
regime of truth: “ ‘Truth’ is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which 
produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it” 
(Foucault 1980: 133). Therefore, power relations create the truth, and the truth creates 
power effects. 
“Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that 
is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; 
the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and 
false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the tech-
niques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the 
status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true” (Fou-
cault 1980: 131). 
Discourse (regime of truth) is produced by the exclusion of other discourses deemed 
unacceptable, by an internal mechanism for identifying truth, by employment and ap-
propriation, as well as by constraint through selection of qualified speakers (Love 
1989: 279-280). Political space is structured, and identities and social categories are 
constructed in the processes of exclusion (Sondergaard 2002: 188). 
Through discourse, an empire penetrates and shapes the reality. Domination 
through discourse is possible, and it has democratic implications. For instance, the 
description of the ‘best practices’ and the policy recommendations following them 
increase the pressure on the member states that have not yet applied those practices. 
These pressures entirely ignore the domestic context of preference building and the 
existing domestic consensus among the actors – the very aspects that are meant to le-
gitimize both domestic and European policies. Moreover, discursive separation be-
tween the member states with good and bad practices alone implies the existence of 
asymmetries. 
While controlling the discourse, an empire indirectly promotes the re-
definition of a state through its policies. If agenda is set on the EU-level, but the for-
mal inclusion requirement remains obligatory on the national level only, some inter-
ests recognised as legitimate on the national level can be left with no regard on the 
EU-level. From the democratic perspective it is especially alarming if economically 
stronger actors simultaneously oppose the excluded interests. The former usually have 
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large resources and networks at their disposal and ultimately benefit from stronger 
presence in the ‘behind closed doors’ negotiation process.  
 
1.2.2.2. The empire perspective and democratic deficit of the EMU 
From my point of view, divergence and asymmetry between the member 
states of the EMU should be emphasized because these aspects did not only determine 
the development of integration in this policy field in the past but also strongly influ-
ence its present and future. The roots of asymmetric relation in the case of the EMU 
lie in different economic conditions, different policy models, and legitimation (socio-
economic embedding of economic and monetary policies), as well as the structures of 
the EMU themselves. 
The EMU is part of a polycentric governance structure where the member 
states, the Ecofin, the Commission, and the European Central Bank (ECB) share the 
authority. There is no clear central decision maker in the EMU, and the provisions of 
the treaty aimed at dividing power were especially watered down during the Euro 
zone crisis. Economic part of the EMU formally almost fully belongs to the preroga-
tives of each member state government. Nevertheless, the Commission as part of a 
wider network and of an epistemic community promotes a paradigm of the ‘best’ eco-
nomic policy. The monetary part is attributed to the ECB, but the Council has some 
competencies in the definition of exchange rate policies. There is neither a common 
government that would be responsible for the economic welfare, a parliament nor an 
established cooperation of the societal groups on the basis of a long-term consensus. 
The membership in the EMU is voluntary, but it is certainly influenced by the condi-
tions of the global economy (see Chapter 4). 
Regarding specifically the institution and the mandate of the ECB, there is dif-
ferentiation between the functional independence and democratic responsibility of a 
central bank within the monetarist paradigm. A central bank should be independent 
from any political pressure in choosing and implementing its strategy, but it should 
carry responsibility for the choice of an objective on which it develops its strategy. 
Although it is often compared to the German Bundesbank before the monetary inte-
gration, the independence of the ECB goes even further, as it is not an object of par-
liamentary control, and it is based on an international treaty – a legal basis considera-
bly harder to reform (Andersen 2004: 233; Scharpf 2012: 19ff). However, the ECB 
declared the wish to become “the most transparent and accountable central bank in the 
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world” (Issing 1999: 505). As it has a clear goal of price stability, which can be moni-
tored, regularly provides reports to the European Parliament (EP), and holds press 
conferences after each meeting of the Governing Council, providing good reasoning, 
some might see the necessary legitimacy requirements fulfilled (see Majone 1998). 
Yet, for example, meetings of the ECB-Council take place behind the closed doors, 
and their protocols are not published. In fact, questions of transparency and responsi-
bility play a minor role for the ECB when compared to credibility as its main goal. Its 
model of transparency and accountability is characterized by an extensive but unilat-
eral communication (Jabko 2009: 400). Such radical independence and even closure 
are justified by the ECB with the argument that monetary policy must be isolated 
from the pressure of the national governments, interest groups, and the public. This 
argument is not convincing, as the interest groups are usually still able to get the in-
formation they need concerning the work of the ECB’s board, and the latter has other 
tools to protect itself from the pressures of the national governments (Heine/Herr 
2004: 56). On the contrary, in spite of a number of good reasons presented in the sci-
entific literature in favour of the parliamentary overview (Eichengreen 2010: 42; 
Fitoussi/Creel 2007: 212; Jabko 2009: 395; Heine/Herr 2004: 56f), the citizens or 
their representatives in the parliaments do not have any mechanisms to influence or 
draw any members of the ECB to responsibility in the case of poor performance and 
wrong decisions of the central bank (Forder 2004; Brown 2010).  
The conditions and form of economic and monetary policy in different mem-
ber states were different when the EMU was first launched. Economic policy has been 
basically reduced to the nominal convergence and the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) criteria because the consensus on a common economic policy was not reached. 
Thus, the structures of the EMU ignore the problem of unequal sensitivities and vul-
nerabilities among its members. This unequal dynamic has proven to be persistent and 
has not found a resolution. As economic cycles of the member states’ economies re-
main unsynchronized and there is only one central bank in the EMU, which defines 
the interest rates for all its members, such an interest rate is usually suboptimal for 
everyone (De Grauwe 2013). Moreover, the costs of the ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy can 
be uneven (Tsoukalis 2003: 341ff). Although the ECB-Council seems to be quite ho-
mogenous, without significant conflicts or internal alliances, there is some evidence 
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against this assumption5. The divergence in credit cycles is exemplary: credit booms 
and bubbles were generated in some countries (Ireland, Greece, Spain) due to the low 
real interest rates, whereas constraints and relatively low growth due to higher real 
interest rates – in the others (Benelux, Germany, France). Simultaneously,  
“persisting inflation differentials and differentials in productivity 
growth led to changes in relative unit labour costs and ‘real’ exchange-
rate changes inside the euro area. Firms in some states, notably Ireland, 
Portugal, Greece, Spain, and Italy, became less competitive and their 
current account deficits widened. In contrast, Germany, Austria, Fin-
land, and Belgium gained competitiveness” (Dyson 2009: 39). 
The Northern EMU members opted for the policies of relative suppression of the do-
mestic demand through wage restraint and balanced budgets, generating external trade 
surplus (Overbeek 2012: 230). The latter in its turn fed capital exports from the 
Northern countries, both reinforcing the transnationalization of industrial capital and 
injecting speculative capital into the Southern periphery (for example, the case of 
construction sector) (Overbeek 2012: 230). On the contrary, the Southern members 
generated increasing public and private debt. Their decreasing competitiveness, final-
ly, pushes them towards continuous internal devaluation “with rapidly rising social 
inequality, political risks and rising authoritarianism” (Overbeek 2012: 230). Thus, as 
a result of an asymmetric development, central countries gained in competitiveness 
while the periphery lost it (De Grauwe 2013). 
Before the EMU, monetary policy was embedded in certain socio-economic 
structures and modes of governance, which diverge across the member states or 
groups of member states. As economic and monetary policies have significant redis-
tributive consequences and require strong legitimacy, they must be embedded in the 
state-society relations described in terms of modes of governance. Such embedding is 
enforced by inclusion, communication for coordination of actions, exchange of in-
formation, and policy feedback. In this case, both economic and monetary policies are 
defined and implemented in the context of a political system, consisting of such cen-
tral and regional state institutions as parliament, government, judiciary, and central 
bank together with societal organizations such as industrial, business associations, and 
employee organizations. Corporatism, statism, and pluralism are characterized by dif-
ferent degree of centralization and cooperation between the actors in policy definition 																																																								
5 For example, the resignations of Axel Weber and Jens Weidmann, both of whom held the 
position of president of the German Federal Bank at different times, followed a period of con-
flict within the ECB Council and an open disagreement with the ECB’s policy. 
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as well as different patterns of communication, while the central bank might have a 
different status and fulfil a different role according to its mandate and political con-
text. Different patterns of institutional embeddeddness across the member states are 
problematic in two regards – first, due to different adjustment costs, and second, be-
cause the EMU itself is not embedded in a political system with a clear framework for 
inclusion of the organized interests into decision-making. 
Depending on the previous experience, it might be easier or harder for the 
domestic actors to adjust to the European modes of governance. In those cases where 
the adjustment does not happen easily, the previous mode of governance persists, 
making the issue of legitimacy very acute. The EMU resulted from negotiations and 
concessions among the governments that did not include the representatives of vari-
ous socio-economic groups. Thus, it was decoupled from the socio-economic context 
within the member states, which previously have provided a ground for the national 
and societal interest definitions. Moreover, the EMU is not able to guarantee the im-
plementation of regional preferences and, simultaneously, isolates itself from the rest 
of the political system, especially from the functional representation of the organized 
interests. European integration strengthened some member states and multinational 
corporations without the employee representation that would be able to balance the 
interests. This asymmetry does not provide conditions for solidarity and does not mo-
tivate the actors for long-term oriented consensual policies. In order to be both effec-
tive and legitimate, monetary policy must be embedded in the socio-economic struc-
tures of community where inclusion of all macroeconomic actors and authorities is 
provided. Yet both the terms of the EMU and its activity are neither consensual nor 
based on a direct authorization. 
Generally, the requirement of democratic quality should be measured by an-
swering the question of how far the citizens are affected by the decisions on the EU 
level (see Scharpf 2010; Schmidt 2003, Wimmel 2014). The European Economic and 
Monetary Union changes the overall conditions for economic policy, and it has impli-
cations for a wide range of other policy fields whereas some of them are outside of 
the EU competencies. The EMU as the guardian of stability puts constraints on the 
fiscal, social, labour, and wage policies (Dyson 2003: 466ff). The EMU is based on 
internationally negotiated treaty, establishing a market-oriented regulatory regime. 
Therefore, its actors “may succeed in disciplining domestic fiscal policy into compli-
ance with overall monetary stability objectives, even when this runs counter to do-
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mestic objectives of economic competitiveness and social stability” (Hueglin 2002: 
263). The core of empire sets the rules of how exactly a member state must adjust it-
self to the global competition. These rules are described exceptionally in terms of 
market efficiency, discipline, and sound money. The EMU defines the ideological 
base of consensus, the principles, and goals within which policies are framed, and nei-
ther its actions nor the concept of the EMU itself is open for deliberation. 
Schmidt fairly points out that some member states face greater challenges “to 
traditional conceptions of economic order and social justice” as well as political rep-
resentation and participation (Schmidt 2003: 206-207). The central question here is 
whether the strong focus on the macroeconomic discipline and the neo-liberal para-
digm of the ECB are compliant with the national economic policy models (Dyson 
2003: 472). Underhill poses a fair question: “does the stability culture deliver results 
in line with the expectations – diverse across national political economies – of the cit-
izens of the new Europe, still intimately engaged in national-level democratic pro-
cesses and identities with contrasting dynamics” (Underhill 2002: 48). It would be 
crucial to ask why or for whom the monetary policy is being conducted (instead of 
how to conduct it) because the monetarist paradigm and its instruments are contested 
(Begg 2009: 367). Even if economic and monetary policies within the EMU would 
serve a clearly identifiable public interest (that is not the case), there would still be 
need for some degree of involvement and coordination between the governmental and 
societal actors. The alienation of monetary and economic policy from the political 
process implies serious democratic risks “if the core of economic policy is seen to be 
remote from, and untouched by processes of electoral competition” (Dyson 2002: 
353). When the unrestrained pursuit of economic and legal integration does not corre-
spond with the perceptions of the citizens, the legitimacy of any national government 
would be weakened, and the EU legitimacy would be endangered (Scharpf 2010: 
311). In the case of the EU, it is not only national governments that should ensure the 
voluntary compliance of the citizens, but the EU norms are strongly dependent on the 
compliance of the member state governments as well. 
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Chapter 2: Sovereignty, Legitimacy, and Democracy 
2.1. Popular sovereignty: history, functions, features, and criticism 
  It is not an easy task to define sovereignty, as its meaning has many facets and 
strongly depends on the context in which the term is used. Moreover, it has often been 
instrumentalized in politics and adjusted to the discursive strategy of the speaker (see 
Oeter 1997: 34ff), making it an ambiguous and contested term (Newman 1996: 5). 
National and European actors discursively refer to sovereignty for both opposing and 
supporting the integration project, especially in the context of European integration 
(Saurugger 2012). In order to shed some light on this concept, it is necessary to pro-
vide a definition and point out those facets of sovereignty, which are of the main im-
portance for this thesis. This chapter begins with explanation of the origins of popular 
sovereignty and its relation to legitimacy and democracy. It then moves to the idea 
and essence of democratic sovereignty. 
  To the features of popular sovereignty belong its imaginative nature that is 
meant to bring certain coherency to the theory and empirics of state (Badie 2002: 9). 
Thus, the whole national law is considered to be an expression of the sovereign will 
or, in other words, an interest based on certain values, representing the criterion of 
law and justice. Because a state is a dynamic system, and an agreement made once 
cannot include the solutions for all possible scenarios and challenges that a state and 
its population might face, there should always be some power competent to make the 
final decision (Kahn 2011). According to the concept of sovereignty, such power or 
authority possesses the capacity to act beyond the law (Kahn 2011). 
 Understanding the circumstances of the period in history when the concept of 
popular sovereignty originated, its reason, and function help us to further define a few 
more aspects of sovereignty. This concept first appeared and was essentially devel-
oped in Europe between the 16th and 18th centuries. The circumstances of that time – 
bloody religious and civil wars as well as dynastic conflicts – determined and strongly 
influenced this concept because its idea is inseparable from the experience and chal-
lenges which states and society had to face at that time. Especially, the emergence of 
the concept has its roots in the sacramental foundations of law and Western Christian 
dogmatic understanding of power (Zartaloudis 2010; Kantorowicz 1990; Haltern 
2007). On this basis, the religious terms and praxis had been introduced and integrat-
ed into political life during the early ages of formation of the modern system of state 
and constitutional law (Haltern 2007). The Protestant belief that each individual could 
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interpret the Bible for herself simultaneously allowed individual interpretation of the 
ethical truth and challenged the stable position of the Church in the period from 1517 
to 1650 (Havercroft 2011: 97). Consequently, the authority of the Church had been 
delegitimized as the Church has insisted on possessing the competence to provide cri-
teria by which ethical principles were judged for the whole period before the Refor-
mation (Havercroft 2011). A series of wars followed the elimination of a clear arbiter 
for ethical disputes and consequently “led to the demise of the political power of the 
Pope and the Holy Roman Empire, and the consolidation of political power in the 
hands of monarchs” (Havercroft 2011: 97, 55). The autonomy of the monarchy from 
papacy is interpreted here as secular sovereignty. Furthermore, “the roots of origin of 
the modern nation state as a certain organizational logic followed from secular author-
ity, constitutionalized form and territoriality in development of certain type of politi-
cal economy in Europe” (Sassen 2008: 59, translation S.M.). The claims to national 
identity and loyalty made the creation of a vague term of sovereignty or, much later, 
of popular sovereignty possible. This is quite contradictive, considering that the pur-
pose of a revolution was the destruction of the state type based on the grace of God, 
and actually the divine source of authority was simply substituted by a secularized 
founding myth of a nation (Sassen 2008: 46-47). 
Concerning the reason and purpose of sovereignty, the ideas of social contract 
and sovereignty emerged as a response to weak social and political institutions, which 
had been challenged by the widespread distribution of scepticism in the intellectual 
circles of that time (Havercroft 2011: 53). Different philosophers tried to answer the 
question of how a state should be organized in order to be capable of absorbing the 
sceptical arguments with their de-stabilizing potential and of creating coherency, 
guaranteeing a long-term stability and social peace (Havercroft 2011). Inspired by the 
previous history of religious authority being their strongly dominating experience, 
they claimed sovereignty as the absolute power of a monarch and a strong hierarchic 
structure to be the existential features of a stable political order capable to provide 
certainty and finality.  
“In organized society, Hobbes saw that basic disagreements and con-
flicts arose over defining what is secular and what is religious, and 
over what is good and right. Individual right reason is not adequate to 
settle the problems, since there is no indubitable or satisfactory criteri-
on for determining whose right reason to accept. But, to prevent the 
social disintegration that would ensue, political authority has to deter-
mine what is true in religion and morals. The bizarre and authoritarian 
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theory of truth spills over into scientific, mathematical, and logical 
questions as long as there are disagreements and social consequences 
of views in these areas” (Popkin 2003: 205). 
 So, a sceptical challenge can be perceived as a political problem because it 
represents doubt about the validity of some political judgements and their criteria, 
causing the fragmentation of political space (Havercroft 2011: 10). In fact, if the scep-
tical arguments in the ancient world targeted the writings of stoic philosophers, be-
tween the 16th and 17th centuries, sceptical arguments came out against the truth 
claims in the areas of epistemology, morality, and religion – against the very philo-
sophical foundations of the political and social order (Havercroft 2011: 58). Thus, ac-
cording to this logic, one of the main functions of sovereignty would be to provide a 
political resolution to the sceptical moral arguments by determining what is right and 
wrong through its law-making capacity (Havercroft 2011: 7). 
 The concept of sovereignty went through a significant transformation along 
the European political philosophy, especially in the time of struggles for democratiza-
tion. Indeed, depending on interpretation, this concept obtains authoritarian features 
as easily as democratic ones. Although the analysis within this research is based on 
the radically democratic idea of sovereignty, which will be considered in depth later 
in this chapter, it is useful to briefly provide some examples of its alternative interpre-
tation. Starting with the earliest historic concepts of sovereignty in the 16th century, 
Jean Bodin (1530-1596) defined sovereignty as the highest and the most absolute au-
thority above citizens and inferiors; he concentrated mainly on the legislative power. 
According to his view, the absolute monopoly on decision-making is the central char-
acteristic of a sovereign. Bodin strongly supported the absolute monarchy as the best 
type of political administration, which grants long-term peace in a state. However, he 
also considered a state to be a dynamic, implying the necessity of adjustment to the 
changing circumstances (Stammen et al. 2007: 85). 
 Thereafter, a group of scholars who focused on individual interests and wel-
fare appeared, such as Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Unlike Bodin, Hobbes consid-
ered in his writings all three branches of power that are present in the modern state. 
The state of nature was described as chaotic and dominated by the aggressive human 
nature because naturally every man has the right to everything – the situation, which 
inevitably leads people to the condition of permanent war (Hobbes 2007: 86-87). A 
covenant based on the contract between its subjects creates an artificial or unified per-
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son, authorizing a state and a sovereign to act on their behalf (Hobbes 2007: 107ff). 
Consequently, the sovereign becomes the main actor who acts on behalf of the origi-
nal decision-makers but is not accountable to anyone, exclusively representing the 
interest of the statehood (Havercroft 2011: 70). Hobbes concluded that the ethical 
principles must be imposed upon individuals through the power of the sovereign in 
order to guarantee the enforcement of the moral and political principles (Havercroft 
2011: 79, 98). Later the liberal philosophy broadly used and built upon the ideas of 
Thomas Hobbes. For instance, John Locke (1632-1704), Charles-Louis Montesquieu 
(1689-1755), and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) integrated one or more elements of 
the Hobbes’ theory into their own works. 
 On the other hand, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) introduced his vision 
of a radical popular sovereignty embedded in the community interest. Rousseau ex-
panded the vocabulary of sovereignty to include the concept of general will (Haver-
croft 2011: 143). In Rousseau’s understanding, a transcendent general will locates the 
internal legitimacy and principles of the social contract in certain institutions, creating 
the foundation for a people to become a people (Zartaloudis 2010: 116). Taking into 
consideration the distinction of constituent and constituted powers, the notions of 
general will and popular sovereignty can be characterized as indistinct (Zartaloudis 
2010: 116). 
 Again, the renewed understanding of sovereignty in the absolute meaning ap-
peared in Germany at the beginning of the 20th century, and it is associated with the 
name of Carl Schmitt (1888-1985). The central concern of Schmitt was the conflicting 
social reality rooted in incompatible ideologies (Ingram 2010). He defined sovereign-
ty through the idea of exception and the sacred experience: a sovereign is above the 
law and people, it is the sovereign who decides on the exception. Such exception 
could be described as a situation that differs from the normal situation, and only the 
authority of the ruler legitimizes the exceptional decision. In Schmitt’s opinion, it is 
not parliamentarism that should be the institutional foundation of democracy. Democ-
racy, from his perspective, is the shared „identity of rulers and ruled“ (Stammen et al. 
2007: 477, translation S.M.). Moreover, he underlined the importance of homogeneity 
in a society and argued for struggle with any heterogeneous elements (Stammen et al. 
2007: 478). In this sense, sovereignty does not necessarily require an individual (a 
king, a leader) to be in charge of everything while being situated over society, but ra-
ther that a homogeneous political subject, as a party, a nation, or a people, would ful-
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fil this role (Hardt/Negri 2004: 364). Whenever the existence of state as an organized 
historical presence is threatened, there appears the condition of the Schmittian excep-
tion. The state here “suspends the law in the exception on the basis of its right of self-
preservation“ (Kahn 2011: 44). 
 In summary, the scale of interpretation of the sovereignty concept varies sig-
nificantly among different authors and even more among the political actors. Often 
interpretation appears to be different as a result of the diverging perceptions and con-
ceptualizations of freedom. Taking the example of popular sovereignty, there is a 
clear division between the liberal and republican approaches. In terms of the liberal 
theory, political community originates on the basis of contract, and its development 
should follow the logic of reason (Kahn 2011: 7):  
“We often align law, welfare, and commerce, thinking that the point of 
law is to create a stable context for commerce that will satisfy the ma-
terial needs of individuals. On this view, the creation and protection of 
property is at the centre of law. Political action is seen as a supplement 
to action in the market; it is driven by the same interest groups that op-
erate in the market. Accordingly, political reasoning, like market rea-
soning, should demonstrate means-ends rationality” (Kahn 2011: 22).  
As such, liberals believe that the purpose of the state is to enable the maximum 
amount of value autonomy, and that the purpose of democracy is to provide means for 
aggregating individual interests into collective decisions within a legal system, which 
must be implemented without exception (Kahn 2011). This leaves no place for a sov-
ereign (neither for an exception) but creates a framework of division and mutual con-
trol of competencies instead (Kahn 2011: 42). Thus, liberalism argues for the limita-
tion of government and public administration through constitutional protection of in-
dividual rights. In those areas where the need of governmental interference is not de-
bated, it should be governed through consensus of the affected interests (Scharpf 
2012: 7). In terms of legitimacy, liberalism “provides no explicit normative reasons 
for an obligation to comply with acts of government imposing sacrifices to which one 
has not consented” (Scharpf 2012: 10). Republicans, communitarians, and radical 
democrats criticize liberalism for its inability (or unwillingness) to offer the ultimate 
grounds for common values in a community. The main concern is liberalism’s value 
pluralism that can lead to a conservatism that is unable to challenge society’s norms 
and provide a basis for moral and political progress. It can also lead to nihilism as an 
extreme form of scepticism, which can lead to a dictatorship (Havercroft 2011: 164). 
A second fear is that relativism will be unable to confront evil.  
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On the other hand, the republican approach to sovereignty claims it to be a sa-
cred experience within the modern nation-state (Kahn 2011: 26). “A politics of mi-
raculous”, as Schmitt describes it, is rooted in revelation and faith rather than argu-
ment and reason. It is also an experience of freedom (Kahn 2011: 157). This is the 
reason why the republican approach to sovereignty is often called political theology. 
While liberalism regards the democratic will formation as a mechanism to legitimize 
the political power, the republican approach recognises a much stronger role of popu-
lar sovereignty as transforming a society into a political community and keeping the 
memory of this construction act alive (Habermas 1992: 363). Although a modern, lib-
eral constitution tends to deny that sovereign power is localized anywhere in the state, 
“we know that sovereignty exists when we see it operate” (Kahn 2011: 41). Some 
scholars claim that, in fact, it is impossible to eliminate sovereignty from reality be-
cause political life is often unpredictable and dangerous. Therefore, political actors 
must have the competence to deal with the unexpected. Such competence is what is 
usually called “discretion” (Kahn 2011: 42). 
Public good as the ultimate ground of values becomes central when it comes 
to the republican concept of popular sovereignty. The latter is either embedded within 
the institutions of the state or within the people, securing the necessary conditions to 
nurture and sustain the common good (Havercroft 2011: 165).  A violation of the pub-
lic good principle by the governors justifies protest and even an abolition of the gov-
ernment because the delegation of power happens on the condition that the public 
good represents the foundation of the regime (Tully 2013: 169ff). Moreover, the re-
publican theory “puts limits on the delegation of governing powers to non-
accountable courts and agencies” (Scharpf 2012: 11). The more the functions of gov-
ernment are extended, interfering further with individual preferences, the more the 
relational character of legitimating arguments comes into play. Republicanism calls 
upon common identity and solidarity of the citizens and “emphasizes the orientation 
of public debate to a common interest and shared norms of justice that may legitimate 
the sacrifice of self-interested concerns” (Scharpf 2012: 12). Such a strong concept of 
sovereignty describes people as the exclusive decision makers in the world where fi-
nal truths are uncertain (Haltern 2005: 84). 
According to this view, it is not possible to explain the phenomenon of the po-
litical if we consider reason and interest to be its only elements (as the liberal thought 
does). The element of will is not less important. The latter would help to contextualise 
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liberalism and prevent it from developing into a technocratic state where the political 
is marginalized under the pressure of ineffectiveness if the technical-scientific deci-
sions have to go through the channels of democratic will-formation (Haltern 2005: 
48-49, 217). Exactly what makes the technocratic order undemocratic is that it tends 
to lack social legitimacy, causing frustration and indifference within the population 
(Haltern 2005: 217, 151). Thus, the republican perspective regards the matrix of polit-
ical psychology as consisting of three elements: reason, interest, and will (where the 
sovereign symbolizes the concentrate of common will) (Haltern 2005: 3, 64). 
All in all, in praxis, both understandings of freedom and readings of popular 
sovereignty – liberal and republican – coexist and even complement each other within 
one polity at the same time (see Scharpf 2012: 13ff). Probably, exactly this co-
existence of two different ideas of popular sovereignty (and interpretations of free-
dom) is the root of the peaceful political processes and social peace because political 
actors in a state recognize this co-existence as legitimate. The co-existence creates the 
necessary environment for dialog and contestation between the political actors on dif-
ferent policy questions, without questioning the existence of the polity itself. 
Summing up the essential features of sovereignty, first, actors and authors did 
not come to terms about the concrete definition of sovereignty neither within the po-
litical process nor in political philosophy, making ambiguity one of its strongest char-
acteristics. Second, sovereignty represents a reaction to scepticism, which has been 
regarded as a threat to law enforcement. Third, sovereignty is always about power and 
its concentration. Fourth, the understanding of popular sovereignty depends on un-
derstanding of freedom. Nevertheless, both republican and liberal ideas generally 
happen to get along in a modern constitutional state in Europe, representing different 
groups of citizens. 
The concept of popular sovereignty was strongly criticised, especially for the 
establishment of the command-obedience relation and denial of political freedom 
(Arendt 1994: 215). It was also described as a judicial power and framework for ma-
nipulation that creates the conditions for exclusion and tends to abuse the situation of 
exception (see Erlenbusch 2012; Agamben 2002; Foucault 2010b). Briefly, it is ar-
gued that any power structure based on sovereignty inevitably possesses a strong hi-
erarchical quality and gives political elites an opportunity to manipulate and abuse the 
authority at the costs of political freedom and inclusion. 
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2.2. Legitimacy, democracy, and democratic sovereignty 
Sovereignty often serves as the reference for justification of policies and the 
source of legitimacy by itself. But what is the actual nature of the relations between 
sovereignty, legitimacy, and democracy? 
Considering what legitimacy means, Fritz Scharpf notes a substantial differ-
ence between the functional, normative, and empirical perspectives on political legit-
imacy. All these perspectives focus on one or the other aspect of legitimacy but can 
hardly be separated in praxis. The functional perspective provides an answer to the 
main question: how to ensure the “acceptance for exercises of governing authority 
that run counter to the interests or preferences of the governed” (Scharpf 2010: 301)? 
The normative perspective is reflected in the institutional arrangements, ensuring 
democratic participation, accountability, and transparency (Scharpf 2010). The empir-
ical perspective focuses on the compliance of the citizens based on legitimating be-
liefs rather than threats and sanctions (Scharpf 2010: 301). In my opinion, legitimacy 
can be defined as acceptance, support (willful or diffused), and trust within the popu-
lation that are grounded in norms, institutions, and procedures. 
Legitimacy of authority is identified through its actual acceptance, which is 
expressed in a general habit of the citizens to obey and comply with the existing 
norms. Moreover, it is important that the norms are generally accepted as a scale of 
the right behaviour and given as a reason for one’s own actions (Veil 2007: 34). Eve-
ry legal order is built upon the actual acceptance that is decisive for its own preserva-
tion and stability. On the contrary, if a state or governmental structures permanently 
lack the acceptance, their authority is being damaged, leading to legitimacy shocks 
(Veil 2007: 35). On the empirical level, legitimacy is also expressed in both wilful 
and diffuse support. It enhances trust and trustworthiness of an individual not only for 
her own compliance in the present but also trust in the present and future compliance 
of others – a crucial feature for the long-term stability and justice of a political order 
(Follesdal 2006: 160). Follesdal points out that 
“Legitimacy deficits are not, however, merely a matter of public opin-
ion polls registering low levels of political support for institutions, pol-
icies and authorities. Legitimacy is about whether citizens have trust in 
the future compliance of other citizens and authorities with institutions 
they believe to be normatively deserving of obedience” (Follesdal 
2006: 172).  
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 The first discussion of legitimacy follows the ideas of Max Weber, who intro-
duced three types of legitimate authority: legal, traditional, and charismatic. Since 
then, the concept of legitimacy has become more complex, and Follesdal, for in-
stance, divides between four fundamental conceptions which define legitimacy: legit-
imacy as legality, legitimacy as compliance, legitimacy as problem solving, and legit-
imacy as justifiability (Follesdal 2006: 154). Moreover, legitimacy is differentiated 
according to its object: a decision, an authority, a public institution, a regime or its 
principles, and a political community as a whole (Follesdal 2006: 159). 
 Despite this complexity of the legitimacy concept, the scientific literature gen-
erally focuses on the difference between the input and output legitimacy where the 
input legitimacy stands for inclusion and participation, and the output legitimacy indi-
cates the effectiveness of decision-making. Vivien Schmidt crucially updated this de-
bate by adding a new dimension – the throughput legitimacy (Schmidt 2013). Fritz 
Scharpf argues that the input-oriented arguments only are not enough for legitimacy 
of a governing power, but they must be extended or in some cases even replaced by 
the output-oriented arguments (Scharpf 1999a: 188). Thus, democratic legitimacy is 
not only about inclusion but also about efficiency (Benz 1998: 364). From my point 
of view, a strict separation of these types of legitimacy can be misleading on the em-
pirical level because there is no real competition or choice between the effectiveness 
as output legitimacy and participation as a procedural input. If decision-makers exclu-
sively opt for one of these possibilities, the quality of policy output can be damaged. 
A technocratic effectiveness-oriented decision, which lacks participation, can face 
civil disobedience, damaging its effectiveness. In the same way, participation without 
the orientation to effectiveness will not lead to reasonable solutions. It is important to 
mention that more participation does not immediately mean qualitatively worse deci-
sions. Moreover, the quality of participation matters for legitimacy (Piattoni 2010). 
Depending on the issue at stake, legitimacy can be achieved through authorization, 
representation, or direct participation (Piattoni 2010: 191). Thus, decision-making 
must be flexible enough to react to the legitimacy needs and claims from the popula-
tion. Sometimes a minimal standard of participation is perceived as fair, but other 
times the minimal standard can bring to life destructive consequences for policy im-
plementation if it does not correspond to the expectations of some citizen groups. As 
Abromeit fairly argues, the more heterogeneous the society is, the higher the price of 
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frustration would be, and the more participation would be necessary (Abromeit 2004: 
79). 
The concept of throughput legitimacy is understood as “governance processes 
with the people, analyzed in terms of their efficacy, accountability, transparency, in-
clusiveness and openness to interest consultation” (Schmidt 2013: 2). Introducing it, 
Schmidt argues that it is the quality of the governance processes that really matters for 
the evaluation of a polity’s overall democratic legitimacy rather than the effectiveness 
of the outcomes and the participation of the citizenry only (Schmidt 2013: 3). In fact, 
the decreasing throughput legitimacy is the most salient and politically risky, as it 
would also challenge both input and output legitimacies:  
“Bad throughput – consisting of oppressive, incompetent, corrupt or 
biased governance practices – regularly undermines public perceptions 
of the legitimacy of the EU governance, regardless of how extensive 
the input or effective the output” (Schmidt 2013: 3). 
Schmidt underlines the crucial role of interest intermediation with the people. Politi-
cal actors should be responsive to the participatory input demands, and the policy-
making should correspond with the standards of ethical governance and be public, 
providing the citizens with the access to information. Moreover, it is crucial that the 
network governance operates within the established “procedural requirements for ac-
tive participation by a broad range of stakeholders in regulatory decision making” 
(Schmidt 2013: 17-18). Therefore, the author relates legitimacy to the balance in the 
interest articulation or, in other words, “to questions regarding the balance in access 
and influence among organized interests representing business versus those represent-
ing unions or public interest organizations” (Schmidt 2013: 6).    
 Discursive practices can essentially contribute to the shaping and re-definition 
of legitimacy. Discourse is crucial for the processes of social learning and for the es-
tablishment of the trust. In the structures of public communication, representatives 
give reasons for their decisions, and those represented should have an opportunity to 
disagree with their representatives if they are not convinced of the decisions or the 
reasons given for them (Benz 2003: 83). Thus, the public sphere and public dialog 
represent a space for the public scrutiny (Tully 2013: 169ff). The latter supports the 
communicative and controlling relationship between the represented and their repre-
sentatives in the situation of transparency and publicity (Benz 1998: 364). Discourse 
and the discursive representation express the communicative action and, thus, should 
be considered as a mechanism of the throughput legitimacy (Schmidt 2013). 
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 To sum up, sovereignty always requires and depends on legitimacy. Thus, it 
would be right to point out that popular sovereignty is determined by legitimacy. But 
is legitimacy determined by popular sovereignty too? The nexus between these two 
concepts is democracy, as the latter represents the input and throughput aspects of le-
gitimacy and simultaneously is a framework for self-determination and expression of 
political freedom. There are several reasons why democracy and sovereignty are 
strongly connected. First, people or citizens constitute the source of power in both 
these concepts. Second, the majority rule and/or general will as the core of decision-
making represents another common feature of both these concepts. Also, self-
determination is a cornerstone of both democracy and sovereignty. The principle of 
sovereignty is grounded in the principle of autonomy where an individual partly loos-
es her natural freedom but gains a political one, and individual self-determination 
transforms into co-decision right (Veil 2007: 52). Thus, democracy provides a frame-
work for co-decision as expression of political freedom condensed in the procedure 
and practice of political will-formation (Neumann in Abromeit 2002: 69). 
 So, while democracy embodies the input and the throughput aspects of legiti-
macy, the criteria of democratic quality are equal with the criteria of both input and 
throughput legitimacy: equal and effective participation, publicity, and accountability 
(Kohler-Koch 2013:4; see also Karlsson 2001: 40ff). Representativeness (representa-
tion of possibly many public needs and values), transparency, access to information, 
and inclusive participation should be mentioned here too. Also, equally significant are 
responsiveness and popular control (Lord 1998). Moreover, Lord mentions the neces-
sity of political leaders and power relations to be authorized by the people (Lord 
1998). All these create the base for the input legitimacy of a political system through 
the democratic process of collective will-formation, which provides institutional ar-
rangements of circular relationship between governors and the governed (Benz 2003: 
83). Describing the relations between citizens and their representatives, Benz sums up 
the following criteria of democracy. First, “institutions and procedures have to bring 
about effective solutions of political problems” (Benz 2003: 83). Second, “a political 
system must enable an unbiased transmission of citizens’ interests into the process of 
governance. The interests of citizens should be decisive both with respect to the agen-
da of a government and with respect to the decisions on alternative solutions” (Benz 
2003: 83). Third, the office-holders must be held accountable for their decisions 
(Benz 2003). Therefore, democracy is a political framework, which includes institu-
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tions and procedures for exercise of political freedom, political inclusion, and broad 
participation in decision-making, as well as transparency and mutual control of actors. 
According to Abromeit’s definition, “democracy is extension of individual self-
determination into the area of collective decisions; it makes itself concrete in partici-
pation of individuals in decision, which affect them and to which they are subordinat-
ed” (Abromeit 2004: 78, translation S.M.).  
 Contestation is essential for democracy, especially in a society characterized 
by diversity and potential or actual social conflicts. In fact, contestation can be re-
garded as the lowest requirement for democratic polity (see Coppedge et al. 2008; 
Bartolini 2000; Dahl 1998; (Follesdal/Hix 2006). Follesdal and Hix argue that contes-
tation (for political leadership and over policy agenda) is “an essential element of 
even the ‘thinnest’ theories of democracy” because democracy is rooted in the defini-
tion of alternatives (Follesdal/Hix 2006: 533). Through the process of deliberation 
and party contestation, citizens shape their views and get an opportunity to form an 
opinion on their policy preferences. Follesdal and Hix stress the crucial importance of 
alternatives in a democratic political process: “if citizens cannot identify alternative 
leaders or policy agendas, it is difficult for them to determine whether leaders could 
have done better or to identify who is responsible for policies” (Follesdal/Hix 2006: 
548). 
 Democratic sovereignty is understood here as the ultimate location of the final 
decision-making authority in the citizens on the principles of self-determination and 
co-decision. Although some scholars can argue that the ideas of popular and demo-
cratic sovereignty have a very similar or even the same meaning, in my opinion, using 
the term democratic sovereignty in this research would be more precise, as the latter is 
not only based on the democratic understanding of popular sovereignty but also binds 
sovereignty to certain democratic procedures and principles. Moreover, democratic 
sovereignty is free of historical and partly ideological connotations, which the term 
popular sovereignty certainly possesses. 
 So, democratic sovereignty only exists in the context of a democratic proce-
dure and process. It means sovereignty of demos as a heterogeneous political and so-
cial fabric, consisting of politically active citizens with their interests, values, and a 
number of identities (for instance, political, professional, gender, cultural, etc.). These 
citizens should never be incapacitated, as they ultimately decide about which public 
capacities remain to be exercised by them, and which they delegate to the governors. 
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Therefore, they literally govern the way their governors exercise these powers by 
means of evaluation of their performance, overview, and control (Tully 2013: 190). 
The sovereign is the one who has capacity to legitimately disagree or to reject the 
compliance (Abromeit 1995: 50). In praxis, what keeps a state together is the people’s 
belief that their laws are right and just because they are created through the procedure, 
which they themselves have defined earlier in a constitution. As Pernice puts it, “sov-
ereignty is self-determination of individuals rooted in the human dignity” (quoted in 
Veil 2007: 46, translation S.M.). Through democratic procedure, discussions, and de-
liberative opinion building, a decision becomes the positive decision (Haltern 2005: 
52). On the contrary, a decision that is made outside of this framework is regarded as 
coercion (Haltern 2005: 52).  
 
2.3. Deliberative democracy 
2.3.1. The main principles 
Deliberative theory by Jürgen Habermas initiated an intense discussion among 
scholars. As it combines both democratic sovereignty and the procedural aspects of 
democracy, Habermas considers his own approach to be different from both liberal 
and republican approaches. Having rationalization as its core makes popular sover-
eignty more than pure legitimation but still less than construction of power (Habermas 
1992: 364). According to Habermas, people as the source of all state power does not 
represent a subject with will and consciousness but can only act in plurality because 
people is neither able to decide nor to act as one single body (Habermas 1992: 607). 
Habermas re-introduces the idea of democratic sovereignty so that instead of the arbi-
trary deciding subjects, which claim to represent the whole community, there appear 
“subjectless forms of communication that regulate the flow of discursive opinion – 
and will-formation in such a way that their fallible outcomes have the presumption of 
practical reason on their side” (Havercroft 2011: 165). Deliberative democracy de-
clares democratic sovereignty to be the principle “that all political power derives from 
the communicative power of citizens” (Habermas 1992: 209, translation S.M.). In this 
sense, the procedural sovereign establishes rational consensus as the ultimate source 
of authority, and the principle of democratic sovereignty is expressed in the commu-
nicative and participation rights (Habermas 1996: 298). Therefore, Habermas presents 
a very decentralized model of democratic sovereignty. However, the role of the pro-
cedural sovereign is crucial in a political order, enacting Habermas’s discourse prin-
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ciple and thus rational understanding. In accordance with the principle of democratic 
sovereignty, a subjective law of equal participation in the democratic will formation 
overlap with the objective and legal, enabling the institutionalized procedure of civil 
self-determination (Habermas 1992: 209). Habermas “believes that in the absence of 
his procedural sovereign, society will fall into a state of conformism that is unable to 
critically modify existing norms on a rational basis” (Havercroft 2011: 188). Mudung 
argues that Habermas regards state as the means of institutionalization of the self-
determination procedure for citizens, representing the idea of simultaneous origin of 
law and political power (Madung 2007: 112). Consequently, democratic sovereignty 
in the formulation of Habermas has only the aim of establishing a procedure that 
would ensure the most favorable conditions for the public discourses (Madung 2007: 
115). 
The original concept of deliberative democracy by Jürgen Habermas has its 
source in the ordinary language theory, since both of these ideas regard truth as a 
phenomenon defined through intersubjective rational communication. Both Habermas 
and the ordinary language scholars (see Wittgenstein 2001, Cavell 1979 and Austin 
1985) acknowledge the necessity of contestation within a community and political 
models of non-hierarchical authority (Havercroft 2011: 235ff). 
Habermas believes that communicative rationality and its implementation 
through law to be the only measure that is able to achieve the goal of social integra-
tion in a modern society and overcome the colonisation as a form of life. Therefore, 
he demanded the public and critical use of ratio as well as an actual realization of the 
social and political functions of each individual (Madung 2007: 97). The experience 
of social cooperation where solutions to the common problems are found through 
publicity and contestation is the essence of deliberation (rather than a sort of scientific 
discussion with purely argumentative understanding) (Schmalz-Bruns 2002: 279; 
Scharpf 2010: 166). Deliberation, according to Habermas, provides legitimacy not 
only through participation and will-expression but rather through the general accessi-
bility to the deliberative process, whose configuration is based on the expectation of 
rationally acceptable results (Schmalz-Bruns 2002: 276). Citizens perceive a decision 
that resulted from the democratic procedure, discussions, and deliberative opinion 
building as the positive decision (Haltern 2005: 52). Consequently, deliberation and 
the procedural democratic elements, such as democratic elections, provide legitimacy, 
authorizing the polity to rule in the name of all its citizens. 
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I believe that Cohen and Sabel’s definition of deliberative democracy includes 
its essential features: 
“On the deliberative interpretation, then, democracy is a framework of 
social and institutional conditions that both facilitates free discussion 
among equal citizens by providing favourable conditions for expres-
sion, association, discussion, and ties the authorization to exercise pub-
lic power and the exercise itself – to such discussion, by establishing a 
framework ensuring the responsiveness and accountability of political 
power to it” (Cohen/Sabel 1997: 320).  
The moral reasoning within competing values is the central element in deliberation. In 
the deliberative disagreement, citizens are expected “to accommodate the moral con-
victions of their opponent to the greatest extent possible, without compromising their 
own moral convictions” (Gutmann/Thompson 2000: 3). As Eriksen and Fossum 
claim, it also “denotes actors’ attempts to come to an agreement about the definition 
of a situation, to reach a common understanding of how a given situation should be 
described with the help of the human language” (Eriksen/Fossum 2012: 16). This fea-
ture makes deliberation perfectly compatible with the policy areas, which are often 
considered too technical for public participation. Despite the claims of some authors 
that public participation can lead to inefficiency and complexity of decision-making, I 
think that there are situations when the public involvement is crucial to finding a solu-
tion and providing its legitimacy. In my opinion, ignoring the necessity of public par-
ticipation would aggravate the problem in future, creating a dangerous situation: 
“Moral argument in politics can be socially divisive, politically ex-
tremist, and morally inconclusive, but avoiding it for these reasons 
would be self-defeating. The divisions, the extremism, and the incon-
clusiveness would persist, while the prospects of finding better terms 
of social cooperation would deteriorate” (Gutmann/Thompson 2000: 
347).  
 But except for the public sphere, there are further conditions for deliberation. 
Abromeit outlines some of them as: 1) the participants of decision-making process 
must have a common purpose and be in agreement about the substantive boundaries 
of discourse; 2) the formal voting procedure should be of minor significance during 
decision-making or, in other words, “subordinated to argumentative interaction”; and 
3) there should be a “neutral party” present (Abromeit 2003: 37-38, translation S.M.). 
Citizens or participants in deliberation must recognize one another as free and equal, 
both horizontally and vertically, rejecting strategic behaviour in favour of the goal to 
reach the common understanding. Gutmann and Thompson describe reciprocity as 
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acting fairly, while “the possibility of any morally acceptable resolution depends on 
citizens’ reasoning beyond their narrow self-interest and considering what can be jus-
tified to people who reasonably disagree with them” (Gutmann/Thompson 2000: 2). 
Reciprocity, in this sense, implies moral respect even to morally mistaken positions. 
Thus, it neither means impartiality nor prudence but an equal treatment of visions 
among the participants (Gutmann/Thompson 2000: 7). The authors argue that alt-
hough in practice not everyone but some citizens and officials make arguments con-
sistent with the principle of reciprocity, deliberation is still not an utopia (Gut-
mann/Thompson 2000: 2). Even the self-interested speakers are compelled to argue in 
terms of the public interest (Elster 1998), whereas the best argument may be the one 
that generates bigger support, and not the one that is able to convince all the partici-
pants (Thaa 2007: 96-97). Finally, it is important to acknowledge that the conditions 
for deliberation are often considered to be too strict and impossible to provide in real 
life. However, Eriksen argues that even if the perfect conditions of deliberation have 
not been met, a public debate can still have an epistemic value, which is more of sub-
stantial than procedural character (Eriksen 2007: 38ff). 
 It is crucial that a deliberative procedure creates a direct connection between 
sovereignty and the democratic procedure. Habermas’s democratic sovereignty is an 
expression of his discourse principle – “Just those action norms are valid to which all 
possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses” – is the 
general principle that applies to all moral and legal norms (Habermas 1996: 11ff, 
translation S.M.). It is especially crucial in the context of globalization and European 
integration; as Neyer argues, “in the absence of coercive powers and any widely held 
belief in the sacredness of a given political order, legitimacy by means of discourse 
today carries the burden of providing a normative foundation for political integration” 
(Neyer 2006: 780). Thus, the gaps in social and political integration are closed 
through participation of citizens (Habermas 1996: 292; Haltern 2005: 528).  
 
2.3.2. Deliberative procedure and its requirements 
 The following part considers the procedural core of deliberative democracy. 
The decisions emanate from a plurality of individual statements, which are generated 
and treated according to the democratic rules, and whose collective interpretation 
turns them into a statement of the sovereign general will (Habermas 2011: 53). As 
deliberation is a settlement practice among equals, which is not based on compromise 
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but on the conformity of reasons, its main aspects are rationality and mutual justifica-
tion. Cohen and Sabel point out that “citizens are required to defend proposals by ref-
erence to considerations that others acknowledge as reasons, and not simply by refer-
ence to their own interests” (Cohen/Sabel 1997: 329). While the exchange of reasons 
and statements takes place in public, everyone gets an opportunity to weigh the rea-
soning of the other and estimate its relevance (Cohen/Sabel 1997: 329). For instance, 
although constitutional reasons are recognised to be supreme, no universal weight of 
policy reasons can be defined because different actors weigh a variety of policy rea-
sons differently (Cohen/Sabel 1997: 327-328). Scepticism fulfils a special function 
here as an impulse, which is necessary within the modern political systems because it 
keeps the system lively, triggering the search for new solutions of specific problems. 
 The deliberative democratic procedure directs the administrative power in a 
certain way, making the receivers and authors of law identical (Habermas 1992: 364). 
Thus, the law making through parliament is described as a watergate (Schleuse), 
which enables the penetration of communication flow from public to the political sys-
tems and transfers them into legally binding decisions (Thaa 2007: 91). Legitimacy is 
ensured when an administrative power acts reflexively, permanently crossing the 
communicative flows in the political public (Habermas 1992: 622). 
 The public sphere plays an indispensable role in any model of democracy, es-
pecially in deliberation. Originally, “it is the place where citizens exercise their public 
capacities to judge and hold to account their governors in accord with the public 
good” (Tully 2013: 190). But the framework of deliberative democracy expands the 
functions of the public sphere, giving every individual an opportunity to express her 
vision, values, and solutions, thus encouraging individual responsibility. It is also a 
sphere of mutual subjectivity, ensuring a dialog between the governed and their en-
trusted governors over the delegation of capacities of self-government and the public 
good (Tully 2013: 191). Eriksen describes publicity as “a democratic experimental 
device for detecting and solving social problems – including the identification of un-
intended consequences or by-products – and not as a political principle of legitimacy” 
(Eriksen 2007: 39). 
 The fundamental question of deliberation is, who must participate? Various 
approaches to deliberative democracy understand deliberation as public and possibly 
including everyone concerned consultations about issues and common problems 
(Thaa 2007: 86). However, scholars, including Habermas, usually differentiate be-
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tween the public deliberation (unorganized form of deliberation) on one hand and de-
liberation between the representatives of different interest groups and the government 
or within the political elite in a broad sense (organized form of deliberation) on the 
other hand (Thiel 2012: 94, Schmidt 2002). Such division cannot be strict, as the elite 
and ordinary discourses cannot be entirely separated in practice. In fact, they are 
closely related and in many cases representative for each other. The public delibera-
tion increases the plurality of discourse, bringing more fresh ideas into politics for 
better policy outcomes (Steiner 2012: 26). It also presumes that a free and open dis-
course brings forth qualitatively better decisions and their better justification 
(Eriksen/Fossum 2012: 17). In its turn, the elite discourse is rather characterized by 
better selectivity and a stronger focus (Thiel 2012: 94). 
 Moreover, it is possible that the elite deliberation ‘behind closed doors’ pre-
cedes the public deliberation. There are scholars who even argue that some policy is-
sues should be left for the elite deliberation exclusively because the public delibera-
tion among citizens often relates to how the media tend to report politics (Wendler 
2005; Schmidt 2002). Wendler points out that when it comes to the EU, there is a ten-
dency to conceptualize the principle of deliberative politics separated from the general 
public. In this case, deliberation is narrowed down to discussions among experts who 
are treated as functional equivalent of the general public (Wendler 2005: 211ff). Ac-
cording to this logic, deliberation is limited to political actors, interest groups, and 
those actors who have important stakes in the issue. However, the elite deliberation 
should not turn into a case where representatives give reasons and citizens merely re-
ceive them. The concept of associative democracy tries to solve this problem by locat-
ing deliberation within the political associations, which are less than public but more 
than elite. In this case, authors draw attention to the necessity to institutionally 
strengthen the weak and less organized interests on purpose, in order to create the bal-
ance and guarantee equal participation of various interests (see Huget 2002: 24ff). 
The associative approach is especially suitable for inclusion and representation of the 
functional interests. 
 To sum up, it is not always necessary that every citizen participates in order 
for deliberation to take place. Once the criteria of inclusiveness, contestation, and ra-
tional reasoning are satisfied, deliberation can also take place among the representa-
tives. In fact, deliberation should be considered as representation of views rather than 
individuals (Elster 1998: 13), encouraging contributions from citizens through elimi-
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nation of barriers to participation, and thus promoting the multiplicity of perspectives 
and multivalency (Schmalz-Bruns 2002: 279). This type of deliberation can be a step 
forward in transparency and accountability, as it encourages the interest groups to im-
prove their organization and be more present within the democratic framework, insti-
tutionalizing reciprocal objections (Schmalz-Bruns 2002: 280). 
 Deliberation should be aimed on resolving something thus it has an end. Ideal-
ly, in its final stage, the opinions of losing minorities are expected to be treated with 
respect and due consideration. Habermas defines the purpose of communication quite 
narrowly – actors intending to seek the truth (Thaa 2007). Therefore, a decision as a 
result of deliberation should be a consensus because a compromise does not demand 
the compliancy of reasons but rather represents a trade-off between the interests and 
opinions of participants that remain stable (Thaa 2007: 87). In practice, communica-
tion is not only truth seeking but also interest driven. Hence, deliberation is a mixture 
of bargaining and arguing, making both consensus and compromise its possible out-
comes (Schmidt/Radaelli 2004: 374). Analysing the empirical material on delibera-
tion, Schmidt and Radaelli conclude that there were neither ‘pure conflicts of inter-
ests’ based exclusively on bargaining nor ‘pure conflicts over facts’ in which actors 
use argument to establish the truth. They discovered a conflict of policy paradigms, 
norms, and values where arguing was often used as a means of bargaining, but it also 
possessed potential to more transformative effects (Schmidt/Radaelli 2004: 374). 
Gutmann and Thompson express the idea of deliberation whose principles strongly 
depend on the concrete, issue-specific context. They believe that “deliberative per-
spective sometimes justifies bargaining, negotiation, force, and even violence” (Gut-
mann/Thompson 2000: 4). In any case, according to the idea of deliberation, the ma-
jority of decisions should be considered fallible and can be taken up again at a later 
stage if new information and new arguments arise (Steiner 2012: 11). 
 Some scholars argue that deliberation is also important for efficiency, effec-
tiveness, and quality of decision-making, especially in a heterogeneous polity (Neyer 
2006: 787). It reduces the number of acceptable policy options to those, which are 
compatible with the general interest and thus makes political compromise more likely 
(Neyer 2006: 787). The public scrutiny of the effectiveness of strategies and leaders is 
another positive side effect enforced by deliberation (Cohen/Sabel 1997: 314). Con-
cerning the policy effectiveness and the outcomes of deliberation based on the empir-
ical research, Gutmann and Thompson conclude that deliberation may not have pro-
	 65	
duced the best possible solutions, “but its results were probably no worse than less 
deliberative means would have achieved, and they surely advanced public understand-
ing further” (Gutmann/Thompson 2000: 359). 
 It seems like deliberative democracy represents a solution to the challenges of 
heterogeneity and institutional constraints and is able to correct the recent negative 
development of the aggregative democracy models. Deliberation advances efficient, 
effective, and legitimate governance in the EU (Neyer 2006: 786). While democracy 
is usually analysed either in its procedural or substantial forms, deliberative democra-
cy combines both these elements in one idea (Abromeit 2002: 114f). 
 Deliberative democracy does not confine democracy to a state or demos “but 
rather grounds it in the rights that free and equal subjects grant to each other when 
they want to govern common affairs through positive law” (Eriksen/Fossum 2012: 7). 
From this perspective, the concept of democratic sovereignty implicates citizens’ po-
litical opinion building and will-formation, which bears the burden of legitimation. 
 Unlike the other models of democracy, the deliberative model interprets diver-
sity and heterogeneity in the EU integration positively: as a facilitator and enhancer of 
the public use of reason. Cohen and Sabel point out that  
“the advantage of actual deliberate consideration of alternatives by cit-
izens of equal standing but diverse experience and disposition is that 
the diversity of viewpoints brings out the strengths and weaknesses of 
diverse proposals” (Cohen/Sabel 1997: 330).  
In this understanding, heterogeneity in the EU is considered to be an important re-
source of the democratic self-government because “disagreement can even be condu-
cive to democratic governance, providing incentives to debate, political interaction 
and intersubjective learning” (Neyer 2006: 781). Deliberative democracy also repre-
sents an attempt to address the challenge of moral disagreement more efficiently than 
the other models of democracy, as the former secures a central place in the political 
life for the moral discussion (Gutmann/Thompson 2000). 
 Deliberation addresses the quality requirement of democracy (Eriksen/Fossum 
2012: 16) and simultaneously helps to overcome some of the difficulties of enforcing 
compliance in the EU. From the perspective of effectiveness, there are several rele-
vant arguments in favour of deliberation: relevant local knowledge, that participants 
tend to be more other-regarding, and that participants tend to be more reflective in 
their definition of problems and proposed strategies (Cohen/Sabel 1997: 333). Flexi-
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ble deliberative procedures provide an institutional structure for voicing concerns and 
for adapting rules to the changing preferences and technological innovations. 
 Nevertheless, a complete substitution of all elements of the other democratic 
models with deliberation seems to be counterproductive. Deliberative democracy 
should rather be seen as a critical extension and strengthening element to the proce-
dural-aggregative foundation of democracy. Deliberation introduces the decision-
making procedure, which is “not a question of a democratic election, but of propos-
ing, listening, concerting, changing one’s opinion, in order to form in common a 
common will” (Elster 1998: 3). 
 
2.3.3. Dangers of deliberation 
 It must be recognised that deliberation has received at least as much criticism 
as support. In the following section, I would like to present a critical assessment of the 
deliberative idea too. The exclusive deliberation is not capable of filling the legitima-
cy gap, while being grounded in the elite epistemic communities and expertise that 
produce ideas and images, which can be true or false. The circumstances of exclusive 
deliberation enlarge the gaps in legitimacy, scepticism, and frustration of the popula-
tion. Moreover, there are three main dangers connected to the real life deliberation: 
lack of the mutual understanding and respect among the actors (see Marcinkowski 
2005), lack of inclusiveness of the deliberative procedure (see Kohler-Koch et al. 
2004; Abromeit 2002), and escalation of conflict instead of reaching a consensus (see 
Sanders 1997; Karlsson 2001; Elster 1998). These dangers finally lead to a defected 
deliberation, which, instead of fulfilling its original purposes, leads to increasing 
asymmetries in power. 
 Many scholars question the idea that deliberation can actually provide inclu-
sion. These doubts can be summarized as danger of elitism (Scharpf 2010), exclusion 
of less-educated or less rational citizens (see Elster 1998; Thaa 2007), absence of pro-
cedure to secure the real participation of each affected individual, inability of deliber-
ation to guarantee the balance in interest representation (see Blaes-Hermanns 2007; 
Sanders 1997), and questionable public rationality (see Emden/Midgley 2013; Sand-
ers 1997; Sunstein 2003). There is the growing concern that the goals of deliberative 
theory transform into symbolic politics in practice (Abromeit 2002: 107). 
 Although deliberative democracy states that everyone affected by a decision 
should be able to participate in it, scholars are rather sceptical about this possibility. 
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As Steiner fairly observed, there are plenty of issues, like environment or health care, 
which concern literally everyone (Steiner 2012). Especially in a large political system, 
such participation in the decision-making is organisationally or administratively im-
possible. There has been an attempt to solve this problem through the deliberative 
pooling, as James Fishkin suggests it (Fishkin/Laslett 2003). However, the latter has 
been criticised by the scholars too (see Steiner 2012: 33ff). 
 The demand for too high a degree of moral and intellectual sophistication 
makes deliberation in Habermas’ terms exclusive (Scharpf 2010: 165). For example, 
education enhances deliberation, whereas it is clear that everyone cannot be equally 
well educated (Elster 1998: 13). Therefore, deliberation can lead to discrimination “on 
seemingly democratic grounds the views of those, who are less likely to present their 
arguments in ways that we recognize as characteristically deliberative” (Sanders 
1997: 349). Moreover, discourse as a flow of information can fail to reach or to con-
vince the counterparts, and the public rationality often cannot be guaranteed. The lat-
ter is highly criticised among scholars, either from the perspective of the universal 
rationality as being unrealistic or as a practice, which actually hides exclusion mecha-
nism within itself (Thaa 2007: 88). Deliberation process is time-consuming and can 
be very demanding for the participants. If people are not trusted to deliberate or not 
everyone is able to participate in deliberation, it can become exclusively elite and 
technocratic (Kohler-Koch et al. 2004: 224; Abromeit 2002: 105). Bargaining pro-
cesses among the insiders have potential to externalize costs on the outsiders. 
 Although discourse in Habermas’ understanding is very significant for democ-
racy, in some conditions it fails to provide inclusion and participation, even together 
with the institutional and other procedural aspects of democracy. Blaes-Hermanns an-
alysed the question of whether deliberation is able to increase equal representation, 
especially when it comes to the weak interests, such as the interests of poor (Blaes-
Hermanns 2007: 129ff). She claims that the structural problem of the deliberative 
procedure is that from the very beginning certain interests have less chance of partici-
pating successfully while the reasons for this were not deliberated and agreed upon. 
Here, she basically refers to Habermas’ classification of the discourse types and 
claims that, in practice, the moral discourse is substituted with the pragmatic dis-
course (Blaes-Hermanns 2007: 131). Thus, deliberation has so far not been able to 
bring balance to the interests’ representation, which makes its practice “often neither 
truly deliberative nor really democratic” (Sanders 1997: 349). 
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 In fact, even if all interests are equally represented, domination of a debate by 
some actors also has crucial consequences for politicization and the quality of delib-
eration. Analyzing the public debates on the Eurozone crisis in six countries6, the re-
search by Grande and Kriesi shows that there was no significant increase of politiciza-
tion as both the range of actors and the degree of polarization remained relatively low, 
despite the great salience and importance of the issue over a long period of time 
(Grande/Kriesi 2015). Interestingly, in the case of Germany, the authors proved low 
polarization despite high salience and participation of a wide range of actors 
(Grande/Kriesi 2015). In their study, Grande and Kriesi explain the low politicization 
by strengthening of the executive power in the situation of the Eurozone crisis that led 
to a decrease in polarization (Grande/Kriesi 2015: 498). In other words, the domina-
tion of the executive on both the European and national levels hampered a wide and 
intensive deliberation on the topic of European integration. 
 How can it be guaranteed that all conditions of deliberation, especially the mu-
tual understanding, are fulfilled? The ordinary political life in parliamentary democra-
cies does not prove to be cooperative, intending to reach conformity of reasons or find 
the truth (Thaa 2007: 92). Moreover, there is a consensus among the scholars that de-
liberation should not be considered as a decision-making procedure by itself but as a 
necessary supplement to bargaining, voting, or both (see Elster 1998: 14; Cohen/Sabel 
1997: 320). In the empirical research of constitutional debate in Liechtenstein, 
Marcinkowski concludes that from the beginning until the end of the debate, the party 
in power neither shows respect nor accepts the claims of its opposition as legitimate 
(Marcinkowski 2005: 144). Another example would be the case of the USA, where 
consequences of prejudice, such as race, class, and gender, were scrutinized in delib-
eration (Sanders 1997). The author came to the conclusion that “deliberation requires 
not only equality in resources and the guarantee of equal opportunity to articulate per-
suasive arguments but also equality in “epistemological authority”, in the capacity to 
evoke acknowledgement of one’s arguments” (Sanders 1997: 349). In fact, the argu-
ments and/or participation of some groups can be disregarded on the basis of preju-
dice. If the prejudice remain “unrecognized by both those who are subject to it and 
those who are prejudiced, prejudices cannot possibly be challenged” (Sanders 1997: 
353). The expectation that deliberation would enhance citizenship by inspiring auton-																																																								
6 The public debates have been analyzed in the credit-providing countries – Germany, France, 
the UK, Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland (Grande/Kriesi 2015). 
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omy and a sense of community, leading to the mutual respect, would not be met if 
social hierarchies and patterns of oppression hamper this idea, generating the opposite 
outcome – alienation (Sanders 1997: 369). 
 According to Habermas, the majoritarian decision-making represents a ration-
ally motivated but fallible result of a preliminary ended discussion about what politi-
cal action is right and appropriate (Habermas 1992: 613). As the criticism of delibera-
tion fairly points out, there is not only one scenario that deliberation will end in a con-
sensus. For instance, Karlsson claims that there is rather little empirical evidence sup-
porting this (Karlsson 2001: 59). The second possible scenario would be that delibera-
tion ends with increased differences and escalation of a conflict, following increasing 
distrust and lack of legitimacy (Karlsson 2001: 59; Elster 1998; Abromeit 2002: 148). 
Moreover, the chances of such escalation and radicalisation are higher in a highly het-
erogeneous society because there is different perception of problems, making the 
agreement on solutions very problematic (Abromeit 2002: 148). Abromeit emphasizes 
how the mutual reason giving generally depends upon a higher degree of homogenei-
ty among the citizens than can reasonably be assumed in a large-scale, pluralistic de-
mocracy (Abromeit 2002: 148). 
 Therefore, neither mutual understanding nor steering towards a consensus can 
be taken as granted. Publicity is ambiguous too: “emotionally charged and with an 
unclear understanding of the foundations of constitutional order, the public could not 
entirely be trusted” (Emden/Midgley 2013: 6, see also Marcinkowski 2005). Some 
scholars recognise the difficulties for the democratic process in dealing with the ques-
tions of exceptional complexity (Sbragia 2005: 179). Moreover, it is claimed that citi-
zens are particularly driven by the interests, which immediately and obviously con-
cerns themselves, and are not capable of apprehending anything beyond this (Sanders 
1997: 355; see also Sunstein 2003: 91). If this were indeed the case, a strategic bar-
gain would be preferred to deliberation. Thus, 
“although without any doubt the communicative action theory of Ha-
bermas has a goal to strengthen universal norms of justice against both 
values of particular groups and imperatives of societal subsystems, a 
look at real political disputes about moral norms as human rights, so-
cial justice, or welfare state shows that moral norms are not only con-
troversial but also are in danger to become substituted for functional 
demands, especially for the economic ones” (Thaa 2007: 105, transla-
tion S.M.). 
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The public media tends to be incapable of generating discursive communication be-
cause of its preference for a conflict, its motivation for discrimination of a political 
opponent, its tendency toward simplification and trivialisation of issues, motivating 
political actors to appeal directly to the public and discuss each other instead of com-
municating with each other (Marcinkowski 2005: 136ff). Especially in the case of the 
European initiatives and policy-making, it is the national media that dominates the 
news reporting (including analysis) in the local languages and tends to concentrate on 
antagonisms.  
To sum up, the idea of deliberation and its reality in the EU is complex as 
there are arguments both for and against deliberative democracy. Although some 
questions concerning the deliberative procedure remain unresolved, in my opinion, 
deliberation still can have legitimating and democratic value in the highly heteroge-
neous polity of the EU under the condition that functional representation is guaran-
teed and that the contestation of ideas and policy concepts actually takes place. The 
idea of deliberation is especially useful for reinforcing democracy in a heterogeneous, 
de-centralized polity, opening new channels for effective participation and emphasiz-
ing the significance of discourse in a modern state. Despite all the technical difficul-
ties, the concept of deliberate democracy by Habermas provides a normative concept 
of procedural popular sovereignty in a transnational setting. This approach is both in-
clusive and depends on participation of citizens and political actors in the definition of 
agenda as well as in concrete policy-making. It demands equal opportunity to present 
a view in public, communicating values and experience, and contributes to the objec-
tive of finding the policy solutions built on consensus or at least a compromise. The 
end results of deliberation are fallible and can be re-considered in the future delibera-
tions. The following chapters attempt to offer an answer to the question: if we assume 
that democratic sovereignty can only exist in the context of a democratic procedure, 
to what extent does the elite public deliberation in the EU fulfil the basic requirements 
of deliberation and channel democratic sovereignty? 
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	Chapter	3:	Methodology	
3.1. Research question and operationalization 
Regarding the operationalization and methodology of this thesis, it is im-
portant to summarize once again the idea and central definitions adopted in the theo-
retical part of this research. The main question of this research is: how does the shift 
of authority, expressed in the realignment of some competences between the EU and 
its member states, and simultaneous recognition of sovereignty undermine democra-
cy? 
If the EU is conceptualized as an empire that on the one side pervades and cer-
tainly exercises some control over the effective sovereignty of its member states, but 
on the other side also (at least formally) recognises their democratic sovereignty, and 
the legitimacy of the EU policies depends on this sovereignty, what criteria for de-
mocracy are to be applied in this case? Additionally, it must be recognized that the 
central characteristic of the EU polity is diversity of the policy regimes (at least in the 
sphere of economic policy). This diversity is rooted in the different socio-economic 
and cultural backgrounds. Therefore, it must be channelled and must also result in a 
contestation on the EU level. In the previous chapter it was argued that, in order for 
the deliberative procedure understood as proceduralized democratic sovereignty to 
take place, two basic criteria – functional representation (reflected in discursive repre-
sentation) and contestation over agenda – should be fulfilled. The idea of discursive 
representation is not new; Dryzek and Niemeyer even suggested some formal institu-
tions to operate it and select the discursive representatives (see Dryzek/ Niemeyer 
2008). The objective of this thesis is not to promote a new normative model of de-
mocracy for the EU level but rather to assess the EU polity on the base of two basic 
criteria of democracy. 
In fact, discursive representation (discursive inclusiveness) seems to be the 
very least we can expect in terms of democracy in a large differentiated polity, such 
as the EU. How inclusive or exclusive is the discourse on the EU level? To what ex-
tent does it reflect the actors’ preferences and concerns identifiable in the dominating 
discourses in the member states? How representative is the EU discourse for the 
member states? Representation of discourses rather than individuals seems to be justi-
fied in the EU polity where member states are recognised as sovereign, and where the 
politics in the member states formally remain the main level of participation and ac-
countability. It is crucial for legitimacy that the policies in the member states are em-
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bedded in the domestic context of the modes of governance and societal power rela-
tions. Even if not all relevant discourses were present on the EU level, a basic discur-
sive contestation would be an important indicator of the democratic quality. 
According to the first hypothesis, democracy in the EMU has been under-
mined through inability or unwillingness to recognise the difference in the economic 
policy dynamic and in traditional definitions of values in the member states. This fail-
ure is expressed in the lack of representativeness and missing contestation on the EU 
level. The differences were neglected and suppressed within both monetary and eco-
nomic aspects of the EMU. The second hypothesis claims that the hegemonic dis-
course has failed to naturalise itself in the early years of crisis and was resisted in 
some parts of the EMU, resulting in distrust and loss of legitimacy. The fact that the 
existing antagonisms do not find a resolution through articulation, but some meanings 
are forced upon some groups, comprises an element of coercion. It increases the 
asymmetry of power and further enforces centre-periphery relations among the mem-
ber states. 
In this thesis, the EU is conceptualized as a new type of empire – a polycentric 
polity, employing non-hierarchical modes of governance and recognizing its member 
states’ sovereignty. In my opinion, it is also characterized by asymmetric power 
among its member states that manifests itself in a different capacity of each member 
state to influence the agenda and in a different degree of vulnerability of the member 
states due to socio-economic difference among them. The modes of governance em-
ployed by empire enable the domination through discourse. At the same time, discur-
sive representativeness and contestation have been identified as the minimal indica-
tors of democracy on the EU level, suggesting that some type of deliberation among 
communities rather than individuals can take place there. Therefore, lack of discursive 
representativeness and contestation on the EU level would evidence in favour of the 
existence of asymmetric power if it can simultaneously be proven that there is a cru-
cial difference within the dominating domestic discourses in the member states. In 
particular, we need to understand how inclusive or exclusive the discourse on the EU 
level is in terms of responding to the ideas, values, and perceptions in the member 
states. These assumptions are tested in this research, focusing on the policy field of 
economic and monetary policy. 
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3.2. Discourse analysis 
Discourse analysis is applied in this thesis with the goal to evaluate the discur-
sive representativeness and contestation. There are several defining features of dis-
course, which I would like to draw attention to. Discourse is a social practice and use 
of language that shapes identities and enacts practices. Discourse means   
“a system of stories and expert knowledge diffused through the socie-
ty, which convey the widely accepted generalizations about how the 
society operates that are theorized in these terms, as well as the social 
norms and cultural values to which most of the people appeal when 
discussing their social and political problems and proposed solutions” 
(Young 2003: 116). 
Discourse also reveals the private concerns and information, enforces a particular 
mode of justifying the demands, serves for legitimization of the ultimate choice, and 
should promote Pareto-superior decisions and a larger consensus (Elster 1998: 11). 
Moreover, discourses provide a favourable environment for citizens to be able to 
make sense of what is happening and how to respond, while exercising control and 
ensuring the common-interest orientation of the legislative and electoral choices 
(Scharpf 2010: 167; Scharpf 2012: 5). Nevertheless, the content of discourse, which 
structures and explains the reality, is equally able to privilege or exclude certain 
groups and interests as ‘inappropriate’ (Heinrich/ Jessop 2013). 
Discourse does not only have communicative and ideational aspects but also a 
relational aspect, as it reveals discourse coalitions in the forms of epistemic communi-
ties or advocacy coalitions. In this context, an epistemic community is defined as 
loosely connected individuals united by a common set of ideas, whereas more closely 
connected individuals united by the attempt to put those ideas into action would be a 
definition of advocacy coalitions (Schmidt/ Radaelli 2004: 195ff). Hence, discourse 
structures the political space, promoting cooperation, consensus, antagonism, and ex-
acerbation or mitigation of conflicts. 
There are many types of discourse analysis, as each time it is adjusted to the 
goals of a concrete research. Hence, it is important to summarise the purpose of the 
discourse analysis in this research. First of all, it is essential to examine the conflict 
dimension of the discourse in order to reveal competing values at stake. Therefore, on 
the EU level, it is necessary to assess how inclusive/exclusive the EU discourse is re-
lating to the member states’ discourses. Second, it is important to re-construct the dis-
course coalitions, their corresponding positions, and representation. Even though one 
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discourse can dominate the debate and policy-making, it is also necessary to find out 
about the character and scale of such domination.  
Before describing the discourse analysis adopted for this research, it must be 
mentioned that the method presented below is only relevant for the two discourses on 
the member state level. The discourse on the EU level is examined based on the sec-
ondary literature for the reason that its complexity could not be regarded in depth 
within this research. 
Although discourse is not equal to a text, it can be described as production, 
distribution, and consumption of a text. Oral and written texts in forms of speeches, 
media interviews, statement documents, press releases, press conferences, and articles 
aimed at opinion giving and self-representation constitute the units of the discourse 
analysis here. In total, 239 documents have been coded for the analysis, whereas the 
volume of each document varied between one page (usually press releases and state-
ments) and over a hundred pages (the parliamentary debates). Table 2 below provides 
more details on the documents used for the analysis of each case study. The units of 
analysis for the German case study have been analysed in the original German lan-
guage. For the Greek case study, many documents from the official sources could be 
found in the English language (for example, the absolute majority of the docu-
ments/speeches by the representatives of the Bank of Greece and some governmental 
speeches and interviews). Unfortunately, my knowledge of the Greek language was 
not adequate for the analysis of the complex documents, and some documents (espe-
cially, the parliamentary debates) had to be translated from Greek into English (word 
by word). 
There are two aspects of discourse that are often considered central: the argu-
mentative and dynamic. The argumentative content (rather than the linguistic dimen-
sion of discourse) is essential for the question of this research. The analysis is general-
ly focused on the statements regarding the EMU and European monetary integration, 
including rhetoric, frames, story lines, and policy narratives. The texts were selected 
for further analysis if they present an interpretation of objectives and values behind 
the EMU, the narratives regarding implications of the EMU for the other policy fields, 
and/or positive or negative evaluation of the membership. Through the analysis of the 
argumentative content, it is important to identify which actors form the discourse coa-
litions, and whether one dominating discourse can be identified and attributed to any 
discourse coalition.  
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Table 2: Types of documents used for analysis and their total amount for each case 
study 
Type of document Germany  Greece 
Parliamentary debates 17 9 
Additional parliamentary speeches by the government re-
presentatives 
6 - 
Additional governmental reports and policy statements in 
the Parliament (by the Chancellor or the Prime Minister) 
10 15 
Other speeches by the members of government 13 14 
Other speeches and interviews with the members of parlia-
mentary opposition 
- 2 
Speeches by the chiefs of national central banks 4 22 
Speeches by the leaders of enterprise associations 1 3 
Speeches by the leaders of labor organizations - 1 
Interviews with the members of government 6 2 
Interviews with chiefs of the national central banks 3 1 
Interviews with leaders of enterprise associations 4 3 
Interviews with leaders of labor organizations 4 - 
Press conferences 2 - 
Press releases/statements by the government 1 9 
Press releases/statements by the labor organizations 16 14 
Press releases/statements by the enterprise associations 3 25 
Press reports with direct quotes (all actors) 7 - 
Articles in newspapers/magazines by political actors 5 - 
Open letters 2 2 
Reports by the national central banks 1 - 
Reports by the enterprise associations 4 - 
Other (periodical) publications by the enterprise associations 1 1 
Other (periodical) publications by the labor organizations 1 5 
   
Total:  111 128 
 
The discourse coalitions are determined according to the criteria of qualitative 
correlations between the ideas and values expressed by different actors. Moreover, 
discourse analysis also includes the dynamic aspect, inspecting stability or evolution 
of the discourse over the periods of analysis.  
Difining the key actors for analysis often puzzles the scholars because the total 
number of actors must be reduced for the sake of better quality and feasibility of the 
analysis. This analysis is focused on the elite discourse in a broad sense, which would 
include both European and domestic actors. Concerning the European actors, the 
Commission representatives, members of the Council, and the ECB representatives 
are included in the analysis. Additionally, the discursive data from different actors on 
the nation state level was studied, which includes the government representatives 
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(ministers of finance, ministers of economy, and chief of the government), the parlia-
mentary opposition, representatives of trade unions and employee organizations, as 
well as representatives of the national central banks. The elite and the general public 
discourses are closely related. The reason for this research to focus on the elite dis-
course is due to the fact that the latter is more narrowed down and plays decisive role 
in the decision-making. 
Summing up, the discourse analysis with the focus on argumentation proceed-
ed by taking the following steps. After the texts were selected and the preliminary 
reading was complete, the relevant parts of each text were coded in order to recon-
struct such categories as problem, reason, solutions, values, and consequences. All 
relevant categories and definitions were coded. Generally, these questions were asked 
in the process of codification: 
– What are the categories mentioned in the text? 
– Which phenomena are repeated in various texts? 
– What is the main problem? Who defines it? 
– Which solutions to the problem are mentioned in the 
text? 
– Who proposes these solutions? 
– Which strategies and tactics are implemented to solve 
the problem, why are the other possible strategies re-
jected? 
– Which intended and unintended consequences are men-
tioned? 
– Which moral principles or concepts justify the position 
of speaker? 
– Actant analysis: sender/ receiver, hero/ bad, object 
(goal) & helpers. Which actant can be found in the text, 
how do they act, and what are their competencies? 
Once the codification had been finalized, core “stories” and contrastive “stories” can 
be re-constructed for each actor and for actor coalitions. These stories and stances 
were further compared to the positions on the EU level as well as between the two 
member states selected for the analysis. The potential responsiveness of the EU dis-
course is evaluated through comparison of the dominant categories identified in the 
member states’ domestic discourses with the ones dominating on the EU level.  
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Finally, in terms of contestation, it must be established if there is a hegemonial 
discourse in the EMU. It is relevant for this research because, if the hegemonial dis-
course can be clearly distinguished, every political choice would be pre-programmed 
in a certain way. Hegemonial discourse indicates a bias in the field where political 
actors compete with their ideas. Its hegemonial character suppresses particularism as 
the central element of the plural democracy and takes over the representation of the 
“truth” in Foucault’s understanding. According to Laclau, hegemony means a way of 
operation in which a particular takes over the representation of the universal, while 
remaining particular (Laclau 2014: 8). Therefore, a comprehensive claim is promoted, 
whereas what is claimed represents political universality.  
“This relation, by which a certain particularity assumes the representa-
tion of a universality entirely incommensurable with it, is what we call 
a hegemonic relation. As a result, its universality is a contaminated 
universality: (1) it lives in this unresolvable tension between universal-
ity and particularity; (2) its function of hegemonic universality is not 
acquired for good but is, on the contrary, always reversible” (Laclau/ 
Mouffe 2001: xiii). 
According to Foucault, truth claims have constituting power and should be studied for 
their production of social, cultural, and political effects (Sondergaard 2002). Hege-
monic discourse is capable of naturalising an ideology that means it can secure ac-
ceptance for some ideas as non-ideological common sense (Fairclough 2010: 30). The 
critical goal of a discourse analysis is reflected in denaturalization or, in other words, 
“showing how social structures determine properties of discourse, and how discourse 
in turn determines social structures” (Fairclough 2010: 30).  
Therefore, there is need for indicators in order to determine whether or not a 
discourse is hegemonic. Three indicators are crucial for this analysis. First, a dis-
course must be reflected in the activity of the relevant political institutions and/or 
their mandates. Second, the discourse must be promoted by a powerful discourse coa-
lition, which has its representatives in the decision-making process. Finally, it is es-
sential that the oppositional (alternative) discourse(s) accepts and does not attempt to 
challenge the basic assumptions of the hegemonic discourse. The latter condition is 
important because it would prove the naturalisation of the hegemonic discourse. Only 
if all three of these criteria are fulfilled at the same time, a hegemonic discourse is 
present. Nevertheless, it is possible that a discourse does not possess all these features 
during the whole period analysed here. In other words, it might be that a hegemonic 
	 78	
discourse loses and re-gains its hegemonic status throughout the analysed time. If this 
is indeed the case, various phases of the discourse must be identified. 
 
3.3. Context analysis 
The context analysis essentially frames discourse in terms of institutions and 
presents the relevant actors and stakeholders. Context reflects the discourses of the 
past and present. The main function of the context analysis in this research is to pro-
vide a basis for the discourse analysis and to demonstrate further facets that the dis-
course analysis alone cannot grasp. In fact, discourse can hardly be separated from its 
context because such separation would lead to misinterpretations and elimination of 
an important relational aspect. The institutional context may 
“vary greatly across countries and time, and include such things as the 
political rules of conduct, whether consensual, competitive, or con-
flictual; the political governance structures, whether unitary, federal, or 
consociational; the governance processes, whether pluralist, corporat-
ist, or statist; the industrial relations regime, whether co-ordinated, 
fragmented, or decentralized; or welfare state values, whether individ-
ualist, universalist, or family-oriented” (Schmidt/ Radaelli 2004: 197).  
Moreover, states differ in their degree of formalization and institutionalization of the 
decision-making system, including the scale of legality, formal/informal institutions, 
network governance, and transparency (Abromeit 2004: 84ff). The main objective of 
the context analysis in the following chapters would be to identify the features of each 
characteristic mode of governance, which essentially determines the domestic politi-
cal dynamic after the creation of the EMU too.  
However, it is not only the mode of governance that is the object of interest. In 
each case study, it is attempted to point out the framework of the economic and mone-
tary policy-making and to demonstrate how this framework is embedded in the gen-
eral socio-economic context of each case. Precisely, the primary goal is to identify 
how well the social and economic aspects of a member state match or mismatch be-
tween the central bank’s mandate and the institutional structures both before the ac-
cession and after the accession to the EMU, as well as the general objectives of eco-
nomic policy. The secondary goal is to find out exactly how the policy of the central 
bank relates to the economic policy of the government and to the activities of the oth-
er state actors, business groups, and trade unions. This assessment would reveal the 
scale of adjustments that a member state and the relations among the domestic actors 
underwent.  
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3.4. Case studies 
This research includes the analysis on both European and member state levels. 
First, the study of the EMU provides the basis for the comparative analysis later in 
this thesis, presenting the overall framework that includes member states as its parts. 
Second, two country case studies, Germany and Greece, allow the comparison be-
tween them (domestic level) and each of them with the EMU (European level). The 
comparative study of two country cases applying most-different method is especially 
useful for the following reasons. First, it would reveal whether or not the implications 
of sovereignty for the democratic quality of the policy-making within the EMU are 
the same or different across its member states. The latter differ considerably in their 
previous monetary policy tradition, modes of governance, and institutional architec-
ture, reflecting the specific domestic power balance. Second, concerning the discur-
sive representativeness and contestation on the EU level, if the cases are most differ-
ent, the chance of disagreement is higher, and it should be reflected in the diverging 
positions and contestation on the EU level. Therefore, two member states of the 
EMU, Germany and Greece, were selected for the analyses for a number of reasons. 
While Germany transferred the institutional structure of the Bundesbank and the re-
quirement of the budgetary discipline on the EU level, Greece represents the policy 
receiver, at least since its formal application for the membership in the EMU. The 
monetary policy record of these two countries before their membership in the EMU is 
often described as a success and failure, respectively. Moreover, the two countries are 
characterized by the different internal dynamics and different position of state in the 
process of decision-making. While corporatist and cooperative relations among the 
main actors distinguish Germany, the case of Greece is an example of stronger role of 
state and clientelism. 
As mentioned above, each case study consists of two parts – the contextual 
and the discursive. Each part attempts to answer a set of questions. The first set of 
questions in the country case studies aims to analyse what the pattern of economic 
and monetary policy embeddedness in the member state was before the EMU, as well 
as how it changed, and which adjustments it experienced after the country’s accession 
to the EMU. These questions will be answered through the dynamic analysis of insti-
tutions and characteristic decision-making context, which also contextualizes the dis-
course and shows how it is embedded. The second set of questions includes: what is 
the dominating EMU discourse in the country; which discourse coalitions can be 
	 80	
identified; which actors belong to the discourse coalitions; what are the stances of the 
actors; and whose interests do the actors and coalitions represent? An attempt to an-
swer these questions is undertaken by means of the discourse analysis. The period of 
the discourse analysis roughly captures the years around the stage three of the mone-
tary integration (1997-2000) and the period of the Euro zone crisis (2010-2015). The-
se two periods are examined in order to assess whether evolution of the discourse 
over time and its phases can be established. 
Regarding the European level, the context of the EMU study has an objective 
to determine why the integration within the EMU could take place, what kind of chal-
lenges to the economic and monetary policies did the European states face before the 
EMU and experience currently, and how do the structures of the EMU address these 
challenges? This part also concentrates on the domestic and transnational actors, their 
preferences, and power structures. The second, discursive part of the analysis attempts 
to re-construct the discourse on the European level, identifying the actors, prefer-
ences, and coalitions. This analysis covers the period from the first negotiations on the 
EMU until the last important revision of the EMU in 2012. 
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Chapter 4: The European Economic and Monetary integration: features and ex-
planation of dynamics 
4.1. Globalization and economic policy 
Since chapter one has covered the general features of European integration, 
we can now focus on the economic and monetary policy field. Several attempts have 
been undertaken to explain the integration within this field, most of which refer to the 
globalization trend. Therefore, the following part begins with the question of how 
globalization influences the decisions in the economic and monetary policy field. In 
the economic sphere, globalization is characterized by the following aspects: concen-
tration of enormous resources by the global corporations, internationalization of fi-
nancial markets, growing sensitiveness of national economies to the international cri-
ses, transfer of know-how and technology to the developing countries, losses in com-
petitiveness of the developed countries, and liberalization of production (see 
Held/Koenig-Archibugi 2003; Rodrik 2011; Sassen 2008; Crouch 2008; Zohlnhöfer 
2009). The increased competition is an essential aspect of the economic globalization 
that affects the nature of a state, having political consequences. If the real conse-
quences of globalization for different countries and social groups as well as different 
options to react to such consequences are open to discussion, the fact of globalization 
itself is generally not neglected (Held/Koenig-Archibugi 2003: 7ff). 
The political consequences of economic globalization are reflected in trans-
formation in state’s objectives, administration, and balance of power within a state. 
The increased competition on the global scale leads to a partial or complete move of 
production and pressures on wages, taxation, and social benefits (Held/Koenig-
Archibugi 2003; Crouch 2008). The burden of competition significantly reduces the 
chances for success for some enterprises, such as small enterprises (with small capi-
tal), which are less globalized but rather oriented towards the domestic market. The 
inability of some enterprises to compete on the global scale results in higher risks of 
increasing unemployment (Rodrik 2011: 86). Moreover, one should recognize the 
asymmetry between the groups who are able to cross the national borders (e.g. capital 
owners, highly qualified labour) and those who are unable (Rodrik 2000: 10-11). 
While some business groups have been strengthened in this setting, labour did not ful-
ly adjust to the new constellation as less mobilizable and less mobile (Schmidt 2002: 
29). This is illustrates the social costs of an open economy, which should be managed 
through regulation. Simultaneously, there is a competition of economic policy re-
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gimes, where rating agencies evaluate and range the credibility of state bonds accord-
ing to their own criteria for the ‘right’ economic policy. 
Features of globalization de-nationalize areas which were originally construct-
ed as national, and this is happening in a non-transparent and imperceptible way (Sas-
sen 2008: 18). Globalization results in pressures on the levels of taxation, limits on 
redistributive policies within a state, as well as an increasing intervention in regula-
tion and national legislation. For instance, the assessment by the rating agencies even 
gained the reputation of mechanisms of “governance without government” (Sassen 
2008: 397, translation S.M.). The political elites fear the capital flight and reduced 
inward investment. Therefore, every policy initiative that can affect the investment 
rate is considered carefully, including decisions on interest rate policy, taxation, social 
and ecological regulation (Held/Koenig-Archibugi 2003: 4). 
“Today there is a wide-spread concern that democracy is being ‘hol-
lowed out’: formally, democratic institutions and procedures remain in 
place; substantively, the range of feasible options has shrunk as a result 
of the constraints imposed by international markets and the investors’ 
threat of ‘exit’” (Held/Koenig-Archibugi 2003: 5).  
It deserves to be mentioned that globalization is not just an externally driven phenom-
enon. For instance, Sassen argues that globalization is equally driven internally, with-
in a nation state, and influenced by the external factors and actors (Sassen 2008: 53). 
Although there are certain objective constraints rising through globalization, the latter 
does not mean the end of politics, and a government still has significant margins for 
manoeuvre (see Schmidt 2002; Zohlnhöfer 2009). The economic aspects of globaliza-
tion do not directly cause shrinkage of the welfare state. It is rather a problem of dem-
ocratic quality (Schwartz 2001: 17; Pierson 2001: 410). 
Thus, globalization can potentially affect the democratic sovereignty and 
democratic quality of a nation state (Badie 2002: 130) because the exclusiveness of 
state authority and democratic responsibility erode through the dynamic of globaliza-
tion. This situation leads primarily to an asymmetric involvement and participation of 
political groups representing a community (Sassen 2008). The institutional structure 
strengthens the advantages and requirements of certain economic and political actors, 
while weakening the other actors. Such asymmetric participation of actors makes the 
spread of globalization extremely partisan and in no way universal (Sassen 2008: 
438). 
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There are growing gaps in the relations among the citizens, individual states, 
and the economic system at the regional and global levels. Globalization strains the 
re-distributive policies, resulting in decrease in a state capacity to meet the expecta-
tions of citizens that it will balance the unjust distribution of resources (Haltern 2005: 
524). Crouch argues that this unresponsiveness leads to apathy from the side of the 
citizens, who do not want to be active in this system anymore (Crouch 2008: 34-35). 
The increasing distance between state and the citizens can be observed, for example, 
in the case of the shrinking welfare state that means not only a reduction of both so-
cial rights and state obligations but also of the frequency of interactions and interde-
pendencies between citizens and their state (Sassen 2008: 511-512). Consequently, 
the social perception of democracy is becoming tenuous (Rodrik 2000: 83). Summing 
up, the authors of “Cosmopolitan Democracy” point out three gaps, which emerge 
from globalization. First, there is a gap between the formal domain of political author-
ity and the actual economic system of production, distribution, and exchange, which, 
with its many regional and global networks, serves to limit or undermine the actual 
power of national political authorities. Second, there is a gap between the idea of state 
as an independent actor and the vast array of international regimes and organizations, 
which have been established to manage whole areas of transnational activity. Finally, 
there is a gap between the idea of membership in a national political community, i.e. 
citizenship, which bestows upon individuals both rights and duties, and the develop-
ment of regional and international law that subjects individuals, non-governmental 
organizations, and governments to the new systems of regulation (Archibugi/Held 
1995: 5-6). 
Economic integration is often described as a way to react to the challenges of 
globalization. Both the powerful economic actors and governmental actors have inter-
est in a geographical expansion, as it could create cheaper production opportunities 
and improve the economic growth, bringing benefits in tax revenues and employment. 
Hence, “the net benefits of global economic integration may be positive, but globali-
zation would nevertheless be a disturbing phenomenon if its benefits were distributed 
unfairly among those taking part in it” (Held/Koenig-Archibugi 2003: 7). While ac-
tively eliminating trade barriers for all types of goods (negative integration), states are 
extremely passive in balancing this through regulation in the areas of equality, justice, 
and responsibility on a global scale (Sassen 2008: 439). The elimination of regulative 
barriers (through the negative integration) leaves a certain vacuum, neglecting the di-
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versity of regimes and the dynamic within each member states. The lack of the posi-
tive integration inevitably leads to differentiation of the centre and periphery. While 
governments tend to ignore the necessity to sufficiently protect the citizens from the 
risks of the market (Rodrik 2000: 13), the unregulated globalization would constantly 
bring the weights on one side (Held/Koenig-Archibugi 2003: 18ff). 
 
4.2. The financial dimension of globalization and integration within the EMU 
4.2.1. Changing conditions of the monetary policy 
Regarding the financial dimension of globalization, the transnational econom-
ic regimes (incl. international organizations and foreign exchange markets) have in-
creased pressure and restrained the capacity of a nation-state to regulate its own cur-
rency. In the situation of transnational financial integration, the global financial sys-
tem impacts the state’s capacity to formulate an independent and distinct macroeco-
nomic adjustment policies. The pressures on monetary policy can spill over into in-
creased burden on the domestic fiscal policy, as the external forces usually approach 
the domestic policies according to the norms of the neo-liberal economic order: 
„globalization has served as a major rationale for governments to alter 
their countries’ monetary policies by focusing on tight budgets, low in-
flation, and caps on public debt, deficits, and spending; their industrial 
policies by liberalizing the financial markets, deregulating the rules 
governing business, and privatizing public sector firms; and their so-
cial policies by cutting social spending, rationalizing social services, 
and increasing flexibility in labour markets” (Schmidt 2002: 13). 
Although the financial market has no special channels to influence the gov-
ernments, it is nevertheless able to discipline the governments in their economic poli-
cy (Sassen 2008: 419). For instance, it can influence public spending through raising 
the interest rates for the government bonds (Bell 2003: 172ff). Through estimation of 
the rating agencies, which rate states in the same way they review enterprises, gov-
ernment bonds are ranked by their credibility, causing competition between the bonds 
of different states. Therefore, a state with a significant public debt and deficits will 
have less financial flexibility based on the low rank of its bonds. Such judgement of 
investors on the macroeconomic and regulatory environment in a particular economy 
creates incentives for convergence towards the market-based adjustment policies and 
a particular type of macroeconomic policies (Underhill 2002: 44-45). Consequently, 
governments tend to follow the rules of the financial market, having more financial 
flexibility as a goal. 
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Moreover, currencies are financial assets, which are also tradable. The interna-
tional monetary system is hierarchic, consisting of the central and peripheral curren-
cies (McNamara 1998; Terzi 2007; Ponsot 2007). Currencies also compete with one 
another as the government bonds do. If a currency is not on the top of the hierarchy, it 
must adjust itself. For example, the peripheral currency can be under constant pres-
sure of depreciation, which gives investors a reason to relocate their money else-
where. There are two policy options for the peripheral currencies: they either follow 
the interest rate decisions of the recognised leader or unpeg their currencies from the 
stronger currency, running the risk of monetary instability (De Grauwe 2013: 156). 
The latter scenario is usually avoided: 
“Historically, power to shape monetary and financial stability policies 
migrates to the central bank or banks in the major international finan-
cial centre or centres, creating ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ central banks. 
These centres are defined by the size, depth, and liquidity of their fi-
nancial markets and by the significance of their domestic currencies in 
financial market trading and in central bank reserves. <…> Whether 
with or without explicit rule-based international coordination, ‘periph-
ery’ central banks adjust to the actions of ‘core’ central banks and the 
expectations that they generate” (Dyson 2009: 28). 
Since the late 1970s, monetarism dominates, setting the standards of a good 
monetary policy. Unlike Keynesianism, monetarism claims that governments are not 
capable of reaching the goals of economic growth and high employment, and the 
economy is able to bring itself in balance. According to this idea, the main goal of a 
national central bank must be low-inflation and a stable currency. As soon as some 
countries adopt the monetarist idea of inflation targeting as a paradigm for their 
monetary policy, the countries which continue to pursue Keynesian policies experi-
ence constraints and are forced to reform as well. The governmental interventions in 
the monetary policy lack credibility because the currency traders act on expectations 
about the economy and governmental policies as much as they follow the present-day 
policies and economic indicators such as foreign trade, economic growth, etc. 
(McNamara 1998). Such credibility is understood here to mean “the belief that a gov-
ernment is committed to an exchange rate regime and will stick to its low-inflationary 
path of policymaking“ (McNamara 1998: 16-17). Therefore, credibility is the corner-
stone of the monetarist paradigm and should be guaranteed by an independent status 
of the central bank. 
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An increased capital mobility greatly complicates the design and implementa-
tion of the monetary and exchange rate policies. Usually, governments do not have 
fixed exchange rates or allow them to fluctuate freely but rather choose the middle 
way, allowing the rates to float within certain bands of value and intervening occa-
sionally to influence the development (flexible exchange rates) (McNamara 1998). 
Such interventions can battle speculations in the currency markets; however, certain 
coordination of selling and buying and mutual lines of credit among the central banks 
are decisive for a success in achieving the desired rate (McNamara 1998: 16-17). 
Considering the fact that “international monetary cooperation or discord can have sig-
nificant effects inside states, enabling or constraining societies in the pursuit of their 
national goals“, currency management itself and a political commitment to multilat-
eral coordination with some other countries in support of the currency under pressure 
become crucial (McNamara 1998: 1, 16-17). 
 
4.2.2. European monetary integration 
In the early 1970s, the members of the European Community opted for a re-
gional exchange rate regime, as exchange rate instability negatively affected the trade 
in their highly open economies. After the project of European “currency snake” in the 
70s, the European Monetary System was established in 1979, evolving into the Euro-
pean Monetary Union that was introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. Schol-
ars developed several approaches in order to analyse and explain the features of inte-
gration within the EMU. These approaches can be classified into the following cate-
gories: economic rationality, agenda-setting by non-state interests, interstate bargain-
ing, and the dominance of neoliberal ideas about monetary policy (see Hix 2005: 
320ff, McNamara 1998: 23ff).  
The logic of economic rationality can also be divided in three types: the opti-
mal currency areas, the dynamics of internal market, and the transaction costs theory. 
The model of optimal currency areas (OCA theory) introduces three conditions for a 
welfare-improving monetary unification: first, the participating countries should not 
be subjected to divergent economic trends; second, flexibility of labour and goods 
markets; and third, a monetary union should be embedded in a budgetary union (De 
Grauwe 2013: 154ff). Regarding this model, there is a consensus in the scientific de-
bate that the EMU does not represent an optimal currency area, mainly because of the 
asymmetric business cycles with a high risk of asymmetric shocks and the lack of 
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flexibility in labour market (see Tsoukalis 2003; Mulhearn/Vane 2008; De Grauwe 
2009; Fatas 1998; Alesina et al. 2010; Andrews/Willet 1997). Therefore, as the start-
ing conditions of the national economies participating in the EMU were different, 
some observers recognize the danger of asymmetric shocks that can lead to a deep 
recession and high unemployment as a consequence of monetary integration (see 
Forder 2004: 71-72; Fatas 1998: 165, 191; Alesina et al. 2010: 61-62; De Grauwe 
2009: 12). Such concerns reflect a simple logic:  
“had the interest rate been lower, growth would have been faster, un-
employment would have been lower, the government deficit would 
have been lower, and the fears that prices might start falling… would 
have remained very much further away” (Forder 2004: 71-72). 
For the member states, losing the monetary policy instruments without the option of 
inter-country budgetary transfers could mean intense and/or more immediate econom-
ic problems in the case of asymmetric shock, which would shift the burden of adjust-
ment on labour markets (Tsoukalis 2003: 344). In such a scenario, a member state is 
left to cope largely on its own with the social security deficits, unemployment, and 
poverty in a climate of budgetary austerity (Schmidt 2002: 50). Therefore, the OCA 
provides arguments against the EMU rather than explains the current state of mone-
tary integration in Europe.  
The next explanation originates in the neo-functional spillover hypothesis, 
claiming that the benefits of the common internal market could not be fully achieved 
without the common currency. Moreover, the increasing internal trade would balance 
and compensate for the elimination of exchange rates as an instrument of macroeco-
nomic policy (Hix 2005: 255). This explanation is therefore also linked to the transac-
tion costs theory. Contrary to the OCA, the transaction costs theory provides a good 
argument in favour of the monetary integration in the EU: the uncertainty over cur-
rency values complicates the transnational economic activities due to the difficulties 
in calculating prices. Thus, further advantages of a currency union include facilitation 
of payment, removal of costs of exchanging currency, and significant reduction of the 
exchange rate risks (McNamara 1998). Also, the other common policy areas, such as 
the Common Agricultural Policy, would be simplified by the introduction of a com-
mon currency (McNamara 1998: 99). Nevertheless, this approach does not explain 
why the fiscal policies remained a prerogative of the member states, and why the 
membership is limited to a circle of some countries. In conclusion, none of these ar-
	 88	
guments representing economic rationality explain why certain countries joined the 
monetary integration, and why the latter took on the features we can observe today. 
Enterprises, supranational actors, and central bank governors are among the 
non-state interests that favoured the monetary union. The interest group theory claims 
that the “national policy choices can largely be understood as a function of govern-
ment reaction to pressures from domestic groups representing specific interests within 
industry, labour, finance, and agriculture” (McNamara 1998: 32). Against this as-
sumption, McNamara comes to the conclusion that neither transnational corporations 
nor small enterprises considered common currency as their vital interest and would 
lobby for it:  
“Although the neoliberal policies of monetary rigor have had important 
effects on the macroeconomics of Europe, they have not been subject 
to intensive mass political debate or electoral contention, nor have they 
stimulated significant interest group politics” (McNamara 1998: 175). 
Her argument seems to be misleading because transnational corporations in fact pro-
moted the idea of a common currency through, for example, the Association for Mon-
etary Union in Europe (AMUE), which was active between 1987 and 1999 and repre-
sented hundreds of leading European transnational corporations. Also, Fröhlich’s 
analysis suggests that the common currency was without any doubt desirable for en-
terprises, under the condition that the new currency is designed to be a stable one 
(Fröhlich 1991: 294). The Commission also represents the non-state interests that 
promoted the EMU. It can be argued that the idea and design of the EMU were first 
developed within the Commission, and especially, Jacques Delors exercised his influ-
ence to implement the three stages monetary integration process, which is otherwise 
hardly justifiable from the economic point of view and does not reflect any vital 
member states preference (Hix 2005). Delors was supported by the central banks’ 
governors who shared common beliefs about the proper monetary policy and would 
gain in independence as a result of the monetary integration based on the monetarist 
principles (Hix 2005). 
Although chapter 1.1 already reviewed interstate bargaining and liberal inter-
governmentalism in detail, this theory also provides an explanation of the monetary 
integration. From this perspective, the decision of state actors to pool and delegate 
sovereignty within the EMU is explained through “efforts by governments to con-
strain and control one another in game-theoretical language, by their effort to enhance 
the credibility of commitments” (Moravcsik 1998: 9). The crucial issue in this context 
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is that some countries were strongly influenced by the monetary policies outside their 
own borders. A decision of a central bank to increase the interest rates is usually taken 
as a ‘national’ decision, although it has potential to stimulate economic changes in 
other countries (Held 1995: 99). Consequently, the institutional design of the EMU 
was determined by the international bargaining power and local hegemony (An-
drews/Willett 1997: 498ff). As Germany undoubtedly dominated within the previous 
monetary arrangements in Europe, creating a monetary union would mean a more 
equal forum and co-decision opportunity for the other EU members (Dy-
son/Featherstone 1999; McNamara 1998; Andrews/Willett 1997). Thus, an explana-
tion of the institutional design of the EMU often refers to the Franco-German deal or 
a bargain between these two countries, which favored the creation of the EMU for 
different reasons and, therefore, were ready for significant concessions (Dy-
son/Featherstone 1999). The goal of the membership in the EMU meant implementa-
tion of significant domestic reforms for traditionally high inflationary countries, 
which previously suffered because of the strong currency of their neighbours and con-
sequently implemented the strategy of inflation targeting, following their commitment 
to achieve the membership in the EMU. An example of such reforms is the adoption 
of domestic policies of budgetary consolidation and de-indexation (and other institu-
tional reforms) (McNamara 1998). Without having the goal of membership in the 
EMU, these rash reforms would probably not be possible due to the high political 
costs (McNamara 1998: 162). The expected benefits included higher investment by 
virtue of a predictable and stable currency as well as significantly lower interest rates 
for national bonds on the financial market. 
Finally, Kathleen McNamara provided a significant analysis, evaluating dif-
ferent explanations of the European monetary integration. Her main contribution to 
the scientific debate is the recognition of shared beliefs among policy makers as the 
corner stone of monetary integration, translating the effects of interdependence into 
political outcomes (McNamara 1998). The author insists on taking the domestic polit-
ical process into consideration for a better understanding of the evolution of interna-
tional economic regimes, as “the process of defining the national interest is political 
in both its execution and its outcomes” (McNamara 1998: 8). Because high and un-
regulated mobility of international capital flows does not allow the fixed exchange 
rates and domestic policy autonomy at the same time, McNamara claims that the gov-
ernments were forced to search for an alternative to the traditional Keynesian policies 
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while experiencing increasing pressures caused by globalization and high cross-
border capital mobility (McNamara 1998). 
“The EMU is a solution to the challenges of economic governance in a 
world of high capital mobility where, paradoxically, member states can 
partly regain their lost monetary policy autonomy without creating ex-
change rate instability within the single European market” (McNamara 
1998: 169).  
Thereafter, the roots of the monetary integration would be located within the govern-
mental elites and their beliefs about the macroeconomic strategy. The domestic politi-
cal preferences play the central role in a monetary cooperation of the type created in 
Europe because, according to McNamara, a state would not be able to maintain its 
commitments (even motivated by the geopolitical concerns) unless the cooperative 
agreement is congruent with the prevailing domestic political preferences (McNamara 
1998: 128, see also Andrews/Willet 1997: 485ff). It would be interesting to find out 
whether the evidence presented in the chapter six of this thesis would support or ra-
ther contradict McNamara’s explanation of integration within the EMU. Another im-
portant finding of hers is that “the macroeconomic record in Europe shows that the 
consensus of competitive liberalism can create exchange rate stability despite rising 
capital mobility, but it cannot assure politically acceptable levels of employment and 
growth” (McNamara 1998: 11).  
 
4.3. The institutional dimension and mandate within the Economic and Monetary 
Union 
The idea of the EMU was first realized in 1992 with the Maastricht Treaty and 
is currently reflected in a number of legislative acts of the European Union’s primary 
and secondary law (for instance, Art. 119-144 TFEU, Art. 282-284 and 300-304 
TFEU; protocols 12, 35, 36, 37, the Stability and Growth Pact, the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance, the Statute of ECB, etc.).  
The monetary part of the EMU is essentially represented by the ECB that con-
sists of the Governing Council, made up of the presidents of the national central banks 
of the member states, and the Executive Board, which is embodied by six people ap-
pointed for the position for the term of eight years (Art. 283 TFEU). Within the 
EMU’s framework, the national central banks represent agents of the ECB in the 
member states (Mulhearn/Vane 2008: 95). Additionally, the ECB and the representa-
tives of the central banks of the non-Euro zone member states together constitute the 
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European System of Central Banks. The primary goal of the ECB is price stability, 
and the secondary goal is support the community in realization of the goals of high 
employment level and constant, non-inflationary growth (art. 3 TEU). The main tasks 
of the ECB include definition and implementation of the monetary policy, manage-
ment of currency reserves, operation of foreign exchange transactions, and organiza-
tion of payment transactions (Moran/ Macartney 2009: 340). Unlike the European 
Court of Justice, the ECB’s detailed mandate was the subject of negotiations and ap-
proval by the member states, and through the whole period before the Euro zone cri-
sis, the ECB exclusively acted within its mandate. Both the Euro-group and the Eco-
fin also play an important role in the definition and implementation of economic and 
monetary policy within the EMU. The Euro-group refers to the informal meeting of 
the economic and finance ministers of the Euro zone members, including the presi-
dent of the ECB and the president of the Economic and Finance Committee. All its 
decisions must go through the Ecofin, which has a legal personality and is composed 
of the economic and finance ministers of the EU member states. The Ecofin also part-
ly decides about the exchange rates and formulation of general features of the ex-
change rates policy of the Euro zone. 
The economic part is mainly located within the Council and the Ecofin. Arti-
cles 121 and 148 TFEU prescribe the coordination of economic policies, but the 
Council can only issue non-binding recommendations. These treaty provisions have 
been strengthened in 2011 through the amended European Semester, which is an insti-
tutional procedure for analysis, monitoring, and coordination of economic and budg-
etary policies of the member states. 
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is an instrument to provide the minimum 
necessary coordination of tax and budgetary policies, which otherwise belong to the 
member states’ competences only. The original text of the SGP was amended in 2005 
and experienced significant amendments again in 2011. The SGP was constantly un-
der criticism: 
“The academic literature generally provides little support to the fiscal 
discipline mechanisms embedded in EMU institutional architecture. At 
best, fiscal restraints are presented as useless, at worst, as counterpro-
ductive and, on average, as a ‘minor nuisance’… Most of the negative 
feelings rest on the potential costs induced by the lack of fiscal flexi-
bility in response to country-specific shocks” (Beetsma/ Debrun 2004: 
119).  
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The violations against the SGP were quite common among the Euro area members. 
The TFEU includes provisions for the extensive deficit procedure, whereas the Coun-
cil has the final word to decide about the sanctions and a complaint to the ECJ was 
explicitly banned in the original legislation. The SGP was not only proved to have 
little influence but also did not motivate any structural reforms in the national econo-
mies (Eichengreen/ Wyplosz 1998: 69). The criteria of the SGP cannot be economi-
cally justified and are often considered to be of a political nature (De Grauwe 2013: 
156). 
Regardless of the criticism, in the course of the Euro zone crisis, some mem-
ber states have insisted upon the strengthening of the SGP provisions through further 
EU legislation, and as a result the Euro-plus-pact, the Treaty on Stability, Coordina-
tion and Governance (TSCG), the six-pack7, and the two-pack8 were adopted. Benz 
defined ‘Euro crisis’ as “an extreme fiscal imbalance in the Euro-area that finds ex-
pression in excessive debts in some member states and soaring interest rates burden-
ing the governments of these states” (Benz 2013: 132). Having the goal of enhancing 
the economic governance and competitiveness, the Euro-plus-pact introduces a num-
ber of rules on a stronger surveillance and policy coordination between a member 
state and the Commission. It also includes the provisions for monitoring and surveil-
lance of the major budgetary expenditures (including pensions, health care, social 
benefits, and education). The member states commit to set targets within the pro-
grammes, whose implementation is monitored by the Commission, and consult their 
European partners on any major economic reforms before their adoption. However, 
there is no legal mechanism to stop the reforms in case the Commission or another 
member state does not approve them.  																																																								
7 The six-pack represents a package of legislation, including (1) Regulation No. 1175/2011 on 
the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordi-
nation of economic policies, (2) Council Regulation No. 1177/2011 on speeding up and clari-
fying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, (3) Regulation No. 1173/2011 on 
the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, (4) Council Directive 
2011/85 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, (5) Regulation No. 
1176/2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, (6) Regulation 
No. 1174/2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in 
the euro area.  
8 The two-pack includes Regulation No. 473/2013 on common provisions for monitoring and 
assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Mem-
ber States in the euro area and Regulation No. 474/2013 on the strengthening of economic 
and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with 
serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability. 
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 While the Euro-plus-pact has a voluntary character, the TSCG and the other 
legislative acts mentioned above are legally binding for all member states with just a 
few exceptions9. Including a set of rules in order to foster budgetary discipline, the 
TSCG builds on and reinforces the SGP. Its significant part, known as the Fiscal 
Compact, allows deviation from the SGP criteria in the exceptional circumstances. 
Nevertheless, the main idea behind the TSCG is to create a framework that would al-
low the EU institutions, particularly the Commission, to identify an excessive budget-
ary deficit as early as possible and push forward structural reforms in the member 
states with budgetary deficit. Moreover, the voting procedure in the case of sanctions 
for excessive deficit has been changed to a negative qualified majority, and the mem-
ber states gained the right to bring the case to the ECJ if a member state with a deficit 
failed in the implementation of corrective mechanism. 
Unlike the Euro-plus-pact, which gives quite vague provisions on economic 
governance, the six-pack and the two-pack are of a rather technical character. Both 
these legislative packages contain detailed rules on accounting, economic statistics, 
macroeconomic and budgetary forecast, timeline for the European semester, a system 
of sanctions for violations of the SGP and manipulation of statistics, etc. Their main 
goal is to clarify and extend the provisions of the SGP and the TSCG. 
Finally, the EMU was extended by the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF), which had a temporary character at first and was updated to a permanent Eu-
ropean Stability Mechanism (ESM) later. Its effective lending capacity reaches 500 
billion that are achieved through the member states contributions. The activation of 
the ESM follows the unanimity vote and implies strict conditionality. The ESM is 
based on two facilities: loans and primary market support facility. The latter enables 
its board of governance to acquire public bonds on the primary market. According to 
the formal provisions, the Commission must negotiate a macro-economic adjustment 
programme with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB. This programme represents 
conditionality for loans and must also be approved by the ESM board of governors. 
On the proposal of the Commission, the Council can decide about a post-programme 
surveillance, which can be maintained for the period as long as 75% of the financial 
																																																								
9 The United Kingdom and the Czech Republic opted out from the TSCG and some other le-
gislative acts.	
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assistance has not been repaid. The European Parliament has only the right to be in-
formed about the decisions of the ESM board or the Council. 
 
4.4. European discourses on the EMU: discursive contestation and bargaining 
power 
In order to be able to evaluate the contestation and representativeness on the 
EU level, it is necessary to return to the moment when the EMU was first negotiated 
in order to track the establishment and development of the dominating discourse on 
the EMU. Such re-construction of the discourse on the EMU from its origins would 
also reveal different perspectives on the features of an economic and monetary union 
that are often rooted in the political culture, identity, and the domestic political con-
sensus. At the same time, it would enable us to identify the transformation of the dis-
course, including those ideas behind the EMU that disappeared from the discourse 
and those that proved to be persistent. The following analysis is based on the second-
ary literature and represents the base for the later comparison with two domestic dis-
courses (in chapters 5 and 6). Three phases of contestation can be identified in the Eu-
ropean discourse on the EMU, whereas each of these phases resulted in an introduc-
tion of new regulations, establishing one of the competing sub-discourses in the legal 
domain. It must be pointed out here that these three periods should not be seen as the 
beginning and the end of certain discourse or sub-discourse. In my understanding, 
discourse should rather be imagined as a river, which can get fuller or thinner, de-
pending on the amount of precipitation, for example. In this case, discourse continues 
to ‘flow’ and never disappears completely while the three phases represent the mo-
ments of it being ‘fuller’ than usual. 
 
4.4.1. Phase one 
The first phase covers the period in the beginning of 1990s, when the essential 
features and institutions of the EMU were discussed and negotiated. Two competing 
perspectives on the EMU can be identified, representing two coalitions – France, Ita-
ly, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, and Ireland against Germany, the Netherlands, Den-
mark, and the UK. Although the countries belonging to one block did not have a 
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common negotiating position, their perspectives were essentially similar10. Usually 
the positions of Germany and France are scrutinized in the literature as contesting, 
whereas the consensus between these two countries is regarded as crucial for an 
agreement and the Treaty of Maastricht. 
How did the positions of these two countries differ during the negotiations on 
the EMU? According to Heisenberg, there were two central issues where the stances 
of the member states diverged: “a possible ‘two-speed’ EMU and how to ensure that 
fiscal power, which would remain at the national level, would be consonant with 
monetary policy set by the ECB” (Heisenberg 2006: 240). Two aspects were central 
in the French proposal: legitimation of the EMU through implementation of a com-
mon economic policy and convergence in the real economy (see Dyson/Featherstone 
1999; Leuffen et al. 2013). According to the perspective of the French government 
during the negotiation, EMU required a common economic government that would 
act as a political counterweight to the ECB and express the growth goal, balancing the 
monetary stability goal (Heisenberg 2006; also Dyson/Featherstone 1999: 66; Marsh 
2011: 134). Starting from October 1990, both the President François Mitterrand and 
the Minister of Economy and Finance Pierre Bérégovoy promoted the idea of a demo-
cratic gouvernement economique, “a political pole”, “a centre of economic power”, 
which was meant to balance the technocratic “monetary pole” of the European Cen-
tral Bank (Dyson/Featherstone 1999: 208-211). It was proposed to establish a stronger 
role of the European Council and the Ecofin, which should have gained power to de-
cide on the fiscal and structural aspects of economic policy, providing economic poli-
cy guidelines and defining the exchange-rate policy by a qualified majority (Dy-
son/Featherstone 1999: 208, 69). In November 1990, Bérégovoy emphasized in sev-
eral communications that the idea of an independent central bank was unacceptable 
for the French government due to “the absence of respect for the views of elected pol-
iticians” (Dyson/Featherstone 1999: 211). President Mitterrand pointed out in 1989:  
“I am not hostile to Central Bank, but to certain of its modes of opera-
tion. The Bundesbank is completely beyond the control of govern-
ments. Our Central Bank (Banque de France) is independent, but it is 
the Government that defines the economic and monetary policy. How 
can we bring the Germans to accept progress on the road to monetary 
union? I have the impression that if they had the guarantee that mone-
tary union would not endanger their good economic health, they would 																																																								
10 Spain, Greece, Portugal, and Ireland also formed another coalition, demanding economic 
convergence through an access to a cohesion fund (Martin 1993; Dyson/Featherstone 1999). 
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be ready to go forward. But I hesitate to make this concession. It is 
dangerous that the Central Bank, in the absence of a political authority, 
should have sovereign power. The (European) Monetary System is al-
ready a German zone. But the Federal Republic of Germany does not 
have authority over our economies. With the (European) Central Bank 
it would have it” (quoted in Marsh 2011: 132). 
Also in the official paper prepared by the Ministry of Economy and Finance of France 
and presented to its European counterparts in December 1990, it was stated that “the 
independence of the monetary institution can only be conceived within an interde-
pendence with a strong ‘gouvernement economique’” (Dyson/Featherstone 1999: 
223-224). Dyson and Featherstone argue that the French idea of gouvernement 
economique was deeply rooted in the republican tradition where both economic and 
exchange-rate policies belong to the prerogatives of the elected politicians: 
“Ultimately, the nation was the source of political values; government 
had to express, balance, and reconcile those values. It needed to be 
vested with the power to act on behalf of the nation. Rules were ulti-
mately a matter for political determination. Hence in approaching the 
Maastricht negotiations French conceptions of the appropriate balance 
between discretion and rules differed from German conceptions. 
French politicians like Mitterrand and his Finance Minister Bérégovoy 
were determined to ensure the primacy of the political level over tech-
nocrats” (Dyson/Featherstone 1999: 69). 
 With the launch of the EMU later, the French government was preoccupied 
exclusively with the aspects of European social policy and fiscal harmonization (Dy-
son/Featherstone 1999: 70). However, during the negotiations it attempted to establish 
three main principles of the EMU: viability, democratic quality, and European re-
sponsibility (Dyson/Featherstone 1999: 229). It was argued that this approach corre-
sponded to the one in the Delors Report, which recommends the integration of eco-
nomic and monetary policies in parallel, establishing a political structure to balance 
the independence of the ECB and ensure a dialogue on monetary and economic poli-
cies (Dyson/Featherstone 1999: 229). 
As a result of negotiations, Eurogoup and Ecofin were created but remained 
strongly intergovernmental with the member states’ responsibility for economic 
growth. The Council gained the competence to decide on the exchange rate policy, 
however, under the conditions of unanimity and respect of the primary objective of 
price stability. 
 “A range of French initiatives ran into opposition: notably that the 
sole subscribers to, and holders of, the capital of the ECB should be 
member governments; that the President of the Council should be able 
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to suspend ECB decisions for two weeks and to present motions for 
deliberation to the ECB’s governing council; and that council members 
should be accountable to national parliaments as well as to the Europe-
an Parliament. These proposals were firmly rejected by the Germans 
and the Dutch, notably at the IGC on 8 October…” (Dy-
son/Featherstone 1999: 241-242). 
From the very beginning of the negotiations, the government led by the Chan-
cellor Helmut Kohl insisted upon the creation of an independent European Central 
Bank, with the primary goal of price stability (see Financial Times from 23.06.1988, 
quoted in Heisenberg 2006: 237). The German negotiating position was in line with 
ordoliberalism, which was strongly established within the Ministry of Finance and the 
Bundesbank (see chapter 5.1), reflecting the rule-based approach with the focus on 
economic policy principles, strict convergence criteria, and automatic sanctions for 
excessive deficits. Dyson and Featherstone point out that such a rule-based approach 
was in contrast “with a French preference for discretion” (Dyson/Featherstone 1999: 
282). As the German Draft Treaty proves, its position was promoting economic stabil-
ity as well as an open and competitive market economy (Dyson/Featherstone 1999: 
372, 411). Although later rejected by the other member states, the German Draft Trea-
ty originally proposed a creation of a European cartel office, regulations on the free 
setting of prices in the context of open markets, requirements of privatization, and 
freedom of collective bargaining (Dyson/Featherstone 1999: 411). 
A strict economic convergence criteria that would guarantee the convergence 
before the membership in the EMU was central for the German negotiating position 
(Heisenberg 2006; Leuffen et al. 2013; Dyson/Featherstone 1999: 432). The other 
countries represented by France and also the Commission spoke out in favour of some 
flexibility in the interpretation of the criteria and sanctions for violation (Dyson 
2002). Nevertheless, five criteria were formally established, which include (1) a max-
imum 3 per cent budget deficit (of GDP), (2) a maximum 60 per cent government 
debt (of GDP), (3) a deviation of inflation rate of a maximum of 1.5 per cent, (4) a 
deviation of long-term interest rates of 2 per cent compared to the average inflation of 
the three best-performing countries, and (5) two years of membership in the EMS 
without devaluing (Heisenberg 2006: 241). In the mid 1990s, the German government 
further promoted budgetary discipline in the form of a stability pact, whose main pur-
pose was to enforce the implementation of the criteria also after the accession to the 
EMU. According to the German position, the sanctions for violating the convergence 
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criteria should be automatic and strict enough in order to be effective (Heisenberg 
2006). 
Although the German negotiators generally did not reject the idea of economic 
policy coordination, they opposed any detailed formulation and the French concept of 
gouvernement economique (see Dyson/Featherstone 1999: 411). Both elements were 
considered likely to threaten the independence of the ECB (Leuffen et al. 2013: 159). 
The structural reality strengthened the negotiating position of the German 
government where “its dominating position in the EMS and very sceptical domestic 
public” enabled the negotiators “to establish both independent monetary policy insti-
tution and its macroeconomic policy preference in Europe” (Leuffen et al. 2013: 160; 
also Heisenberg 2006: 245). Therefore, the period of discursive contestation around 
the negotiations of the EMU ended when the final agreement on the Treaty of Maas-
tricht has been reached in February 1992, and the EMU essentially reflected the Ger-
man preferences supported by the Netherlands and Denmark11. Because the aspects of 
growth and employment were absent in the final design of the EMU, the latter repre-
sents a macroeconomic regime that does not exist anywhere else, in any of the mem-
ber states. Instead, in the macroeconomic policy, the discourse exclusively prioritized 
competition, budgetary discipline, and monetary stability. The final result of negotia-
tions established three asymmetries. First, in the discourse, economic and fiscal poli-
cies were subordinated to the goal of monetary stability. Second, disproportional pres-
sures of adjustment emerged, with higher adjustment costs for some member states. 
Third, the EMU created a bias of economic and monetary policy against the social 
policy, when economic and monetary policies became a subject of European com-
mitments, unlike social policies, which were absent from its agenda. 
 
4.4.2. Phase two 
The second, short, and less intense phase of contestation in the EMU discourse 
was triggered by the excessive deficit procedure against the two biggest economies in 
the Euro area – Germany and France. In fact, by 2003, Germany, France, and Italy 
had already violated the provisions on budgetary deficits. The anti-SGP sentiments 
were strengthened by the period of very low growth in the Euro zone following intro-																																																								
11 The UK opted out during the negotiations of the EMU in 1991, and Denmark opted out af-
ter the referendum results rejected the membership in June 1992. 
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duction of the common currency (Blavoukos/Pagoulatos 2008). The President of the 
Commission Romano Prodi, speaking of the SGP, even allowed himself to openly call 
it “stupid”, yet the member states are obliged to follow its rules (Heisenberg 2006: 
249). In June of 2003, the French Minister of Finance refused to change the expan-
sionary budget, arguing that growth and employment were more important than the 
pact (Heisenberg 2006: 249). This certainly challenged the priority status of the budg-
etary discipline and of monetary stability, as well as the assumption that they auto-
matically lead to growth. Simultaneously, the German government referred to im-
portance of the German unification and its costs as the reason why the country could 
not realize its SGP commitments (Blavoukos/Pagoulatos 2008). Therefore, the prob-
lem of the pact was not only its lack of enforcement mechanisms12 but also the fact 
that it simply failed to be convincing as the government’s primary goal. It has been 
criticized for lack of flexibility and especially for not taking into consideration the 
domestic economic cycles (Eichengreen/ Wyplosz 1998). Nevertheless, abandoning 
the pact completely or essentially departing from its orthodoxy would have sent a 
negative signal to the financial markets and endangered the member states’ credibil-
ity. Therefore, 
“some Member States (most notably Germany and France; Greece to a 
lesser degree) engaged publicly in rhetorical adherence to the strictest 
SGP orthodoxy in order to enhance the credibility of their national 
macroeconomic policy. Paying lip service to SGP orthodoxy was tan-
tamount to free-riding on the strictness of the Pact as a collective good 
– before denting it subsequently. At least these three governments em-
ployed the debate instrumentally to demonstrate both determination 
and ability to control their own public finances” (Blavou-
kos/Pagoulatos 2008: 260).   
Also, the leaders of Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, and Estonia, alt-
hough each of them for different reasons, called for sound budgetary policies and ap-
plication of the SGP rules in a joint letter (Financial Times from 16.02.2004, quoted 
in Blavoukos/Pagoulatos 2008: 260). The situation where France and Germany could 
neither accept the sanctions against them for violations of the SGP nor abandon the 
SGP completely resulted in the reform of the SGP. The flexibility of the latter has 
been increased and the excessive deficits procedure amended to consider the reasons 
or source of the excessive deficit in order for the sanctions to be applied. 																																																								
12 Germany and France successfully used their diplomatic weight in the Council in order to 
prevent the implementation of sanctions against them. 
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The SGP was reformed, despite the protest from the side of the ECB. Howev-
er, within the framework of the EMU, a powerful independent institution of the ECB 
was created, which constantly advocated and encouraged neo-liberal reforms in the 
member states. It first constitutionalizes the new European economic order, writing 
into “constitutional stone the autonomy of European monetary policy from democrat-
ic scrutiny and control” (Hueglin 2002: 261). It then announces its doctrine, “to re-
duce the government size and presence in the economy, and make the system more 
flexible by reducing labour market rigidities and cutting welfare-related public ex-
penditures” (Fitoussi/Creel 2007: 212). The ECB, therefore, translates an image of the 
‘proper behaviour’ aimed at modifying the identity of actors on the national level. To 
sum up, this short period of contestation did not challenge the main principles of the 
EMU, but it did undermine the application of the budgetary discipline provisions of 
the SGP. 
  
4.4.3. Phase three 
Finally, the third phase of contestation in the EMU discourse started with the 
Euro zone crisis. The course of the Euro zone crisis brought back the old political 
cleavages among the member states, and again two visions re-appeared: one of fiscal-
ly conservative Northern European countries led by Germany, including the Nether-
lands and Finland; and one of France and Southern European periphery, including the 
countries with higher levels of debt, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, and Ireland. While 
both groups of member states promoted the idea of common economic policy and 
growth, their understanding of priorities and features of European economic policy 
diverged significantly. Discussing the topic of economic growth, the group led by 
France argued for Keynesian type of measures, while the Northern countries argued 
for the orthodox competitiveness oriented measures (Vail 2015: 148). As Schwarzer 
points out, there is a fundamental difference in regard to austerity and budgetary poli-
cies in the times of low economic growth. While in Germany, austerity and decreas-
ing public expenditures are preferred to an increase in taxation because it is expected 
to increase the trust of private economy and investors, the same measures in France 
are linked to fears of falling demand, as growth of the French economy is more 
strongly dependent on the domestic consumption (Schwarzer 2015: 131). In France, 
sinking wages and prices are not regarded positively as a sign of increasing competi-
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tiveness but negatively as a sign of increasing unemployment and of growing danger 
of a recession  (Schwarzer 2015: 131). 
The former French President Nicolas Sarkozy emphasized solidarity and re-
vived the original idea of the common economic governance and deeper fiscal policy 
coordination promoted by France during the negotiations of the EMU (Vail 2015: 
148). The central concern of the French government was stabilization of growth 
(Schwarzer 2015: 131). A co-equal partnership between political leaders and mone-
tary policymakers at the ECB would possess legitimacy and manage the fiscal policy 
(Vail 2015: 151-152). Moreover, according to the position of France and the Southern 
countries, the EMU should include a permanent monetary fund and eurobonds – the 
bonds issued by the Euro zone as a whole rather than any individual country (Leuffen 
et al. 2013). Finally, it was also suggested to reform the no bail-out clause of the Trea-
ty, enabling the ECB to purchase the bonds from the primary market (Leuffen et al. 
2013). Both the idea of eurobonds and the change in ECB’s mandate would enable 
financial transfers from wealthier to less wealthy member states  (Leuffen et al. 2013). 
The anti-austerity discourse strengthened once again in the summer of 2012 
when Francois Holland became the new President of France. This was also reflected 
in the attempt to create an anti-austerity coalition that would be able to counter-
balance Germany and its allies (Vail 2015). Such a coalition included Spain, Portugal, 
and Italy (once Matteo Renzi became the leader of the Italian government). Moreover, 
Holland’s government strongly advocated the introduction of eurobonds and demand-
ed European measures to stimulate the economic growth (Vail 2015: 156). 
The Northern countries led by Germany claimed that the responsibility for 
solving the crisis lies on the member state level. It is common for the German gov-
ernment to give its own example where Germany enormously gained in competitive-
ness through austerity, the Agenda 2010 reforms, and wage suppression (Schwarzer 
2015: 128). Therefore, it is argued that the member states with the debt problems 
must do the same. Newman provides following quote by Wolfgang Schäuble, the 
minister of Finance, from the year 2013: 
“Ten years ago Germany was the “sick man of Europe”. We had to 
tread a long and painful path to become today’s engine of growth and 
anchor of stability in Europe. We too had extremely high levels of un-
employment, even long after we started to adopt urgently necessary re-
forms. But without these reforms there can be no sustainable growth” 
(quoted in Newman 2015: 133). 
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Also, the Foreign Minister of Germany Guido Westerwelle affirmed: “Our success 
could serve as a model for our partners” (Meiers 2015: 25).  
What this group of countries described as common economic governance is 
basically strengthening and reinforcement of the existing principles of the SGP, in-
cluding fiscal discipline and budgetary austerity. The list of measures includes debt 
clauses in all member states’ constitutions, automatic sanctions for violation of the 
SGP, and strengthening of the procedure of economic surveillance of national budg-
ets. Germany rejected any form of ‘communitarization’ of the public debt, such as 
eurobonds and change in the mandate of the ECB (Leuffen et al. 2013: 166). In fact, 
preservation of the independent status of the ECB was crucial for the German gov-
ernment (Vail 2015: 151-152). Despite the different points of view, the principles of 
budgetary discipline were incorporated in the legal acts mentioned in the chapter 4.3 – 
the Euro-plus-pact, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG), 
the six-pack, and the two-pack. Consequently, the austerity discourse strengthened its 
positions as the solution for the Euro zone crisis. 
Concerning the European institutions, especially the European Commission 
and the ECB, they generally continued their earlier, pre-crisis discourse, demanding 
from the member states more efforts on the way to budgetary consolidation, structural 
reforms, privatization, and further liberalization of their economies (European Com-
mission 12.01.2011, Barroso 12.01.2011). Jean-Claude Trichet, the former President 
of the ECB, asserted that the common currency requires the stability oriented finan-
cial and economic policy (Trichet 17.02.2011). According to him, the root of the 
problem lies in violations of the Stability and Growth Pact by some member states 
and in ineffectiveness of the surveillance mechanism (Trichet 17.02.2011). In De-
cember 2012, four presidents together (the Council represented by Van Rompuy, the 
Commission - by Barrosso, Euro group – by Juncker, and the ECB – by Draghi) pre-
pared the report “Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union”. The presidents 
demanded an integrated financial framework, an integrated budgetary framework, an 
integrated economic policy framework, and strengthening of the democratic legitima-
cy and accountability (see Schwarzer 2015: 126). According to the report, an intro-
duction of the single financial supervision mechanism is necessary in order to prevent 
a banking crisis in future. In this report, an integrated budgetary framework is de-
scribed in terms of sound budgetary policies, economic coordination, and surveil-
lance. The report explicitly encourages the member states to implement structural re-
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forms, contributing to higher efficiency of labour and product markets that is de-
manded by the EMU. The authors emphasize the necessity of risk-sharing tools on the 
European level, but their application is attached to approval of the reforms recom-
mended by the EU institutions. The described integrated economic policy framework 
is essentially based on implementation of the existing agreements, mainly the SGP. 
Finally, the report concludes with the democratic aspects, such as the requirement of 
national debates on priority measures and approval of the measures by the parlia-
ments, stronger involvement of the European Parliament, provision of information, 
transparency, and reporting to the national parliaments: 
“One of the guiding principles is that democratic control and account-
ability should occur at the level at which the decisions are taken. <...> 
Ultimately, these far-reaching changes undertaken by the European 
Union in general and the Economic and Monetary Union in particular 
require a shared sense of purpose amongst Member States, a high de-
gree of social cohesion, a strong participation of the European and na-
tional parliaments and a renewed dialogue with social partners” (“To-
wards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union”: 16-17). 
 While the European Commission certainly lost some of its inluence under the 
circumstances of an increasingly intergovernmental process of the crisis management, 
the ECB started playing a stronger role. In the period in which the governments could 
not agree on the right measures, causing distrust of the markets, and despite the Trea-
ty provisions, the ECB introduced its new instrument in May 2010 – Outright Mone-
tary Transaction (OMT). The latter enabled the ECB to purchase the member states’ 
bonds on the secondary market. In 2012, the president of the ECB Mario Draghi de-
clared that the ECB would do “whatever it takes” to protect the Euro zone from the 
collapse, adding “and believe me, it will be enough” (Draghi, 26.07.2012). 
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Table 3: The European discourse on the EMU in three phases 	 1st phase 2nd phase 3rd phase 
France, 
Italy,  
Belgium, 
Greece, 
Portugal, 
Ireland	
Germany, 
the Nethelands,  
Denmark,  
the UK 
Germany, 
France,  
Italy 
Germany,  
Finland,  
Austria, 
the Nethelands 
France, 
Italy, 
Greece, 
Spain, 
Portugal, 
Ireland 
Two-speed EMU ✖	 ✔	 -	 -	 -	
European economic 
policy ✔	 ✖	 -	 ✖	 ✔	
Primacy of political 
over technical 
monetary decisions 
✔	 ✖	 -	 -	 -	
Strict nominal con-
vergence criteria ✖	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 !	
Automatic 
sanctions ✖	 ✔	 ✖	 ✔	 ! ✖	
Absolute priority of 
the budgetary dis-
cipline and of the 
monetary stability 
(the SGP criteria) 
-	 -	 ✖	 ✔	 ✖	
Austerity during the 
periods of no or 
low growth 
-	 -	 ✖	 ✔	 ✖	
eurobonds -	 -	 -	 ✖	 ✔	
Independence of 
the ECB ✖	 ✔	 -	 ✔	 ✖	
✔	-	agreed/ promoted;	✖	-	disagreed/ rejected; !	- not central/ absent	
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Chapter 5: Germany  
5.1. Economic and monetary policy in the Federal Republic of Germany before 
the EMU: the Bundesbank, stable currency and the German economic policy 
paradigm in the context of de-centralized polity with inclusion of social partners 
5.1.1. The German Bundesbank: mandate and institutional context 
Similarly to the ECB, the Bundesbank’s structure consisted of a council, a 
board of governors, and the managing boards of the regional central banks, whereas 
the council acts as the main decision-making body. The law that establishes the cen-
tral bank in Germany, the Bundesbankgesetz from 1957, describes the original struc-
ture, tasks, and instruments of this institution. According to §2 of this law, the Bun-
desbank manages the circulation of money and supply of credit to the economy with 
the purpose of securing the currency and arranging the domestic and foreign monetary 
transactions. 
The design and paradigm of the newly created Bundesbank were significantly 
affected by the previous experience of hyperinflation in 1923. The inflationary and 
hyperinflationary periods of the Weimar Republic left awareness among the elite and 
the population of its devastating consequences for the economy and for society 
(Crouch 2000a). Therefore, there was a broad consensus among all main actors on the 
monetary policy goals, whereas they were simultaneously committed to contributing 
to the re-building of the state (Crouch 2000a). Moreover, the trust and authority 
gained by the Bundesbank among the population over the years were crucial for its 
active involvement in the political life of the country. Finally, the hard currency rep-
resented an economically stable state and soon became a part of identity in Germany. 
The Bundesbank is an institution where ordoliberalism was and remains the 
dominating approach. But the ordoliberal tradition is also strongly entrenched in both 
German governing institutions and their social partners (Young 2014: 278). The 
ordoliberal paradigm implies a strong rule based approach and strengthening competi-
tion as the central goal of a state in economic policy. According to this paradigm, a 
state must provide a constitutional framework, a certain order within which market 
forces can operate freely (Van Esch 2014). Ordoliberalism is often presented as a 
‘third way’ between the hands off liberal approach and socialistic politics. The re-
quirement of sound money represents a fixed point in such order: 
“When taken as an ideal type, the Ordoliberal view is characterized 
first and foremost by a belief in the primacy of price stability (‘sound 
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money’), which is the guiding principle by which all other policy-
measures are assessed. Crucially, in the eyes of the Ordoliberals, there 
is no trade-off between price stability on the one hand, and employ-
ment and economic growth on the other” (Van Esch 2014: 289). 
Nevertheless, the ordoliberal policy paradigm has never been exclusive in Germany. 
As Young convincingly argues, in fact, it is exactly the combination of the ordoliberal 
and social (Keynesian) policies that provided strong economic growth in Germany 
during the post-war period (Young 2014). 
The high level of social support for the Bundesbank was essential for its supe-
rior performance because “when a public believes that its central bank is competent – 
and that its role is justified even when its decisions are unwelcome – it can bring 
about changes in private market behaviour at far lower cost” (Malcolm/Lord 2000: 
250). After World War II, there has always been a positive attitude towards the inde-
pendent conduct of monetary policy and a general support for the low inflation rates 
among the German population and by the organized interests, such as trade unions 
and employers’ organizations (Verdun/ Christiansen 2000: 165; see also Woll 1991). 
The context of how monetary policy was conducted in Germany included the 
interactions of the Bundesbank with the government, trade unions and business organ-
izations. Scholars fairly define central banks as “institutions independent of, but not 
from government” (Siklos/Bohl 2005: 406). The law described the Bundesbank as 
“independent of instructions” from the federal government but expected to “support 
the general economic policy” of the government (Bundesbankgesetz 1957, § 12, 
translation S.M.). This clause opens opportunity to debate the appropriateness of a 
monetary policy decision. Although the government did not possess any mechanism 
to overturn the Bundesbank’s decision, the former could request to postpone a mone-
tary policy decision if the government disagreed with it. Nevertheless, this power was 
never formally invoked (Siklos/Bohl 2005: 397). In its turn, the Bundesbank was ex-
pected to remain in dialog with the federal government, providing advice on “mone-
tary policy matters of major importance” (Bundesbankgesetz 1957, § 13, translation 
S.M.). 
It is crucial that the public played a key role in the relationship between the 
Bundesbank and the government. For both institutions, the appeal to the public would 
be justified, depending on the degree of the public support (Lohmann 1998). The gov-
ernment did not pressure the Bundesbank to accommodate its electoral or party-
political demands because the latter could appeal to the public. If the Bundesbank 
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publicly disagrees with the government in the situation of weak popular support of the 
government’s economic policies, vulnerability of the latter would be increased. But if 
the government’s policies had already become popular, the bank would risk its inde-
pendent status by publicly disagreeing with them (Lohmann 1998: 407). Under such 
circumstances, the Bundesbank preferred to reassert its independence in public but 
generally remained in continuous dialog with the federal government (Siklos/Bohl 
2005: 398). Therefore,  
“a formally independent central bank will be able to follow a sound 
monetary policy only if elected politicians (and ultimately voters) want 
such a policy; or if there exists a coalition of inflation-averse interests 
politically capable of protecting the integrity of the institution against 
inflation-prone politicians” (Lohmann 1998: 443). 
 From my point of view, it is important to consider the context of the German 
politics in order to understand the central idea behind Germany’s monetary policy and 
the role of the Bundesbank. There are two main aspects that I would like to empha-
size. First, the German polity is characterized by horizontal and vertical de-
centralization. Also, the mode of economic governance in Germany is based upon the 
involvement and cooperation of organized interests (business and trade unions). The 
second aspect concerns the main direction of the German economic policy and its ex-
port-oriented nature.  
To begin with the embeddedness in the institutions of the German federalism, 
Länder, the federal Parliament, and the federal Government each nominated members 
of the council of the Bundesbank. Moreover, the formal independence of the Bundes-
bank was protected by this embeddedness and “by the federalist components of its 
decentralized organizational structure” (Lohmann 1998: 401). Dyson emphasizes the 
provincialism of the Bundesbank, which 
“reflected the firm political roots of the Bundesbank council and or-
ganization in the German federal system, the hostility to creating a sin-
gle powerful German financial market centre in Frankfurt, and the state 
central banks’ tendency to protect the interests of the public savings 
banks and hence to be cautious on financial market liberalization” 
(Dyson 2009b: 141). 
Moreover, as it has already been mentioned above, the Bundesbank functioned in the 
climate of corporatism and social market economy where the central bank “stood be-
yond the reach of organized interests – not in any power of the corporatist actors to 
influence the Bundesbank’s behaviour” (Crouch 2000b: 210). For instance, the atti-
tude of the Bundesbank strictly against the increase of inflation rate forced the bar-
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gaining partners to reach deals, building moderation into their own demands in order 
to avoid a defensive counteraction of the Bundesbank (Crouch 2000b: 210). The de-
sign and goals of the Bundesbank reflect preoccupations of the period in Germany 
after the World War II. The capacity of the Bundesbank to act as counterweight to the 
market-interfering tendencies of the corporatist economy was as important in the 
German context as the control of inflation. In fact, the central bank exercised the sig-
nalling power, while “the trade associations were needed for industrial recovery; la-
bour market corporatism was needed to overcome class conflict and also to mark a 
complete break from Nazi intolerance of labour’s right to organize” (Crouch 2000a: 
13).  
The mutual accommodation between the actors was possible due to their de-
termination to behave strategically and regard the national economic interest in the 
context of social market economy where opposing forces are required to coexist 
(Crouch 2000a: 13) and the state’s role is enabling rather than either withdrawn or 
imposing. The governmental discourse  
“emphasized the liberal nature of the economy, the federal state’s 
hands-off approach to industry and its limited powers with regard to 
the economy – passing over the Länder’s larger involvement in local 
industrial policy – and the Bundesbank’s role as the independent 
guardian of the stability of the currency and, by extension, of the econ-
omy” (Schmidt 2002: 288). 
However, it also acknowledged the autonomous cooperation of business and labour as 
well as the generous welfare state (Schmidt 2002: 288). The establishment of coordi-
nated or managed capitalism in the post-war period reinforced and encouraged a con-
sensus-oriented political system where “an enabling state is linked to an evolutionary 
view of economic policy, one that reflects the changing needs of economic actors and 
the outcomes of their interactions” (Dyson 2003: 214). Since the early 1970s, the 
Modell Deutschland was aimed to enhance the competitiveness through the corporat-
ist arrangements, simultaneously targeting austerity and modernization (Jessop 2014). 
The integration of the unions into crisis management created a shared responsibility 
for its economic and political costs (Jessop 2014). The neoliberal turn in the begin-
ning of 1980s introduced some adjustments but preserved a largely neo-corporatist 
and neo-mercantilist strategy (Jessop 2014: 252). The transformation of the German 
post-war corporatism started long before the introduction of the common currency, 
and it is linked to globalization (as described in chapters 4.1 and 4.2). It is not so 
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much the reforms of institutions that mark transformation of the German corporatism 
but rather the evolution of the industrial relations and organisational change (Eich-
horst 2015: 52). Therefore, the transformation of the German corporatism is mainly 
the result of adjustments driven by the pragmatic strategies of actors. The changed 
economic circumstances led to a major reversal in the strategies of employers (Bacca-
ro/Howell 2011: 539). The industrial relations experienced dramatic transformation 
through change 
 “in the practices and functioning of works councils, and the erosion 
and retreat of collective bargaining coverage, trade unions, and em-
ployer associations. Escape routes have permitted employers to opt out 
of once dominant industrial relations practices without being forced to 
dismantle them” (Baccaro/Howell 2011: 539).  
Finally, it must be mentioned that the connections between the political and 
business elites in Germany do not always take place within the democratically moral 
and legal domains. As in many other countries, the phenomena of corruption, clien-
telism, and patronage are also present in Germany. It is argued in the literature that 
corruption in a strict sense, as exchange of political and administrative resources for 
economic resources, represents a problem mainly on the local government level 
(Darge 2009: 78). However, lobbying as a grey zone between the official representa-
tion and corruption is widely spread on the regional (Landesebene) and federal levels 
(Balser/Ritzer 2016). Although law does not prohibit lobbying, at its core, it still rep-
resents priviledged access to decision-makers and an exchange of a service for a re-
ward. In Germany, lobbying often happens beyond the public space through the per-
sonal relations, networks, lobby agencies (who often keep their clients secret), think 
tanks, and foundations (Balser/Ritzer 2016). 
To sum up, federal roots, independence of but dialog with the federal govern-
ment, public trust, as well as its position above all organized interests established the 
Bundesbank as a key actor in the economic policy. Nevertheless, the Bundesbank ex-
isted “alongside powerful political and wider institutional forces: democratically 
elected governments with powerful heads; national organizations of different business 
sectors capable of articulating their problems and needs to national mass media” 
(Crouch 2000a: 11). These constraining and monitoring institutions either do not exist 
or do not represent the same challenge on the EU level. 
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5.1.2. The Bundesbank’s monetary policy and the German economic context 
Another aspect that should be highlighted here is the embeddeddness of the 
Bundesbank’s policies in both economic governance strategy and the performance of 
the real economy. As it was mentioned above, the ordoliberal approach is focused on 
enhancing the competitiveness. Since the 1980s, Germany has been increasing its ex-
ports, and the stable currency and its recognition certainly gave the German exporters 
a competitive advantage. But so did the EMU, as the euro was a weaker currency than 
the Deutsche Mark, providing cheaper prices for the German exports. Therefore, the 
EMU was also expected to support the export-oriented strategy by extending the 
Deutsche Mark zone and by the enhancement of competitiveness of the French and 
the German industrial capital through a cheaper currency, “especially when reinforced 
by direct wage restraint, a reduced social wage and lowered domestic consumption” 
(Jessop 2014: 253). What is even more significant in this context, the evidence shows 
the real goal of the Bundesbank as being a 2% long-run inflation rather than an exact 
price stability (Clarida/ Gertler 1997: 405). Although publicly not stated, the devia-
tions of the short-term rates from the targets were caused by countercyclical policy of 
the Bundesbank (Clarida/ Gertler 1997). Therefore, without publicly declaring it, the 
Bundesbank actually takes into account the performance of the real economy (Clari-
da/ Gertler 1997: 378), letting “the short-term rate rise in response to news of increas-
es in inflationary pressures, manifested in either a rise in commodity prices, a rise in 
the money supply, or a depreciation of the exchange rate” (Clarida/Gertler 1997: 
385).  
The Bundesbank actually combined its aggressive behaviour in dampening in-
flation through setting short-term interest rates with orientation to the performance of 
the real economy. It adopted  
“a gradualist approach to disinflating, and it does ease when the real 
economy weakens. During these situations it often cites other factors in 
public announcements – concern about maintaining the stability of ex-
change rate regimes, for example” (Clarida/Gertler 1997: 405).  
In fact, it was “implicitly pursuing a countercyclical policy” (Clarida/Gertler 1997: 
405). So, the analysis of the long-term trend in the interest rate development generally 
supports the claim of countercyclical policies by the Bundesbank. However, it must 
be acknowledged that economic growth (or downturn) is one of the factors among 
many others, which determine the decisions of a central bank. Economic data illus-
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trates quite stable interest rates between 1950 and 1998, which are generally higher 
than those of the ECB13. 
 
5.1.3. The ERM and the negotiations of the EMU 
Concerning the European level, the Bundesbank showed itself to be coopera-
tive, and played an important role as a leader within the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM). Nevertheless, the latter was clearly dominated by the Bundes-
bank, which did not seem “to be very responsive to the requests of its monetary part-
ners” (Abdelal 1998: 253). The ERM is often referred to as the D-Mark zone (Dyson 
2003: 218). This situation changed radically with the launch of the EMU, as both the 
constraint of the ‘hard’ D-Mark and the Bundesbank’s role as the monetary policy 
leader disappeared (Dyson 2003: 218). 
At the time of negotiations on the monetary union, two political legacies were 
crucial for the German position: first, support for further European integration as 
Konrad Adenauer’s legacy, and second, ordoliberalism as the legacy of Ludwig Er-
hard (Dyson/ Featherstone 1999). The ordoliberal coalition on the moment of negotia-
tions included the ministries of economy and of finance as well as the Bundesbank, 
benefitting from the strong support of the employer and banker organizations (Bun-
desrverband Deutscher Industrie, Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag, Bun-
desverband Deutscher Banken, Deutscher Sparkassen und Giroverband) (Dyson/ 
Featherstone 1999: 278). This coalition demanded the European single currency to be 
at least as stable as the D-Mark, insisting therefore on the necessity of strict and de-
tailed rules of convergence among the European partners. It promoted the rule-based 
approach that would guarantee the market principle based on competition, low infla-
tion, and budgetary discipline, which was expected to lead to the close approximation 
of the interest rates before the stage 3 of the monetary integration (Dyson/ Feather-
stone 1999; Fröhlich 1991). Although there was a general support for the economic 
policy coordination, the economic policy guidelines and the financial support mecha-
nism were rejected (Dyson/ Featherstone 1999). Moreover, the independence of the 
																																																								
13 See the data: http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/4878/umfrage/bruttoinlandsprodukt-von-
deutschland-seit-dem-jahr-1950/ 
http://www.bundesbank.de/Navigation/DE/Statistiken/Zeitreihen_Datenbanken/Makrooekonomische_
Zeitreihen/its_list_node.html?listId=www_s11b_mb02 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/monetary/rates/html/index.en.html 
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ECB and of all participating national central banks was a non-negotiable position 
(Dyson/ Featherstone 1999). 
The German public showed a rather sceptical attitude towards the EMU. 
While the European enterprises generally showed interest in a monetary union with 
the average support of 90%, only about 60% of the German companies supported this 
idea under the condition that it would be as stable and reliable as the D-Mark (Fröh-
lich 1991: 276). At the same time, 80% of the German enterprises believed that the 
Euro-currency would not be as strong as D-Mark (Fröhlich 1991: 293). In February 
1998, a public poll evidenced that 58% of respondents were against the introduction 
of the euro and 30% were in favour (Schmidt 2002: 295). 
 
5.2. The context and the mode of governance after the EMU: the new central 
bank and disrupted balance of ordoliberalism and managed capitalism 
The EMU is certainly associated with significant institutional changes in the 
monetary policy regime, but the transformation following it does not end there. Start-
ing with the mandate of the ECB, the formal structures, goals, and instruments of the 
ECB and the Bundesbank are basically identical. In its turn, the original mandate of 
the Bundesbank was changed, leading to its new institutional structure and search for 
a new functional identity. The EMU triggered a complex and difficult reform of the 
Bundesbank, introducing a stronger hierarchy that certainly undermined its federal 
character (Dyson 2003: 222). Furthermore, the ECB took over the prime responsibil-
ity for the banking supervision. Hence, formally, the Bundesbank now simply repre-
sents the agent of the ECB in Germany, focusing its activity mainly on research. 
The new constellation also disrupted the connection between the activity of 
the central bank and the real economy, as the ECB often disregards sensitivities and 
vulnerabilities of a single member. For example, the decisions of the ECB can be pro-
cyclical for Germany. Similarly, the link between monetary and economic policy has 
been abolished. There is no governmental counterpart to the ECB, which would be in 
dialog with the central bank or would be capable to challenge its decisions. Economic 
policy adjustment remains nationally specific and path-dependent (Schmidt 2002: 15). 
Because each government of the member states operates in a different environment 
and pursues different economic strategy, it is almost impossible for the ECB to stay in 
dialog and consider the policies in each member state.  
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It is important to point out that the disciplinary role of the Bundesbank in the 
domestic collective bargaining and in containing the unit labour costs has disap-
peared, “leaving a potential vacuum in which the outcomes of wage bargaining could 
have negative effects on ECB monetary policy” (Dyson/ Goetz 2003: 31). Moreover, 
in case of Germany, the EMU decreased the influence of regions, the Länder, on eco-
nomic and monetary policy while strengthening the executive. The ECB has so far not 
gained the same level of authority in the general public that the Bundesbank had 
among the German population that might be caused by the fact that the former mainly 
communicates with the financial experts rather than generally with the population. 
The transformation of the context brought in by the EMU is very complex and 
was determined by two processes: first, the separation of the ‘technical’ monetary pol-
icy from the ‘political’ economic policy and, second, the gradual erosion of the ‘polit-
ical’ in the economic policy reflected in decreased inclusion and strong limitations on 
the economic policy agenda. Within the EMU, the monetary policy has been trans-
ferred to the supranational level, economic policy formally remains in the national 
domain, and the SGP provides the criteria of the ‘good’ economic indicators.  
In the case of Germany, it can be observed how the benchmarking within the 
EMU strengthens reformers and the discourse of competitiveness, promoting econom-
ic liberalization of financial and of labour markets as well as shareholder values (Dy-
son 2003: 210-211). The EMU lacks the flexibility in adjustment of its paradigm to 
the socio-economic circumstances in the Euro zone. Especially during the euro zone 
crisis, the European economic governance was finally established as a universal re-
quirement of the budgetary discipline. As Dyson fairly noticed, the broad strategic 
direction at the EU level, including the market competition, sound finance, and sound 
money, fits the German economic and monetary policy well. Nevertheless, this is a fit 
with the German ordoliberalism only (Dyson 2003: 213). In fact, Germany represent-
ed the ordoliberal position during the negotiations, although its domestic policies 
shared the features of both ordoliberalism and managed capitalism. The latter has also 
been deeply rooted in the German politics but is absent in the EMU: 
“historically, ‘managed’ capitalism formed a continuum with the orga-
nized capitalism of cartels, cross-ownership, elite networking, self-
regulation, and public-private pacts that characterized early German 
industrialization. It has fewer problems with mergers and the concen-
tration of economic power than did post-war ordoliberalism. Cultural-
ly, it rested on a respect for the principles of consensus. This principle 
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was deeply entrenched in both the political and economic systems” 
(Dyson 2009b: 205). 
Therefore, the ordoliberal policies (which were transferred on the EMU) embody a 
policy preference rather than the German model or practice (Dyson 2003: 223). This 
can be illustrated by the fact that Germany faced significant problems in meeting the 
requirements of economic policy as prescribed in the SGP, whose provisions incorpo-
rate the German stability culture. After the German unification, the competitiveness 
pressures of globalization have been high, and the need for reforms became more ob-
vious. Nevertheless, it was still hard to introduce and implement the corresponding 
reforms due to the specifics of the German political system distinguished by federal-
ism and cooperative character with a variety of significant veto players, as, in Germa-
ny, 
“the outcomes of Europeanization are bound up with a domestic policy 
process that traditionally favours co-operation and consensus over im-
posed change and confrontation. This process also gives institutional 
support to a continuing preoccupation with issues of redistributive jus-
tice and provision of collective goods” (Dyson 2003: 205).  
The reforms in Germany are at least partly dependent upon the “re-conceptualization 
of the traditional notions of economic order and social justice” by the state, business, 
and union actors (Schmidt 2003: 214). European and global competition did not yet 
destroy the managed capitalism but eroded it through transforming the relation be-
tween business and labour towards less cooperative and more competitive. 
Another important point is that the ordoliberal paradigm has been reduced to a 
monetary policy field without taking the broader economic constitution into consider-
ation. As Joerges argues, the launch of the EMU marked the departure from the eco-
nomic constitution expressed in the German Ordnungspolitik. While, at national level, 
the economic constitution was socially embedded and “conceptualized in the theorem 
of independent orders or in the social politics of the “social market economy”” 
(Joerges 2015:7), social and economic policy were ‘decoupled’ in the newly estab-
lished European economic order. The social embeddedness of the markets refers to 
“the whole range of institutions on which the operations of market economies relies, 
most notably “money” and “labour”” (Joerges 2015: 8). In the national contexts, 
economies are embedded in the institutions of welfare state and modes of political 
accountability, which are missing on the EU level. As a result, the EMU re-defined 
the German economic model where the model of social market economy and man-
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aged capitalism was at least partly substituted by the shareholder values, which have 
been strongly promoted by the transnational enterprises (Dyson 2003: 474).  
Although the ideas and preferences were in fact transferred onto the EMU, in-
cluding the design of the central bank and concept of ‘sound’ finance, the German 
mode of governance faced serious transformations, as its coordinative and consensus-
oriented character is not reflected at the EU-level. This effects the distribution of 
power among the political actors: among the federal ministries, between the federa-
tion and the regions, as well as between the employers and the trade unions in the col-
lective bargaining and labour market. It is not the domestic consensus that is decisive 
anymore but a broader European context. 
“In another respect, and adding to its complexity, Europeanization res-
onates even more deeply in the body politic, raising fundamental long-
er-term cultural questions about the kind of polity and of political 
economy that Germany aspires to be and whether that aspiration is sus-
tainable. The central constraint on change at this deeper level is set by 
the domestic institutional ‘fit’ between the federal, corporatist and coa-
lition government features of the German polity (the main elements of 
its ‘negotiation’ democracy) and an economy that displays strong ele-
ments of co-ordination and privileges strong producer groups and the 
practice of social partnership in labour-market and social policies“ 
(Dyson 2003: 205).  
The corporatist institutions in Germany have not been formally changed in 
their structure, but their function changed crucially. In fact, political-economic institu-
tions function differently in the new context (Baccaro/Howell 2011: 525). The Ger-
man model has been transformed by the policy change and actors’ adaptive behaviour 
(Eichhorst 2015: 49). Generally, the federalized and de-centralized nature of the Ger-
man polity makes the adjustment to the European modes of governance easier, espe-
cially because the policy content was actually uploaded on the EU-level. Neverthe-
less, the informal and soft nature of the open methods of coordination and other new 
modes of governance does not make the inclusion of business and trade unions in the 
decision-making obligatory. Moreover, the dominance of negative integration and its 
liberal character strengthen enterprises and the executive branch of state.  
 “The network model of policy-making displays a high degree of com-
patibility with corporatist governance and surrounding perceptions, 
appearing as an ‘evolved’ state of meso-corporatism. Distinct differ-
ences from corporatism probably pertain to the horizontal structure of 
network governance, its emphasis on informal and personalised inter-
action, its inclusion of transnational EC actors, the likelihood of non-
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participation of peak associations, and the relatively weaker bargaining 
strength of the latter” (Pagoulatos 2002: 201).  
It is labour that feels the shift in the balance of power the strongest, acting defensively 
while  “collective institutions and forms of labour market regulation have been weak-
ened” (Baccaro/Howell 2011: 522). The increased competition and relatively low 
growth rates weakened the negotiating position of the labour where “the trade unions 
accepted wage self-restraint and flexibility of working conditions as well as partial 
privatization of social services in turn for maintaining employment” (Bieling/Lux 
2014: 154). The EU economic governance continued affecting the collective bargain-
ing and labour market institutions without the establishment of a mechanism for the 
EU-wide collective bargaining and an appropriate form of wage-policy coordination. 
Generally, the neoliberal convergence is expressed in deregulation through elimina-
tion or relaxation of the institutional barriers (incl. removal of legal or contractual re-
strictions at the workplace level) and in institutional deregulation as a shift from high-
er levels of collective bargaining to the lower ones, shrinking of collective organiza-
tion and capacity of the class actors, as well as the re-structuring of unemployment 
benefits and employment protection (Baccaro/Howell 2011: 527). Decline in the cov-
erage and binding power of the sectoral agreements are further signs of weakening of 
the trade unions due to decentralization of the collective bargaining (Baccaro/Howell 
2011). All this is accompanied with change in identities of employees, who prefer to 
engage with their employers at the firm level in order to protect the jobs there. 
 
5.3. The elite discourse on the EMU in Germany between the years 1997 and 
2000: dominance of the ordoliberal coalition 
The discursive period considered in this section covers two coalition govern-
ments – first, the Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands/ the Christlich-
Soziale Union (CDU/CSU) and the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) coalition gov-
ernment of Helmut Kohl (November 1994 - October 1998), and second, the Sozi-
aldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) and the Bündnis 90/die Grünen coalition 
government of Gerhard Schröder (1998 - 2002). 
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5.3.1. Governmental sub-discourse: Kohl government 
The speeches and interviews of the representatives of the government have 
been analysed, including the Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU), the Minister of Finance 
Theo Waigel (CSU), and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Klaus Kinkel (FDP). The 
central topics of the governmental sub-discourse were the general historical im-
portance of European integration and of the EMU project (being a crucial step for-
ward in the integration), the economic policy implications and advantages of the 
EMU for the German economy, and finally, stability of the future European currency 
and pre-conditions for it. The discourse on the EMU has been part of the broader dis-
course on Germany’s participation in the European integration and its European iden-
tity. Therefore, a big part of the governmental sub-discourse has been happening on 
the identity level. Similarly to how the D-Mark became the cornerstone of the Ger-
man post-war identity, the new European currency was expected to shape the Europe-
an identity among the German citizens. As there already existed a broad consensus 
and legacy of the post-war Germany being a part of the European “family”, any voice 
for postponing or opposing the EMU was often stigmatized by the governing coalition 
as anti-European, “spreading insecurities” within the population and within the finan-
cial markets. Moreover, Europeanization was also subsumed in a wider discourse of 
the “requirements” to adapt in the interest of competitiveness. 
Another topic, which was not central but present within the governmental sub-
discourse, was the employment policy. It was common for the governmental actors to 
refer to the principle of subsidiarity as the one that determines that the employment 
and social policies strictly remain on the national level. Without any further elabora-
tion, it was usually declared that the transfer of competences in these areas would 
simply be against the principle of subsidiarity.  
 “Eine Sozial-, Lohn- und Steuerunion würde die Entwicklung zur 
Transferunion vorprogrammieren. Sie würde die nationalen Verant-
wortlichkeiten verwischen und das Subsidiaritätsprinzip verletzen. Sie 
wäre das Gegenteil von dem, was wir wollen, nämlich ein Europa, in 
dem Bürgerinnen und Bürger, Unternehmen und Regierungen ihre 
eigenen Aufgaben selbstverantwortlich in die Hand nehmen”. Theodor 
Waigel, Bundesminister der Finanzen, 29.04.1998. 
Concerning the Minister of Finance, economic convergence and budgetary 
consolidation were also central. On the contrary, democratic considerations were not 
significant within the governmental sub-discourse, which regards the transition to the 
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third stage of the EMU as an exclusively technical process, without any parts of socie-
ty winning or loosing from it. 
“Der entscheidende Unterschied zur Geburtsstunde der D-Mark liegt 
jedoch darin, daß die Umstellung auf den Euro ein rein technischer 
Vorgang sein wird. Bei der Umstellung auf den Euro wird es keine 
Geldentwertung, keine unterschiedlichen Umstellungssätze, kein 
"Kopfgeld" geben. Vor allem wird es keine Gewinner und Verlierer 
geben”. Theodor Waigel, Bundesminister der Finanzen, 30.06.1998. 
The central topics of this governmental sub-discourse can be organised in a 
story as follows. An adjustment to the consequences of globalisation, including the 
measures to increase the European influence and German competitiveness, can be 
identified as the governmental goals. The EMU provides a framework to achieve the-
se goals. The main problem is ensuring the stability of the European currency. The 
solution to this problem will be achieved through a strict and narrow interpretation of 
the convergence criteria, budgetary consolidation that will lead to a certain degree of 
economic convergence among the EMU member states. Modernisation is often men-
tioned as a central policy goal that implies liberal reforms, including the increase in 
flexibility of labour markets. 
“Auch ohne Währungsunion müßten wir die Modernisierung unserer 
Volkswirtschaften rasch in Angriff nehmen, will Europa seine 
Wettbewerbsfähigkeit im Zeitalter der Globalisierung erhalten. Der 
Euro ist zwar nicht die Lösung der vorhandenen Strukturprobleme. Er 
wird aber ihre Lösung erheblich beschleunigen. Er wird einen frischen 
Wind der Modernisierung nach Europa bringen. Wenn wir jetzt ja zur 
Währungsunion sagen, dann stellen wir damit auch unsere Reform-
bereitschaft und unsere Zukunftsfähigkeit unter Beweis”. Theodor 
Waigel, Bundesminister der Finanzen, 29.04.1998. 
In this context, Germany is often described as ‘exporter of stability’, playing 
the role of the policy sender. The European countries, in their turn, are receivers, as 
they ‘adopt the stability culture’.  
“Jeder, der den Vertrag von Maastricht liest und die ergänzenden Bes-
chlüsse dazu kennt, muß das einsehen. Es ist uns gelungen, die 
deutsche Philosophie der Geld-, Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik eu-
ropaweit zu verankern”. Theodor Waigel, Bundesminister der Finan-
zen, 2.04.1998. 
With the launch of the EMU, small and medium enterprises as well as the German 
exports would benefit, strengthening growth and securing the employment in the 
country. Therefore, the success of the D-Mark would not be eliminated but transferred 
and continued on the European level.  
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“…die Erfolgsgeschichte der D-Mark geht mit dem Wechsel zum Euro 
auf europäischer Ebene weiter. Mit dem Euro sichern wir die Werte, 
die die D-Mark zum Inbegriff von Stabilität und Vertrauen gemacht 
haben”. Helmut Kohl, Bundeskanzler, 2.04.1998. 
As already mentioned above, there were several elements that the governmen-
tal ‘story’ explicitly rejected as possible solutions. These points included the transfer 
of employment policies to the European level as well as harmonization of the wage 
policy, social policy, and taxes. 
This governmental sub-discourse claimed universalism in several regards. A 
close discursive link has been established between European integration and the 
EMU, leading to a conclusion that anyone who supports the former must support the 
latter too. In its turn, the idea of the monetary integration was reduced to what has 
been negotiated as the EMU. Then, any critical points to the already negotiated pro-
ject of EMU were declared as opportunistic and populist. The reference to ideologi-
cally different prominent political figures in support of the common currency are 
quite common in the governmental sub-discourse of this period, which is aimed at 
proving the argument that, in Germany, leaders of all democratic parties of the post-
war history supported European integration. Along with the legacy of Konrad Aden-
auer, the conservative government representatives refer to Carlo Schmid (SPD), Kurt 
Georg Kiesinger (CDU), Franz Jozef Strauß (CSU), Willy Brandt (SPD), and Helmut 
Schmidt (SPD). The governmental sub-discourse emphasizes that both European so-
cialists and the German trade unions strongly support the EMU, downplaying their 
criticism of some features of this project. Therefore, the government made an effort to 
describe the EMU as an ideologically neutral project. Although the government also 
presents the calculations of how much money enterprises would save by eliminating 
the exchange rates, it also claims to represent the interest of the people who save 
money as well as the citizens with a small income.  
“Eine harte Währung - das ist eine wichtige Erfahrung gerade der 
Deutschen - ist zugleich die beste Sozialpolitik: Rentner, Sparer sowie 
Bürgerinnen und Bürger mit kleinen Einkommen sind ganz besonders 
darauf angewiesen, daß ihr Geld seinen Wert behält”. Helmut Kohl, 
Bundeskanzler, 2.04.1998. 
Finally, the government presents the negotiated features of the EMU as based 
on objective and universal truths. For example, while pointing out the benefits of the 
common currency in Europe, Kohl refers to the “scientific discussion”, which pro-
vides the exact numbers that represent the volumes of money saved by the enterprises 
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from the elimination of the exchange rates. Then, he just instantly assumes that these 
savings will appear as investments and employment in Germany and Europe. Never-
theless, it creates an impression among the audience that the latter is also supported 
by the scientific knowledge. 
“… aus der wissenschaftlichen Diskussion wissen wir, daß der Wegfall 
des Wechselkursrisikos für die Unternehmen in den Euroländern Ein-
sparungen in einer zweistelligen Milliardenhöhe ermöglicht. Denn mit 
der Einführung des Euro entfällt die teure Absicherung gegen Wech-
selkursschwankungen. Die gemeinsame europäische Währung wird 
das Klima für Investitionen und Beschäftigung auch bei uns in 
Deutschland und in Europa nachhaltig verbessern”. Helmut Kohl, 
Bundeskanzler, 2.04.1998. 
Similarly, the claim of convergence among the member states is supported by the “in-
dependent” analysis of the European Commission, European Monetary Institute, and 
the Bundesbank, using the criteria of inflation, interest rates, budgetary consolidation, 
and public debt. The EMU is described as “right” based on the rational and objective 
arguments. 
There are several contradictions, which can be noticed in the linkage of Euro-
pean integration and the EMU promoted by the governmental sub-discourse. The sig-
nificance of the decision to launch the EMU was often compared and historically 
placed with the events in the German („the present of German re-unification”, Helmut 
Kohl, Bundeskanzler, 2.04.1998, translation S.M.), European (a step forward in the 
European unification), and global politics (the most important event since the collapse 
of communism) that all have a positive image through their associations with freedom 
and democratization.  
“Die Verwirklichung der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und 
Währungsunion ist in ihren Konsequenzen die bedeutendste Entschei-
dung seit der deutschen Wiedervereinigung. Sie ist die tiefgreifendste 
Veränderung auf unserem europäischen Kontinent seit dem Zusam-
menbruch des kommunistischen Imperiums. Und sie ist zugleich der 
wichtigste Meilenstein im europäischen Einigungsprozeß seit 
Gründung der Montanunion 1951 und seit Gründung der Europäischen 
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft im Jahre 1957”. Helmut Kohl, Bun-
deskanzler, 2.04.1998. 
Interestingly, all of these events are political in their nature and have strong political 
implications, whereas the same government describes the EMU as technical, apoliti-
cal, or ideologically neutral.  
While the German interest in promoting European integration was central for 
the governmental sub-discourse, and the EMU is considered as a unique opportunity 
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to push the integration project forward due to the symbolism of currency and its ef-
fects on identity, the government actually rejected the proposals of the opposition, 
which would in fact mean even deeper integration. The former tried to cultivate the 
image of the opposition as supporters of a European superstate, which would elimi-
nate the distinctive features of the German political system. In this context, the notion 
of subsidiarity is regularly used as a democratic principle of preserving the diversity 
and closeness of political decisions to the people. It is opposed to the centralistic Eu-
ropean community “demanded by the opposition”. This discursive frame makes the 
government appear as a protector of the German social policies established according 
to high standards of the social market economy and tariff autonomy. 
“In der Europäischen Union stehen wir erst am Anfang eines sozialen 
Dialogs, in den die Tarifpartner eingebunden sind. In Deutschland ha-
ben wir bereits eine lange und gute Tradition der Partnerschaft 
zwischen Politik, Arbeitgebern und Gewerkschaften. Dieses 
Miteinander ermöglicht es, sich auf gemeinsame Ziele zu verständigen, 
ohne daß die notwendige streitige Auseinandersetzung um den bes-
seren Weg dabei unterbunden wird. Damit ist auch die Selbstverpflich-
tung aller Beteiligten verbunden, ihren eigenen, ihren konkreten Bei-
trag zur Verwirklichung der Ziele zu leisten. Auf der Ebene der Eu-
ropäischen Union müssen wir diese Art der Partnerschaft erst noch 
entwickeln und ausbauen”. Helmut Kohl, Bundeskanzler, 12.11.1997. 
The governmental discourse has its heroes and villains: courageous, true to the 
principles, and strategic visionaries compete with anxious and opportunistic opposi-
tion. Conveying the positive image of the German re-unification and European inte-
gration as the one associated with freedom and piece, Kohl instantly creates a nega-
tive image of anyone who is against the EMU. The latter are described as regressive, 
the same groups who resisted the German unification. Although the opposition criti-
cized the content, not the idea of EMU itself, the government presents the opposition 
as generally being against the EMU. Such a strategy provides a framework in order to 
escape the necessity to actually give answers to the criticism of content. 
Nevertheless, the government briefly mentioned the points of criticism by the 
opposition – economic welfare, social security, and necessity to increase employment 
in Germany and Europe – as only being possible within the framework of the Europe-
an unification that would be deepened through the EMU.  
“Hinter uns liegt die Epoche des kalten Krieges und der Konfrontation; 
vor uns öffnet sich eine neue Ära mit neuen Möglichkeiten, aber eben 
auch mit neuen politischen, sozialen, wirtschaftlichen und auch 
ökologischen Aufgaben. Für viele dieser Aufgaben ist der National-
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staat zu klein. Nur wer bereit ist, Souveränität zu teilen, gewinnt Hand-
lungsfähigkeit. Das bedeutet für uns: Wir brauchen ein modernes, leis-
tungsstarkes Europa der Bürger. … In Maastricht wurde der Euro bes-
chlossen, eine strategische Weichenstellung, damit sich Europa im 
Zeitalter der Globalisierung behaupten kann”. Klaus Kinkel, Bundes-
minister des Auswärtigen, 11.12.1997. 
This type of argumentation attaches the future social security, welfare, and employ-
ment to the EMU, although none of these policy areas have been directly included in 
the project of the EMU. So, while the opposition argued for a certain degree of Euro-
pean harmonization in the fields of social protection and employment, the government 
claimed that the German social protection and employment would be protected under 
European integration. Therefore, the government used the same notions as opposition 
but connected them to the European integration rather than the EMU itself. According 
to the government, a direct harmonization would not be realistic due to lack of will of 
Germany’s partners to take over the high social and environmental standards, which 
already exist in Germany. In this context, the lower standards are considered as a 
competitive advantage.  
“Eine solche Politik wäre ganz und gar unrealistisch, um nicht zu 
sagen unehrlich, weil wir genau wissen, daß in Europa niemand bereit 
wäre, sich jetzt beispielsweise auf unsere hohen Sozial- und Umwelt-
standards einzulassen. Schließlich würde das für unsere Partner bedeu-
ten, zugunsten Deutschlands auf eigene Wettbewerbsvorteile zu ver-
zichten. Eine solche Politik ist auch deswegen gefährlich, weil nur eine 
Harmonisierung auf einem niedrigeren Niveau zustande käme”. 
Helmut Kohl, Bundeskanzler, 2.04.1998. 
According to the governmental discourse, harmonization demanded by the opposition 
is not necessary in order to preserve high levels of employment in Germany because 
elimination of the exchange rates will create employment by itself through reduction 
of the risks for the German exports. 
 
5.3.2. Governmental sub-discourse: Schröder government 
 By the end of 1998, the social-democratic and green coalition government led 
by Gerhard Schröder substituted the conservative-liberal one. Although by that time 
the debate on the EMU had passed its peak, the debate has not been finished yet. The 
new government attempted to shift the focus to growth and employment as well as 
democracy within the EMU. It must be mentioned that the new government was also 
in favour of the price stability and budgetary consolidation. Yet, it also pursued the 
goal of extending the existing stability policy with a European employment policy.  
	 123	
“Der Euro, von dem ich eingangs geredet habe, hat seinen ersten 
Härtetest auf den Märkten bestanden. Seine Akzeptanz in der 
Bevölkerung nimmt zu. Aber wenn wir diesen Trend halten wollen, 
müssen wir uns darüber im klaren sein, daß unsere Stabilitäts- und 
Konsolidierungsanstrengungen, die auch in Zukunft ohne Abstriche 
nötig sein werden, nur dann die Unterstützung der Bürgerinnen und 
Bürger finden, wenn wir sie durch eine wirksame Koordinierung der 
Wirtschafts-, Finanz- und Sozialpolitik in Europa ergänzen. Das ist die 
Aufgabe, die in der nächsten Zeit vor uns liegt. Ein Stabilitätspakt 
ohne Beschäftigungspakt muss auf Dauer wirkungslos bleiben. Wir 
müssen diesen Beschäftigungspakt genauso ernst nehmen, wie wir 
auch weiterhin die Verabredungen zur Stabilitätsorientierung ernst 
nehmen warden”. Gerhard Schröder, Bundeskanzler, 10.12.1998. 
It was repeatedly stated that the EMU must have a purpose of growth and employ-
ment, as, with the EMU, the employment problem can only be solved on the Europe-
an level. Therefore, stronger economic and social policy coordination would be nec-
essary. This coordination should be accompanied by the inclusion of social partners 
and stronger accountability of the ECB towards the European Parliament.  
“Dabei entspricht es entwickelter und guter europäischer Tradition 
demokratisch verfaßter Gesellschaften - auch deshalb steht dies darin -, 
daß zum Beispiel die Europäische Zentralbank ihre in voller Sou-
veränität gefaßten geldpolitischen Entscheidungen regelmäßig dem 
Europäischen Parlament darlegen wird. Was spricht dagegen?” Ger-
hard Schröder, Bundeskanzler, 10.11.1998. 
Therefore, the new government was determined to bring in a few modifica-
tions in the overall functioning of the EMU, which was reflected in its discourse. 
However, the negotiation process on the EMU had already been closed, making it 
harder for the Schröder government to intervene with amendments. This government 
re-shaped the discourse on the EMU mainly in two aspects: first, the inclusion and 
Europeanization of the collective bargaining process and labour market institutions 
and, second, the necessity to reform the SGP where the specific circumstances of the 
member states’ debt should be regarded. These circumstances would have to include 
investment in the future growth, consequences of the German re-unification, and the 
German contributions to the EU budget.  
To sum up, while the discourse on the EMU did not changed radically in 
Germany during this period, its focus slightly shifted towards the employment issues. 
The problem of unemployment and the question of how to reach the possibly highest 
levels of employment is a different discourse, but this discourse is related to the dis-
course on the EMU due to the link with economic growth.  
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5.3.3. Parliamentary sub-discourse: the CDU/CSU, the FDP, the SPD, the Bündnis 
90/die Grünen, and the PDS 
The governmental sub-discourse is usually accompanied by the communica-
tions of the parliamentary parties, which either support or oppose the governmental 
sub-discourse. When the CDU/CSU and the FDP were in a governing coalition, the 
representatives of these parties supported the governmental sub-discourse, underlining 
the importance of European integration and the economic benefits of the EMU for the 
German economy. The main concerns in this case were the stability of the new cur-
rency and respect for the principle of subsidiarity, which is supposed to protect the 
social market economy and the tariff autonomy.  
“Ihre Frage, ob man Beschäftigungspolitik zu Hause oder anderswo 
macht, ist gar nicht so wichtig. Entscheidend ist das Grundverständnis 
von sozialer Marktwirtschaft und Tarifautonomie und ob man dazu ja 
oder nein sagt. Sie glauben darin sind Sie wahrscheinlich in den 
Gesprächen mit Herrn Jospin sogar bestärkt worden -, daß der Staat 
durch möglichst viel Regulierung möglichst viel erreichen könne. Wir 
glauben das nicht, sondern wir glauben das Gegenteil. Wir sind vom 
Gegenteil überzeugt. …Wir haben Tarifautonomie, und das ist gut so. 
Also dürfen wir die Verantwortung für den Arbeitsmarkt nicht in erster 
Linie bei der Politik suchen, weil dann die Tarifpartner aus ihrer 
Verantwortung entlassen werden und falsche Entscheidungen treffen”. 
Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU/CSU), 2.04.1998. 
Concerning the two biggest oppositional parties, the SPD and the Bündnis 
90/die Grünen, both parties supported the idea of monetary integration, but each party 
had a slightly different emphasis in criticizing the project presented by the govern-
ment. In the parliament, only the PDS actually opposed the EMU and the German 
membership in it. For this reason, the PDS sub-discourse played a rather marginal role 
and is not considered in depth here.  
While agreeing with the government on the importance of European integra-
tion and on the necessity to ensure the stability of the new currency, the SPD opposi-
tion presented monetary integration as an urgent necessity under the conditions of 
globalization.  
“Die Entscheidungen der amerikanischen Notenbank beeinflussen 
weltweit das jeweilige Zinsniveau und haben Auswirkungen auf die 
Arbeitsplätze in allen europäischen Ländern. Schnelle Speku-
lationsbewegungen und Wechselkursschwankungen führen zu Verlust 
von Arbeitsplätzen in all unseren Staaten. Unternehmen spüren Wech-
selkursveränderungen und Schwankungen innerhalb weniger Tage. 
Nach Schätzungen der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Institute sind auf 
diese Art und Weise allein in Deutschland 250 000 Arbeitsplätze ver-
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lorengegangen. Darum halten wir das Projekt einer europäischen 
Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion wirtschaftlich und politisch für drin-
gend notwendig”. Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul (SPD), 15.05.1997. 
It was argued that a monetary union could potentially protect the member states from 
the negative effects of globalization and give them more independence in shaping 
their economic and social policies. Also, the benefits of the EMU for enterprises and 
exporters were present in the discourse. However, two central concerns dominated in 
the communications of the SPD representatives: growth and employment. The opposi-
tion saw the danger of European economies growing apart in a situation where growth 
and employment policies were absent on the European agenda.  
“Nun will ich von unserer Seite ein Risiko deutlich machen: Es geht 
nicht um das Risiko der Lohnentwicklung, meine Damen und Herren - 
das ist leider ein fundamentales Mißverständnis wirtschaftlicher 
Zusammenhänge -, sondern es geht um das Risiko auseinanderdrift-
ender Lohnstückkostenentwicklungen, das wir aus der deutsch-
deutschen Vereinigung kennen, das wir in Europa auf Grund der 
großen Exportüberschüsse der deutschen Volkswirtschaft kennen und 
das zu einem wirklichen Problem der Europäischen Gemeinschaft 
werden wird…. Da gibt es etwas, was wir Deutsche wissen müssen: Es 
ist nicht gut - nun komme ich wieder auf die Themen 
Standortwettbewerb und Kostensenkungswettlauf zu sprechen -, wenn 
eine Volkswirtschaft zu Lasten der anderen ständig steigende Expor-
tüberschüsse hat. Der Forderung des Stabilitätsgesetzes, unter anderem 
auch außenwirtschaftliches Gleichgewicht anzustreben, liegt eine tiefe 
ökonomische Einsicht zugrunde, die in den letzten Jahren mehr und 
mehr verlorengegangen ist”. Oskar Lafontaine, Ministerpräsident 
(Saarland), 2.04.1998. 
It was claimed that monetary integration would change the circumstances for the la-
bour markets, whereas monetary policy was presented as a substantial part of the em-
ployment policy.  
“Wer die Unabhängigkeit der Zentralbank ins Feld führt und wer um 
die Bedeutung der Geldpolitik weiß, der kann sich doch angesichts der 
Tatsache, daß die Geldpolitik jetzt europäisiert wird, nicht mehr hin-
stellen und sagen: Beschäftigungspolitik machen wir zu Hause. Nein, 
ein ganz wichtiger Abschnitt der Beschäftigungspolitik, nämlich die 
Geldpolitik, wird in Zukunft europäisch gestaltet werden. Das ist 
tatsächlich eine gewaltige Veränderung, und deshalb wird die Bes-
chäftigungspolitik mehr und mehr auf europäischer Ebene zu betreiben 
sein”. Oskar Lafontaine, Ministerpräsident (Saarland), 2.04.1998. 
The SPD opposition accused the government, unwilling to harmonize the policy areas 
related to the monetary policy, of triggering the kind of competition between the 
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member states as the one known from the private business, i.e., the competition be-
tween enterprises. 
“Ich möchte einen wichtigen Punkt aufgreifen: die Steuerharmonisier-
ung. Es ist einfach falsch, in einen Steuersenkungswettlauf zwischen 
den europäischen Staaten einzutreten. …Lösen Sie sich von dem 
Konzept, das meint, Staaten konkurrierten miteinander wie Betriebe. 
Erkennen Sie, daß wir eine Harmonisierung des europäischen Steuer-
systems brauchen. Im Grunde genommen müßte sie längst durch-
geführt sein, damit die europäische Währung funktionieren kann”. Os-
kar Lafontaine, Ministerpräsident (Saarland), 2.04.1998. 
Concerning the demand of harmonization, the SPD opposition pointed out that it 
would not be about all the other European states taking over the higher German 
standards, but rather agreeing on the European minimal standards. 
For the Bündnis 90/die Grünen, the goal of deeper integration and more sover-
eignty transfer was of central importance. The members of this party argued in favour 
of the transfer of more competences on the EU level, including the employment poli-
cy. 
“Wir müssen doch eine gemeinsame politische Anstrengung machen, 
um endlich von diesen 18 Millionen Arbeitslosen in Europa herunter-
zukommen. Wenn sich die Währungsunion für die Menschen nur als 
eine kalte Veranstaltung der Märkte, als eine kalte geldpolitische 
Veranstaltung darstellen wird, für die die Mehrheit die Zeche in Form 
von Drohung von Arbeitslosigkeit oder realer Arbeitslosigkeit zahlen 
muß, dann wird dieses Projekt scheitern; und es darf nicht scheitern”. 
Joseph Fischer (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), 2.04.1998. 
The necessity of the future European currency to be stable was recognized, but 
the representatives of the party argued for a more relaxed interpretation of the Maas-
tricht criteria and for the inclusion of as many member states as possible.  
“Die fiskalischen Kriterien Neuverschuldung und Gesamtverschuldung 
sind ökonomisch aber sehr viel weniger aussagefähig. Sie wurden 
schlicht aus dem Durchschnitt der damaligen Verschuldungsver-
hältnisse gebildet. Sie sind genau deswegen mit Bedacht relativ offen 
formuliert worden. Ausgerechnet durch die Forderung nach strikter 
Einhaltung dieser Verschuldungskriterien versuchen deutsche Politiker 
und deutsche Ökonomen, unerwünschte EU-Länder von der 
Währungsunion fernzuhalten. Die strikte Einhaltung der Verschul-
dungskriterien entspricht weder den Buchstaben noch dem Geist des 
Maastrichter Vertrages. Der Maastrichter Vertrag zielt auf europäische 
Integration und nicht auf ein Kerneuropa. Diese Bundesrepublik hat 
den Vertrag völkerrechtlich verbindlich unterschrieben. Wer jetzt auf 
die Null hinter dem Komma schielt, stellt sich der europäischen Inte-
gration in den Weg”. Kristin Heyne (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), 
15.05.1997. 
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5.3.4. Sub-discourse of the Bundesbank  
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the position of the Bundesbank evolved 
from a sceptical to moderate, which can also be traced in the public statements of its 
representatives as well as official documents, such as the statement on convergence in 
the EU. By 1998, some advantages of the common currency were finally recognized. 
However, the central issue for the Bundesbank remained to be the necessity of a cer-
tain degree of convergence among the member states in order for the project of the 
new currency to be successfull.  
“Über diese Grundsatzaussage zur Bedeutung einer Währungsunion 
und zu den damit verbundenen Konsequenzen hinaus wurde in dieser 
Stellungnahme neben den institutionellen Voraussetzungen für eine 
gemeinschaftliche Geldpolitik auch die zentrale Bedeutung der stabili-
tätspolitischen Konvergenz vor Eintritt in die Endstufe der 
Währungsunion unterstrichen… 
…Die Bundesbank hat somit von Anfang an darauf hingewiesen, daß 
an die Konvergenzprüfung strenge Anforderungen gestellt werden 
müssen, um der Währungsunion Bestandsfestigkeit zu verleihen”. 
Deutsche Bundesbank, Monatsbericht April 1998. 
According to the Bundesbank, the convergence must be expressed in the elim-
ination of inflation, convergence of the price levels, reduction of the budgetary defi-
cits to sustainable levels, and convergence of the interest rates for the governmental 
bonds on the financial markets. The institution pointed out the need of structural re-
forms and financial discipline. The Bundesbank emphasized that the convergence can 
only be sustainable if both the central bank and the EMU generally are politically em-
bedded. For instance, this is how the president of the Bundesbank Hans Tietmeyer 
described the embeddedness of the Bundesbank in 1997: 
“The Bundesbank is independent, but it is not a state within a state: it 
was created by the legislative authority and is bound by its legally de-
fined mandate; from the beginning it took on itself the obligation to 
publicly present and give reasons for its policies; and it has a task to 
consult the federal government on significant issues related to mone-
tary policy. But the competence to make a decision here clearly be-
longs to the domain of politics”. Symposion “Mit der Sozialen 
Marktwirtschaft in das 21. Jahrhundert”. Hans Tietmeyer, President of 
the Bundesbank, 12.02.1997. 
In fact, the Bundesbank constantly emphasized the connection between the economic 
and monetary policy – in order to make monetary policy successful, there should be 
certain reforms in the economic policies of the member states. 
“Letztlich wird die Währungsunion um so besser gelingen, je flexibler 
die Güter-, Finanz- und Arbeitsmärkte sind. Und sie erfordert überall 
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eine Wirtschaftspolitik, die mit dem Ziel der Preisstabilität in Einklang 
steht”. Deutsche Bundesbank, Monatsbericht April 1998. 
Although known for its ordoliberal approach, the Bundesbank referred to employment 
as an important criterion in its statement on the EMU. Nevertheless, the budgetary 
criteria were obviously a priority for this institution. 
“In der die nationalstaatlichen Grenzen übergreifenden 
Währungsunion können immer wieder Divergenzen auftreten, auf die 
es mit nationalen Maußnahmen der Wirtschafts-, Finanz- und Sozi-
alpolitik, nicht aber mit der unionsweit einheitlichen Geldpolitik zu 
reagieren gilt. So könnte eine in den einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten unter-
schiedlich hohe Arbeitslosigkeit eine beträchtliche Belastung für die 
Währungsunion werden. Dem steht jedoch auf der anderen Seite die 
Chance gegenüber, daß die Währungsunion längerfristig die Bed-
ingungen für mehr Beschäftigung verbessert”. Deutsche Bundesbank, 
Monatsbericht April 1998. 
 
5.3.5. The German trade union association: Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) 
Trade unions generally favoured the EMU and recognized the opportunity it 
could offer for the German exports. Regarding the umbrella organisation of the Ger-
man trade unions, there were four central topics: employment policy, the issue of 
harmonization of the social and ecologic standards, questioning of austerity, and a 
demand of inclusion of social partners on the European level. In the DGB’s state-
ments, the problem was described as sharpening of competition through the EMU. It 
was argued that the monetary integration has potential to bring gains in welfare, 
which is currently endangered by globalization; however, the distribution of those 
gains depends on the overall regulatory conditions.  
“Die wirtschafts- und Währungsunion (und der Binnenmarkt) führen 
zu Wohlstandsgewinnen. Die personelle und regionale Verteilung der 
Wohlstandsgewinne sowie die Beschäftigungswirkungen hängen 
entscheidend von den politischen Rahmenbedingungen ab”. Gew-
erkschaftliche Thesen zur europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsun-
ion, 1997. 
Therefore, in order to strengthen the growth and secure employment, either a Europe-
an employment policy or at least a close coordination of the member states’ employ-
ment policies must emerge. In fact, the DGB claimed that the EMU required defini-
tion of the employment policy on the European level with the inclusion of all relevant 
actors.  
“Ohne die strukturellen Ursachen der Arbeitslosigkeit verniedlichen zu 
wollen, entscheidend für eine aktive Beschäftigungspolitik, sind 
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wirtschaftliches Wachstum und verbesserte Rahmenbedingungen. 
Diese können nur bei besserem Zusammenwirken und aktiver Be-
teiligung der für Geld-, Fiskal- und Lohnpolitik verantwortlichen Ak-
teure geschaffen werden. Mit der Währungsunion in Europa und der 
Schaffung der Europäischen Zentralbank, "kann dieser Abstimmung-
sprozess nicht mehr nur auf nationaler Ebene stattfinden," so Heinz 
Putzhammer”. DGB, Pressemitteilung 117, 7.06.1999. 
Also, it was emphasized that the tariff policy must be coordinated on the European 
level. The DGB insisted on including the basic right on the freedom of trans-border 
coalition and a social protocol in the Treaty.  
“Um einer ruinösen Konkurrenz um soziale Standards in Europa 
entgegenzuwirken müßten Arbeitnehmerrechte abgesichert und soziale 
Mindeststandards durchgesetzt werden. Soziale Grundrechte, die zum 
Kernbestand europäischer Werte gehören, wie Schutz vor Diskrimi-
nierung, Koalitionsfreiheit und Recht auf grenzüberschreitende 
Tarifverhandlungen sowie Unterrichtung, Anhörung und Mitwirkung 
der Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Interessenvertretung müßten europaweit 
garantiert werden”. DGB, Pressemitteilung 103, 27.05.1997. 
The DGB representatives rejected austerity as a solution for the employment 
problem, describing it as “exaggerated” and an “excuse for government to pursue un-
fair redistribution policy” (DGB, PM 065, 25.03.1998, translation S.M.). The organi-
sation also warned against the strict interpretation of the Maastricht criteria and, espe-
cially, the delay of the EMU, as it would result in an upgrade of the D-Mark. That 
happening would have devastating consequences for the employment and internal 
market.  
According to the DGB, not only the labour market and structural policies 
should be embedded in the growth policy but also an agreement on the social and eco-
logic standards should be achieved, preventing the race to the bottom. 
“Zur besseren Bewältigung des sich verschärfenden Wettbewerbs for-
dere der DGB ein Aktionsprogramm zur Verbesserung der qualitativen 
Standortbedingungen mit den Schwerpunkten Qualifizierung, Innova-
tion und Umweltschutz sowie gezielte Hilfen für kleine und Hand-
werksunternehmen, das im Rahmen eines neuen Bündnisses für Arbeit 
unter Beteiligung der Sozialpartner und Bundesländer mit konkreten 
Verpflichtungen für die Beteiligten festgelegt werden sollte. Zur 
Bekämpfung unfairer Wettbewerbsbedingungen müßten auf eu-
ropäischer Ebene darüber hinaus die notwendigen sozialen und 
ökologischen Mindeststandards gesetzlich fixiert werden - die Gew-
erkschaften werden ihre Tarifpolitik, zum Beispiel bei Forderungen 
und Laufzeiten, europäisch koordinieren”. DGB, Pressemitteilung 092, 
7.05.1998. 
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5.3.6. The German employers’ association: Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Ar-
beitgeberverbände (BDA) 
While emphasizing the economic advantages of the EMU for Germany, the 
BDA expressed its strong support for the monetary integration. 
“Die Vollendung der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion war auch für 
die deutsche Wirtschaft von Anfang an ein Ziel, für das wir kämpften. 
Wir haben uns in den letzten Jahren besonders stark für die termin-
gerechte Einführung des Euro eingesetzt. Denn erst jetzt können wir 
alle Vorteile des Binnenmarktes ausschöpfen.” Dieter Hundt, Arbeit-
geberpräsident, 10.02.1999. 
According to the BDA, the new European financial market would offer great 
opportunities for enterprises. Especially the small and medium enterprises would 
profit from the common currency. But in order for the potential of the monetary union 
to be fully realized, reforms that would guarantee the convergence among the member 
states’ economies and the price stability are crucial. 
“Der Euro stellt uns auch längerfristige Aufgaben, die wir meistern 
müssen. Nach der Konvergenz von Maastricht brauchen wir nun eine 
fortgesetzte Konvergenz der Anstrengungen. Der Abbau der Neu-
verschuldung und der Gesamtverschuldung war keine einmalige An-
strengung, um den Euro zu bekommen und dann die Zügel wieder 
schleifen zu lassen, sondern ist eine Daueraufgabe zur Erreichung des 
gemeinsamen Ziels: Die Preisstabilität in der Euro-Zone!” Dieter 
Hundt, Arbeitgeberpräsident, 10.02.1999. 
Moreover, the BDA constantly emphasized that the new common currency 
should be based on the market principles. The ordoliberal discourse of the govern-
ment provided favourable conditions for the employers’ organization to promote its 
interests in promoting the labour market liberalization. The president of the BDA Di-
eter Hundt demanded wage restraint, referring to the increased responsibility of the 
wage policies for the competitiveness of the region. Flexibilization of the labour mar-
ket and wage restraint were presented as the two crucial policy options that would 
lead to more employment. 
Finally, according to the BDA, tax and financial policies, as well as social and 
employment policies must remain a national responsibility. The reference to the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity was used in support of this logic. 
“Diese Erkenntnisse sind nicht neu - wir wissen, gerade aus unserer 
föderalen Tradition, daß problemnahe Lösungen am besten auf re-
gionaler Ebene gefunden werden. Unsere guten Erfahrungen damit 
konnten wir auch auf europäischer Ebene einbringen. Deshalb gibt es 
den Subsidiaritätsartikel im Maastrichter Vertrag. Und deshalb hat 
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eben dieser Vertrag auch nur die Geldpolitik supranationalisiert und 
nur eine neue Institution geschaffen, nämlich die Europäische Zentral-
bank. Finanz- und Lohnpolitik bleiben laut EU-Vertrag in nationaler 
Verantwortung, daran muß man immer wieder erinnern. Denn den 
monetären Standard kann man vereinheitlichen, nicht aber die region-
ale Fiskalpolitik. Die Vorstellung Maßnahmen und Mittelver-
wendungen einzelner Regierungen zentral vorzugeben ist geradezu ab-
surd, wenn man sich die Vielfalt der europäischen Staaten und ihrer 
Gesellschaften vor Augen hält.” Dieter Hundt, Arbeitgeberpräsident, 
10.02.1999. 
 
5.3.7. Summarizing the discourse analysis 
The entire elite discourse in Germany between the years 1997 and 2000 can be 
divided into the dominating and marginal sub-discourses. Powerful actors, including 
the government, the parliamentary opposition, as well as the employee and business 
associations represented the dominating discourse. In the parliament, only one rela-
tively small party, the Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS), represented the 
marginal discourse. Within the dominating discourse, all parties agreed on the posi-
tive aspects and necessity of the monetary integration in the EU. Also, the representa-
tives of the dominating discourse shared the idea that the stability of the new currency 
must be guaranteed.  
Nevertheless, it would not be fair to claim that the dominating discourse in 
this period was homogeneous. In the case of Germany between the years of 1997 and 
2000, two discourse coalitions can be identified. I will refer to them as the ordoliberal 
discourse coalition, which included the Kohl government, the CDU/CSU, the FDP, 
the Bundesbank, and the BDA; and the social democratic coalition, including the 
SPD, the government of Schröder, the Bündnis 90/ die Grünen, as well as the DGB.  
The nodal points of this discourse were the aspects concerning employment 
policy, economic policy, European unification, austerity, convergence, harmonization 
in other policy fields (taxation and social policy), stability of the new currency, sover-
eignty transfer versus subsidiarity, and the democratic aspects of further integration. 
The framing of the discourse by the two discourse coalitions diverges in all nodal 
points with the exception of the European integration and the general support for the 
EMU. Yet it is crucial that neither the basic assumptions on the EMU that were intro-
duced by the ordoliberal coalition nor the overall agenda of the Kohl government 
concerning the EMU were generally questioned or challenged by the social democrat-
ic coalition. The latter rather attempted to extend the agenda, bringing in new points, 
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which would, according to these actors, improve and correct the overall functioning 
of the EMU. Such a constellation strengthened the ordoliberal sub-discourse and sig-
nificantly contributed to the image of certain assumptions and features of the EMU as 
being impartial, universally right. 
Concerning the groups of population represented by the discourse coalitions, 
actors across the discourse coalitions mentioned interest of the German exporters, 
who would benefit from the EMU. The actors of the ordoliberal coalition claimed to 
promote the interest of business (small and medium enterprises), but the government 
led by Kohl also claimed to represent the interest of people with savings and small 
income. The social democratic coalition argued in the interest of labour.  
The main issues of the discursive contestation include the issue of closer eco-
nomic and social policy coordination, introduction of some elements of employment 
policy at the European level, and a European agenda for growth, as well as applica-
tion of the convergence criteria and the SGP. An important difference between the 
coalitions was the expressed wish to extend the economic part of the EMU with the 
issues of employment. In this context, it was made clear that there were no intentions 
to break with the subsidiarity principle but rather to institutionalize the cross-border 
representation of labour, minimal social standards, and an employment criteria in the 
similar manner as the Stability and Growth Pact provided some criteria for the budg-
etary policies. These demands of the social democratic sub-discourse were rejected by 
the ordoliberal governing coalition with the argument of non-conformity with the ex-
isting European legal provisions (subsidiarity) and lack of will of the other govern-
ments to agree on this topic. The demands were often framed by the ordoliberal coali-
tion as a quest for a centralized European superstate. In this case, a European norm 
that was once decided on pre-determines the content of the future agenda. In fact, Eu-
ropean integration itself represents an example of a slow and gradual transfer of com-
petences on the supra-national level based on negotiations and reach of a consensus. 
Therefore, what does or does not correspond to subsidiarity is often not obvious and 
not universal. Since the Treaty on the European Community of Coal and Steel in 
1951, the provisions were fundamentally re-considered nine times, proving a high de-
gree of volatility of the European basic law that is incomparable with the rather stable 
character of the Constitutions of the EU member states. 
Which conclusions can be drawn from the democratic perspective regarding 
this period of analysis? Certainly some degree of contestation in the discourse can be 
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identified, as in fact different visions of the EMU have been presented. The analysis 
showed some signs of conflict, which is rooted in the values and identities of different 
actors and manifested in their policy definitions and preferences. Yet this conflict is 
not clearly recognizable in the discourse because there a general consensus was on the 
participation of the country in European integration and some parameters of the future 
EMU.  
However, the consensus on the EMU was not complete, and the strengthening 
of the ordoliberal discourse against its alternatives has political and democratic con-
sequences. Controlling the agenda, the ordoliberal coalition did not prove to be coop-
erative or have an intention to modify its position in the course of deliberation. In fact, 
an in depth discussion of the proposals put forward by the social democratic discourse 
coalition did not take place. Moreover, when the government changed after elections, 
the new government changed the ordoliberal focus of the discourse but had little room 
to manoeuvre in terms of policy change, and its policy preference could not be im-
plemented fully. Finally, both the evolving context of governance and discourse 
proved to weaken the position of labour. While its preferences were present in the 
domestic discourse, these preferences were completely excluded in the final results of 
the decision-making without the dynamic discourse analysis to show any signs of 
consensus or compromise. 
Although the dominating discourse in Germany of that period had a clear Eu-
ropean dimension, it still preserved focus on the national interest and benefits. How-
ever, the “national” interest presented during the negotiations on the European level 
did not express a consensus, a domestic model, or a result of the popular vote. In fact, 
a policy preference of the ordoliberal discourse coalition became the “national” inter-
est. The fact that one of the main actors in the negotiations of the EMU on the Euro-
pean level promoted a policy preference implies exclusion. 
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Table	4:	Discourse	on	the	EMU	in	Germany,	1997-2000 	
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European	integration/	monetary	integration	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✖	 !	 ✔	 ✔	Stability	of	the	future	currency	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 !	 ✔	 !	 ✔	Interest	of	the	German	exporters	 ✔	 !	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 !	 !	 !	 ✔	 ✔	Budgetary	consolidation/	austerity	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 !	 !	 ✖	 ✔	 ✖	 ✔	Structural	reforms	 ✔	 !	 ✔	 ✔	 !	 !	 ✖	 ✔	 !	 ✔	Closer	European	economic	policy	coordina-tion	*	 ✖	 ✔	 ✖	 ✖	 ✔	 ✔	 !	 ✔	 ✔	 !	Strict	interpretation	of	the	convergence	crite-ria	*	 ✔	 ✖	 ✔	 ✔	 !	 ✖	 ✖	 ✔	 ✖	 ✔	European	employment	policy	*	 ✖	 ✔	 ✖	 ✖	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 !	 ✔	 ✖	Competitiveness	 ✔	 !	 ✔	 ✔	 !	 !	 !	 !	 !	 ✔	Interest	of	business/enterprises	 ✔	 !	 ✔	 ✔	 !	 !	 !	 !	 !	 ✔	Subsidiarity	 ✔	 !	 ✔	 ✔	 !	 !	 !	 !	 !	 ✔	Interest	of	labor	 !	 ✔	 !	 !	 ✔	 !	 ✖	 !	 ✔	 !	Economic	convergence	based	on	the	conver-gence	criteria	 ✔	 !	 ✔	 ✔	 !	 !	 ✖	 ✔	 !	 !	Modernization	as	liberalization	 ✔	 !	 ✔	 ✔	 !	 !	 ✖	 !	 ✖	 ✔	Closer	social	policy	coordination	*	 ✖	 ✔	 ✖	 ✖	 ✔	 ✔	 !	 !	 ✔	 !	European	policy	for	growth	*	 ✖	 ✔	 ✖	 ✖	 ✔	 !	 ✔	 !	 ✔	 ✖	Democratic	concerns	 ✖	 ✔	 !	 !	 ✔	 !	 !	 !	 ✔	 !	Inclusion	of	social	partners	on	the	EU	level	 ✖	 ✔	 !	 !	 ✔	 !	 !	 !	 ✔	 !	Flexibilization	of	the	SGP	*	 ✖	 ✔	 ✖	 ✖	 ✔	 ✔	 !	 ✖	 !	 !	Interest	of	the	small	and	medium	enterprises	 ✔	 !	 !	 !	 !	 !	 !	 !	 !	 ✔	Interest	of	the	people	with	savings	 ✔	 !	 !	 !	 !	 !	 !	 !	 !	 !	Interest	of	the	people	with	small	income	 ✔	 !	 !	 !	 !	 !	 !	 !	 !	 !	
✔	-	agreed/	promoted;	✖	-	disagreed/	rejected;	!	-	not	central/	absent.	Points	with	*	-	issues	of	main	contestation.	
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5.4. The elite discourse on the EMU in Germany between the years 2010 and 
2015: the social democratic opposition and re-established convergence towards 
the ordoliberal discourse	
 The second discursive period examined in this chapter covered two coalition 
governments – the CDU/CSU and the FDP coalition government of Angela Merkel 
(October 2009 – December 2013), followed by the CDU/CSU and the SPD coalition 
government of Angela Merkel (from December 2013).  
 
5.4.1. Governmental sub-discourse: Merkel government II 
The coalition government formed by the CDU/CSU and the FDP was in pow-
er from October of 2009 until December of 2013. The communications of the chan-
cellor Angela Merkel (CDU), the Federal Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schäuble 
(CDU), as well as the vice chancellor and the minister of Foreign Affairs Guido 
Westerwelle (FDP) are regarded as representative for the governmental sub-discourse 
on the EMU. As this sub-discourse experienced certain changes over time, it is neces-
sary to describe it in phases. In my opinion, three phases can be identified through this 
period: the first phase, from 2010 until mid-2012; the second phase, from 2012 until 
the end of 2013; and the third phase, which starts with the new coalition government 
in 2013. These phases are not solid, meaning that they do not represent a beginning 
and an end of a certain discursive framework. As there is a strong continuity through 
the whole period from 2010 until 2015, the phases are rather fluid and are meant to 
emphasize the dominance or loss of significance of certain discursive elements. Thus, 
both elements of continuity and dynamic will be described below.    
Starting with those elements, which were continuously present in the govern-
mental sub-discourse, the proclaimed goal must be mentioned first. According to the 
governmental sub-discourse, the main goal was to achieve the stability culture in the 
European Union because this stability would be the key to a stronger competitiveness. 
The measures of budgetary consolidation and structural reforms were promoted as the 
main policy tools to establish the stability culture. 
The interpretation of crisis and its reasons corresponded to this logic. It is de-
scribed as caused by the lack of competitiveness of some member states and large 
public debt due to “unsound” fiscal policies. The narrative “too many states lived 
above their means” was repeated in numerous communications by the government 
(for example Merkel, 19.05.2010; Schäuble 14.09.2011, translation S.M.). Therefore, 
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the crisis was described as a state debt crisis that was caused by misbehaviour and 
lack of the strategic vision in some member states. Consequently, the solution offered 
by the governmental sub-discourse was based on austerity measures and structural 
reforms in those member states, which must aim at “convincing” or “winning back 
the trust” of the financial market actors.  
“Das ist zum Ersten die Schuldenkrise in einigen Staaten, also die 
übermäßige Staatsverschuldung auch durch die Konjunkturpro-
gramme, die in der Krise sichtbar geworden ist, aber im Grunde auch 
schon vorher angelegt war”. Angela Merkel, Bundeskanzlerin, 
17.11.2011. 
“Wir haben es mit einer Staatsschuldenkrise zu tun. Die Schulden-
stände einzelner Euro-Staaten sind zu hoch. Die Finanzmärkte haben 
infrage gestellt, ob diese Schuldenberge jemals wieder abgetragen 
werden können. Aus der Staatsschuldenkrise ist somit eine Vertrauen-
skrise geworden. Um Vertrauen zurückzugewinnen, müssen wir 
überzeugend darlegen, dass der Euro-Raum künftig ein Ort dauerhafter 
finanzieller Stabilität sein wird”. Guido Westerwelle, Bundesminister 
des Auswärtigen, 11.05.2012. 
Growth and employment were considered to be an exclusively national competence. 
They would both be achieved through the measures that increase the competitiveness. 
The ordoliberal view on economic policy, including its focus on the sound fi-
nance, was often illustrated by the successful example of Germany. In this case, the 
antagonistic image of good and bad was created by the description of Germany as a 
“growth engine” and “anchor of stability” where the politics “did its homework”; and 
the others – irresponsible, living wastefully, “above their means”.  
“Unsere Position in Europa ist gestärkt. Wir treten nicht arrogant auf. 
Aber als Wachstumslokomotive und Stabilitätsanker zugleich über-
nimmt Deutschland eine Vorbildfunktion für die künftige Ausgestal-
tung Europas”. Wolfgang Schäuble, Bundesminister der Finanzen, 
14.09.2011. 
“Griechenland kommt nicht an harter Konsolidierung vorbei. Das Land 
hat jahrelang über seine Verhältnisse gelebt”. Wolfgang Schäuble, 
Bundesminister der Finanzen, 14.09.2011. 
Consequently, the German model was offered as a pattern to be followed, and there-
fore the convergence on the European level should happen towards this model. Alt-
hough the advantages of the Euro zone for the German economy were clearly present 
in the discourse, the success of the German economy was attributed to the internal 
reforms for competitiveness and the ordoliberal policies of the past. Nevertheless, the 
government claimed that all the promoted measures for crisis management in the 
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member states were identified through an objective “analysis”, creating an impression 
of neutrality and independent knowledge.  
Both the ideas of eurobonds and transfer union were rejected as possible solu-
tions in this sub-discourse. It was argued that they would undermine the competition 
and eliminate the impulse for the national efforts to reform. Here, it is emphasized 
that solidarity should not mean mutualization of risks but provision of a long-term and 
in depth solution for the competitiveness problem. 
Another two narratives were continuously central in the governmental sub-
discourse: the principles of “solidity and solidarity” (“Eigenverantwortung und Soli-
darität”) and quid pro quo (“keine Leistung ohne Gegenleistung”). 
“Die deutsche Politik, die vom Bundestag mit großer Mehrheit getra-
gen wird, hat zwei Säulen: erstens die Säule der Solidarität – wir haben 
hier oft über die Pakete der Solidarität beraten –, zweitens die Säule 
der Solidität. Das heißt, es geht darum, dass wir nicht wieder in eine 
solche Krise kommen, und auch darum, dass wir strukturell aus der 
Krise herauskommen. Es gibt das berühmte Wort von den Chancen der 
Krise. Diese Chance der Krise wird heute genutzt, indem wir unsere 
Währung schützen und den Ländern, die in Schwierigkeiten geraten 
sind, Solidarität gewähren, und indem wir gleichzeitig auch die 
Grundlage dafür legen, dass Haushaltsdisziplin nicht nur eingehalten 
wird, sondern Verstöße gegen diese auch sanktioniert werden. Das 
heißt, dass wir zu einer Stabilitätskultur zurückkehren, wie sie ur-
sprünglich im Vertrag von Maastricht angelegt gewesen ist, die aber, 
wie wir wissen, in der Praxis, übrigens auch durch deutsches Zutun in 
den Jahren 2004 und 2005, aufgeweicht wurde”. Guido Westerwelle, 
Bundesminister des Auswärtigen, 7.03.2012. 
„Es gilt weiterhin für uns, dass Solidarität auf europäischer Ebene und 
Eigenverantwortung auf nationaler Ebene, das heißt dass Leistung und 
Gegenleistung, untrennbar zusammengehören“. Angela Merkel, Bun-
deskanzlerin, 7.07.2015*. 
 These narratives were spread in order to justify the financial assistance to the indebt-
ed countries. It basically means that solidarity will be offered under the condition of 
reforms only when each of the indebted countries carries responsibility for the crisis. 
If an indebted member state does not demonstrate the real efforts and deliver signs of 
improvement, there will be no financial support from the creditor states.  
Concerning the case of Greece specifically, it was argued that the assistance 
must be compatible with the European and the German law and would only be pro-
vided based on strict conditionality. As the narrative “Greece must be controlled” was 
widespread in the sub-discourse, it can be interpreted that the Greek government can-
not really be trusted to implement the reforms on its own. It was claimed that the aus-
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terity program by the Troika would improve the Greek competitiveness in the domain 
of economy. Similarly, Greece was also expected to implement severe reforms of its 
administration in the domain of politics. 
 
The first phase 
As mentioned above, there are some elements of the governmental sub-
discourse, which disappeared or lost their significance over the period of analysis. 
The first phase of discourse covers the period between 2010 and 2012. The topic of 
importance of European integration generally represented a significant part of the 
governmental sub-discourse during these years. It was claimed that the future of the 
country could not be separated from the European future where the preservation of the 
common currency plays a major role. Finally, the welfare in Germany would depend 
on the European welfare. While “Europe is currently at crossroads”, the deepening of 
integration was considered inevitable in order to resolve the crisis (Merkel, 
5.05.2010). 
The ideas of a debt cut and the participation of private creditors were both pre-
sent in the first phase of the governmental sub-discourse. Also, the crisis itself was 
interpreted in such a way that the activities of private banks were made partly respon-
sible for the situation. It was referred to primacy of politics over the financial markets 
and therefore the necessity to regulate the latter.  
“Ich sage auch in Richtung der Banken: Wenn jemand in unserer Ge-
sellschaft eine Gegenleistung erbringen muss, dann ist das nicht der 
Staat gegenüber den Banken, sondern dann sind das die Banken 
gegenüber dem Staat und damit gegenüber den Menschen in Deutsch-
land. Aus dieser Verantwortung werden wir sie nicht entlassen. Des-
halb werden wir uns mit Nachdruck für weitere Regulierungsmaßnah-
men bei Derivaten, Hedgefonds und Leerverkäufen in Europa und 
weltweit einsetzen; denn das Primat der Politik gegenüber den Fi-
nanzmärkten muss – das ist mein Ziel, das ist das Ziel der Bundesre-
gierung und sicherlich auch dieses Hohen Hauses – wiederhergestellt 
werden. Daran müssen wir arbeiten, und dabei werden wir nicht 
ruhen”. Angela Merkel, Bundeskanzlerin, 5.05.2010. 
After the adoption of the Euro-plus-pact, which included the voluntary participation 
of private creditors, and the agreement on the content of the Basel III, the topic started 
to slowly disappear from the governmental sub-discourse on the EMU.  
Similarly, some mistakes in the construction of the EMU were pointed out as 
the reasons for the crisis. The strengthening of the economic part of the EMU (eco-
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nomic union) was demanded, and it was repeated that a political union should be cre-
ated step by step. From the communications of the government representatives, it be-
comes clear what exactly they meant here: the economic stability culture should be 
achieved through strengthening the coordination and control over the member states’ 
budgets. Moreover, stricter sanctions should be introduced in order to avoid the future 
violations. While asserting that a monetary union necessarily requires a common vi-
sion of economic policy, the later is almost exclusively described in terms of competi-
tiveness. What is labelled as the common economic policy here, in fact means the 
convergence on the German model of competitiveness. 
Some of these claims of the governmental sub-discourse raise the issue of 
sovereignty, which was also present in the discourse of that period in a very contra-
dictive manner. On one side, it was repeated that the member states are sovereign 
above their budgets and budgetary policies.  
“Nein, Europa ist kein hierarchisches Gebilde, sondern eine Union. 
Die Länder haben Souveränität über ihre nationalen Haushalte”. Ange-
la Merkel, Bundeskanzlerin, 9.11.2011. 
On the other side, it was claimed that the connections between the members of the 
monetary union are so strong that one can hardly speak about independence anymore.  
“Was sich in den letzten Monaten immer deutlicher zeigt: Unsere 
Staaten sind im europäischen Währungsraum wirtschaftlich wie 
politisch so miteinander verknüpft, dass man kaum noch von 
vollkommen unabhängigen Entscheidungen sprechen kann”. Angela 
Merkel, Bundeskanzlerin, 9.11.2011. 
It has been claimed both that the control by the Commission of the budgetary drafts 
does not shrink sovereignty, and that the Euro-plus-pact provides binding regulations 
in the core of sovereignty.  
“Es versteht sich von selbst, dass wir natürlich darauf achten werden, 
dass der Grundsatz der Stabilität erst einmal eingehalten wird. Deshalb 
finde ich die Vorschläge der Kommission, die eine frühzeitige Vorlage 
der Haushaltsentwürfe auch in Brüssel vorsehen, richtig; denn das 
schränkt nicht die Budgethoheit der nationalen Parlamente ein, gibt der 
Europäischen Kommission aber die Möglichkeit, Stellung zu nehmen”. 
Angela Merkel, Bundeskanzlerin, 19.05.2010. 
“Dieser Fiskalvertrag soll dem Deutschen Bundestag in Kürze zur Rat-
ifizierung vorgelegt werden. Damit binden sich nationale Regierungen 
und nationale Parlamente in noch nie da gewesener Weise in einem 
Kernbereich nationaler Souveräbität, dem Haushaltsrecht”. Angela 
Merkel, Bundeskanzlerin, 27.02.2012. 
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Furthermore, it has been argued both that subsidiarity and democracy of the member 
states must be respected, and that economic policy coordination must cover sensitive 
areas such as labor market and tax systems. The governmental sub-discourse does not 
provide a resolution of these, in my opinion, contradictive statements. 
Concerning Greece, it was constantly stated that the credits to Greece are not 
only solidarity but also economic reasoning. Stability in Greece was important, as it 
would otherwise endanger the stability of the Euro zone as a whole. Along with the 
goal of establishing of the stability culture in the EMU mentioned above, there was a 
goal to protect the euro zone from the dangers of contagion. 
 
The second phase 
The second phase is identified from 2012 until the end of 2013, when the gov-
ernmental sub-discourse focused further on the competitiveness and promotion of 
structural reforms. These two notions became the cornerstone of the governmental 
communications during this period. Once the European unemployment problem, es-
pecially the youth unemployment, became the focus of European elite and public de-
bates, the government supported the “flexible and intentional” usage of structural 
funds for support of the small and medium enterprises. 
From my point of view, the second phase can be characterized as a transition 
phase where certain notions started to slowly disappear, but the discourse did not yet 
experience a serious transformation. Also, it must be mentioned that the total volume 
of communications on the topic of the EMU decreased in this period.   
 
5.4.2. Governmental sub-discourse: Merkel government III and the third phase of dis-
course 
With the grand coalition government of the CDU/CSU and the SPD in De-
cember of 2013, the discourse evolved further. While the Federal Chancellor Angela 
Merkel (CDU) and the Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU) preserved 
their positions in the government, Sigmar Gabriel (SPD) took the position of the vice 
chancellor as a result of the grand coalition agreement.  
In this period, the main focus of the discussions on the EMU was turned on 
Greece. The notion of impulses for growth appeared, but the debt cut, requested by 
the Greek government, was now categorically rejected. The results of the referendum 
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once again. Here, the chancellor Angela Merkel argued that each member state was 
partly sovereign but shares common responsibility with the other member states. 
„Die allgemeine Diskussion heute war sehr ernsthaft und auch sehr 
klar dahingehend, dass wir auf der einen Seite natürlich die Ergebnisse 
eines Referendums eines Landes respektieren, dass es aber auch 18 an-
dere Länder gibt, in denen auch politische Entscheidungen diskutiert 
werden und dass die Entscheidung über den Euro eine Entscheidung 
von 19 Mitgliedstaaten ist. Das heißt, wir haben bezüglich des Euro 
nicht die Souveränität eines einzelnen Staates, sondern wir haben die 
Souveränität von 19 Staaten. Das heißt, jeder hat nur noch eine geteilte 
Souveränität, und wir alle haben eine gemeinsame Verantwortung“. 
Angela Merkel, Bundeskanzlerin, 7.07.2015. 
This statement was aimed at justifying why the members of the EMU could simply 
ignore the results of the Greek referendum. It created an image of equality among the 
member states and fairness of the procedure where the Greek government with the 
mandate from its people was simply outvoted by the 18 other member states. It seems 
like the 18 other member states are homogenous and speak with one voice, which is 
highly questionable, taking into consideration ideological and national cleavages 
among the member states. Furthermore, the Chancellor herself actually acknowledged 
the difference in the basic understandings within the Euro-zone but argued that these 
differences are less important than the idea of the European unification. 
„Die neue Regierung traf Anfang des Jahres auf 18 weitere Regier-
ungen in der Euro-Gruppe, allesamt ebenfalls demokratisch gewählt, 
mit zum Teil völlig gegensätzlichen Wahlversprechen und politischen 
Grundüberzeugungen, aber mit einem gemeinsamen Bemühen: Mögen 
die politischen Unterschiede auch noch so groß sein, wir setzen uns 
dafür ein, dass Griechenland Mitglied der Euro-Zone bleiben kann; 
denn der Euro ist weit mehr als eine Währung, er steht wie keine 
zweite europäische Entscheidung für die Idee der europäischen 
Einigung. Dafür, dass Europa eine Schicksalsgemeinschaft ist und sich 
als Rechts- und Verantwortungsgemeinschaft über Parteigrenzen hin-
weg auszeichnet, dafür steht gerade auch der Euro“. Angela Merkel, 
Bundeskanzlerin, 17.07.2015. 
Finally, the German Chancellor emphasized that the European agreements do not de-
pend on elections and can only be changed by a unanimous decision in the Council. 
An establishment of a transfer union and debt cuts would violate the European agree-
ments. 
„Zum einen gilt: Pacta sunt servanda. Das heißt, wenn europäische 
Verträge ihre Gültigkeit verlieren sollen, geschieht das durch einstim-
mig vorgenommene Vertragsänderungen und Ratifizierungsverfahren. 
Es geschieht nicht, indem Einzelne aufgrund nationaler Wahlen diese 
Verträge einfach für null und nichtig erklären können; denn wir sind 
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eine Rechtsgemeinschaft. Zum anderen braucht Europa die Fähigkeit 
zum Kompromiss genauso wie der Mensch die Luft zum Atmen; denn 
wir sind eine Verantwortungsgemeinschaft. Im konkreten Fall heißt 
das: Enormen Eigenanstrengungen Griechenlands steht eine enorme 
europäische Solidarität gegenüber“. Angela Merkel, Bundeskanzlerin, 
17.07.2015. 
According to the Chancellor, the new Memorandum program for Greece was not dif-
ferent from the previous ones, except that the volume of credit is higher as well as the 
demand of more reform efforts from the Greek government. 
Concerning the leadership of the SPD after the latter became a coalition part-
ner in the government, its discourse transformed when compared to the time of the 
SPD being in the opposition. Now the pressure on the Greek government to imple-
ment serious, in-depth reforms became central. But also recognized were the dangers 
of a recession in Greece. These dangers should be eliminated by growth impulses, 
which would improve the economic conjuncture. Nevertheless, the structural reforms 
would have to be implemented before the investment in growth would take place. Al-
so, the political structures in Greece must be reformed, as they play the key role in 
overcoming the crisis. Opposite to how the Federal Chancellor described the latest 
program for Greece  - as basically nothing new -, Gabriel claimed that this program is 
not about austerity but about investment. However, the European investment would 
only happen in return for reforms.  
„Dieses Angebot war gerade vor dem Hintergrund der kritischen 
wirtschaftlichen Lage und der schwierigen sozialen Lage in 
Griechenland formuliert worden. Es ist qualitativ neu, es zeigt einen 
echten Ausweg aus der Krise und es hat Rücksicht genommen auf die 
sozialen Härten. Dabei ging es eben nicht nur um das zweite Pro-
gramm, sondern es ging vor allen Dingen auch um das Angebot, was 
danach kommen kann, um dauerhaft aus der Krise herauszukommen - 
allerdings immer verbunden mit der Voraussetzung, dass die Bed-
ingungen, die Griechenland selbst für das zweite Programm bereits 
akzeptiert hatte, auch eingehalten werden“. Sigmar Gabriel, Bun-
deswirtschaftsminister, 29.06.2015. 
Thus, Sigmar Gabriel adopted the notions of solidarity and solidity (quid pro quo) 
known from the previous phases of the governmental sub-discourse. Similarly to the 
Chancellor, he also revealed the difference, pointing out that Tsipras government 
wanted a different Eurozone.  
„Der fundamentale Unterschied zwischen der griechischen Regierung 
und allen anderen Mitgliedstaaten der Eurozone besteht aus meiner 
Sicht nicht in den Details der Verhandlungen - da war man für das 
zweite Reformprogramm schon dicht beieinander -, sondern darin, 
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dass die griechische Regierung die Bedingungen der Zusammenarbeit 
in der Eurozone generell verändern möchte oder aber mindestens das 
Recht haben will, sich nicht an diese Bedingungen halten zu müssen. 
Deshalb, glaube ich, stellt sich die griechische Regierung sozusagen 
gegen Anforderungen an Hilfsprogramme und die dafür notwendigen 
Grundregeln der europäischen Zusammenarbeit im Euroraum. Die 
neue griechische Regierung hat die angebotene praktische Hilfe für 
Griechenland abgelehnt, weil sie politisch - man kann, glaube ich, auch 
sagen: ideologisch - letztlich eine andere Eurozone will“. Sigmar Ga-
briel, Bundeswirtschaftsminister, 29.06.2015. 
 
5.4.3. Parliamentary sub-discourse: the CDU/CSU, the FDP, the SPD, the Bündnis 
90/die Grünen, and the Linke 
The sub-discourse of the CDU/CSU expressed in the communications and vot-
ing in the parliament, can also be divided in two phases. In the first phase, the discus-
sions were concentrated on the changes that would be necessary on the European lev-
el. In this context, the parliamentarians mainly argued for stricter stability rules and 
more control over the member states’ budgets. The main goal then was the stabiliza-
tion of the EMU. Also, the absense of an insolvency procedure for the EMU member 
states and of a European statistic agency, which would reduce the chance of cheating 
by the member states, was in focus. Moreover, similarly to the governmental sub-
discourse in its first phase, the regulation of the financial markets was present in the 
sub-discourse, showing distrust, especially to the activities of hedgefonds. A transfer 
union was explicitly rejected as a solution on the European level. Here, crises have 
been defined as a national problem caused by the fact that “too many member states 
live above their means”.  
“Ich glaube, an dieser Stelle dürfen wir die Ursachen dieser Krise nicht 
ausblenden. Die Ursachen lagen darin, dass viele Staaten auf der Welt 
über ihre Verhältnisse gelebt haben und dass die Ausgaben weit über 
den Einnahmen lagen”. Gunther Krichbaum (CDU/CSU), 11.05.2012. 
Concerning Greece and the other member states, which requested the financial assis-
tance, it was claimed that those who ask for help lose part of their freedom.  
“Denn jeder, der Hilfen von Dritten anfordert, beraubt sich gleichzeitig 
eines Stückes seiner Freiheiten und Möglichkeiten. Er muss akzep-
tieren, dass an diese Hilfen und Forderungen Bedingungen geknüpft 
sind. Deswegen zögert Griechenland zu Recht. Es geht um die 
Aufrechterhaltung seiner eigenen Souveränität”. Hans-Peter Friedrich 
(CDU/CSU), 25.03.2010. 
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The second phase of the CDU/CSU sub-discourse has a stronger focus on 
Greece and shows a higher degree of skepticism towards providing the credits. The 
fraction generally supported the argumentative line of the government from the be-
ginning of the crisis until the negotiation of the third package for Greece in the sum-
mer of 2015. While the opposition within the CDU/CSU was rather marginal before 
that vote, the latter showed that the opposition grew and became more skeptical to-
wards the financial assistance to Greece. During the vote on the third package from 
113 total votes against it, 63 were from the CDU/CSU. Although the majority of the 
members of this fraction still supported the Chancellor’s policy, the inner opposition 
to it increased mostly with an argument of a lack of trust and disbelief that the Greek 
government was able or willing to advance the implementation the necessary reforms. 
The parliamentarians pointed out that the persistent corruption in Greece seriously 
hinders the reforms.  
“Der griechische Staatsapparat war aufgrund von Korruption – “Vet-
terleswirtschaft” sagt man auf Schwäbisch – nicht in der Lage, eine 
prosperierende Wirtschaft auf die Beine zu stellen. Darin liegt das 
Hauptproblem”. Norbert Bathle (CDU/CSU), 18.12.2014. 
Now and then, it was repeated that the people of Greece are sovereign to vote against 
the Troika programs, but so are the people of Germany sovereign to vote against the 
financial assistance.  
“Es ist richtig, dass die griechische Regierung vom griechischen Sou-
verän gewählt worden ist, und der griechische Souverän hat das 
Reformprogramm abgewählt. Aber die Menschen, die hier in diesem 
Saal sitzen, sind auch von ihrem Souverän gewählt, und die Menschen, 
die in diesem Saal sitzen, lehnen es ab, das Programm der neuen 
griechischen Regierung zu finanzieren. Genauso wie wir respektieren 
müssen, was die neue griechische Regierung vorhat, muss die 
griechische Regierung respektieren, was wir hier entscheiden”. Ralph 
Brinkhaus (CDU/CSU), 27.02.2015. 
The FDP was a coalition partner in the government from 2009 until 2013 and 
is absent in the parliament in the following legislative period. When it was part of the 
coalition government, its sub-discourse was close to that of the government and the 
CDU/CSU. According to the representatives of the FDP, the goal of the stability cul-
ture in the EU must be reached through the budgetary consolidation. Therefore, 
stronger economic policy coordination on the European level was necessary and must 
be supported by the stricter sanctions for non-compliance.  
“Jeder Einzelstaat muss seiner stabilitätspolitischen Verantwortung 
gerecht werden. Deshalb wollen wir die Verschärfung des Stabili-
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tätspakts – das hat die Bundeskanzlerin eben noch einmal ausgeführt –, 
ein Frühwarnsystem sowie nach Möglichkeit automatisierte Sanktio-
nen. Die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit ist zu stärken, und zwar auch durch 
eine bessere Koordinierung der Wirtschaftspolitik”. Birgit Homburger 
(FDP), 24.03.2011. 
The introduction of an insolvency procedure has been argued for, which would in-
clude debt restructuring and participation of private creditors.  
“Wir wollen – auch das ist entsprechend verhandelt worden – eine 
Umschuldung, also ein Insolvenzrecht für Staaten. Es ist wichtig, dass 
es eine Beteiligung privater Gläubiger an Hilfsmaßnahmen geben wird. 
Das darf nicht nur eine theoretische Möglichkeit bleiben”. Birgit 
Homburger (FDP), 24.03.2011. 
The crisis was presented to be a national problem, and it was emphasized that 
the member states carry the sole responsibility for their debts. The idea of the euro-
bonds was described as not being compatible with the German constitution. In order 
to solve the crisis, Greece must be controlled, and the country must improve its com-
petitiveness through in-depth reforms. 
The SPD was in opposition until the grand coalition government in 2013. In 
that period the financial crisis and policy failures were identified as the reasons for the 
EMU crisis. While being in opposition, the parliamentarians from the SPD generally 
supported Merkel’s measures for stronger competitiveness in Europe as well as the 
idea of budgetary consolidation. However, they also demanded a debt cut, participa-
tion of private creditors, and a financial transaction tax. More fairness was demanded 
in the austerity programs, which were generally supported but at the same time were 
criticized as a partial solution. 
“Und trotz aller drastischen Sparprogramme gelingt es Griechenland 
und Portugal nicht, Defizite abzubauen und die Schuldentragfähigkeit 
wiederzugewinnen. Beide Länder stecken in einer Abwärtsspirale: 
Drastische Einschnitte nicht nur bei konsumtiven, sondern auch bei in-
vestiven Staatsausgaben verschärfen die Rezession”. Sigmar Gabriel/ 
Franz-Walter Steinmeier (SPD), Europa ist in der Krise – Wir 
brauchen ein starkes Signal für die Zukunft der europäischen Einheit, 
18.07.2011. 
It was claimed that there should be a stronger focus on growth in Europe, and that 
some targeted investments would be necessary.  
“Wir wollen dafür Sorge tragen, dass in Europa endlich wieder in 
Wachstum und Beschäftigung investiert wird, damit wir aus der 
Schuldenkrise herauskommen”. Sigmar Gabriel (SPD), 8.09.2011. 
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The main goal expressed by the members of the party was the reduction of economic 
divergence among the member states of the Euro zone. The idea of eurobonds was 
therefore supported by the SPD. 
 “Wir brauchen eine limitierte Gemeinschaftshaftung der gesamten Eu-
ro-Zone für die Anleihen ihrer Mitglieder. Sie ist erforderlich, um auf 
Dauer eine Beruhigung der Finanzmärkte zu bewirken. Über intelli-
gente Modelle kann ein Teil der Schuld gemeinschaftlich besichert 
werden, während exzessive Verschuldung weiter im nationalen Risiko 
verbleibt”. Sigmar Gabriel/ Franz-Walter Steinmeier (SPD), Europa ist 
in der Krise – Wir brauchen ein starkes Signal für die Zukunft der eu-
ropäischen Einheit, 18.07.2011. 
Concerning the European polity, the SPD usually argued for a political union, which 
presumed equally more control over the member states budgets and certain level of 
harmonization of tax as well as social policies. Such a political union would require a 
transfer of national sovereignty on the European level. The crisis itself was also de-
fined as the crisis of leadership. The crisis management was claimed to be undemo-
cratic and restrictive of the sovereignty of parliaments.  
“In der jetzigen Situation fallen zwei Krisen zusammen: die 
Überschuldungskrise einzelner Mitglieder der Euro-Zone und die 
politische Führungskrise innerhalb der Europäischen Union insgesamt. 
Längst hat sich daraus eine echte Vertrauenskrise entwickelt, denn sel-
ten standen die Bürgerinnen und Bürger der EU den europäischen In-
stitutionen, den Parteien, Parlamenten und Regierungen Europas so 
skeptisch und ablehnend gegenüber wie heute. Antieuropäische Res-
sentiments nehmen zu und das Fehlen jeder Perspektive und Hoffnung 
treibt in den krisengebeutelten Mitgliedsstaaten die Anti-Europäer und 
Neo-Nationalisten in die Parlamente und Regierungen”. Sigmar Gabri-
el/ Franz-Walter Steinmeier (SPD), Europa ist in der Krise – Wir 
brauchen ein starkes Signal für die Zukunft der europäischen Einheit, 
18.07.2011. 
The European level should not only take over competences but also guarantee the 
democracy in Europe through stronger parliamentarisation.  
“Die Bürger sind nicht müde an Europa, aber sie sind müde an der Or-
ganisation Europas. Um diese Kluft zu überwinden, muss Europa aus 
dem Zustand vornehmlich intergouvernementaler Beschlüsse 
herausgeführt werden. Es bedarf einer Parlamentarisierung euro-
päischer Entscheidungsprozesse mit Blick sowohl auf das Europäische 
Parlament als auch auf die nationalen Parlamente”. Peer Steinbrück 
(SPD), 24.03.2011. 
Finally, concerning the case of Greece, the representatives of the SPD pointed out that 
only through investment and increase in employment would Greece be able to recov-
er. Therefore, the finances from the structural funds should be used to this purpose. 
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Despite conditionality and austerity programs initiated on the European level, one 
should avoid the impression of Greece being governed from outside. 
As soon as the SPD became a part of the grand coalition government in 2013, 
its discourse developed further. In the new phase of the SPD sub-discourse, the repre-
sentatives of the SPD pressured Greece to implement the reforms. It was still stated 
that growth impulses are necessary, as a deep recession would only increase the debt, 
but there were some doubts expressed as to whether was Greece ready for them in 
terms of its political structures. Therefore, the European investment should only fol-
low in return for reforms. It was also mentioned that the Greek government led by 
Tsipras prefers a different Eurozone. The narrative of solidarity and solidity (i.e., sol-
idarity in exchange for the country’s own reform efforts) was adopted from the dis-
course of the previous government. The definition of solidarity has been changed 
from “urgent support” to “Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe”.  
“”Solidarität” heißt für uns übrigens immer: Hilfe für die, die bereit 
sind, sich selber anzustrengen, im Rahmen ihrer Möglichkeiten, im 
Rahmen dessen, was man zumuten kann. “Solidarität” heißt: Hilfe zur 
Selbsthilfe. Das ist die Grundlinie sozialdemokratischer Politik bei die-
sen Rettungsprogrammen”. Thomas Oppermann (SPD), 17.07.2015. 
The Bündnis 90/die Grünen was in opposition through the whole period of the 
analysis here. Its sub-discourse was rather stable in this period, without significant 
changes. The representatives of this party considered the EMU as a gain in sovereign-
ty and therefore demanded a closer economic coordination and common economic 
policy in the EMU members. The reason for the crisis was described as economic 
(performance/policy) differences among the Euro-zone member states and a large 
public debt due to the unsound fiscal policies. The Bündnis 90/die Grünen criticized 
the demand based on credit in the Southern Europe and called for a targeted invest-
ment and increase in internal demand in the surplus countries. 
“Über seine Verhältnisse kann nur leben, wer Kredit bekommt. 
Deutschland hat von dieser kreditfinanzierten Nachfrage nach seinen 
Produkten gut gelebt. Es wurde Exportwelmeister auf Pump”. Jürgen 
Trittin (Bündnis 90/die Grünen), 29.11.2010. 
“Zum Ziel führen zwei Wege: Man macht sie (Defizitländer – SM) 
durch gezielte Investitionen wettbewerbsfähiger, und man verbessert 
die Binnennachfrage in den Überschussländern”. Jürgen Trittin 
(Bündnis 90/die Grünen), 29.11.2010. 
 The idea of a transfer union was rejected, although there was support for the 
introduction of eurobonds. In the debate on the third package for Greece, the Bündnis 
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90/die Grünen demanded a debt cut and expressed strong criticism of the European 
political process as being non-democratic.  
“Ich sage Ihnen als Parlamentarierin ganz offen, dass es mich dauert, 
wie mit der parlamentarischen Demokratie umgegangen wird. Dabei 
geht es nicht nur darum, dass in Griechenland innerhalb von zwei 
Tagen Entscheidungen getroffen werden sollten – ich möchte mal seh-
en, was wir in so einer Situation gemacht hätten –, sondern auch da-
rum, dass dafür gesorgt werden soll, dass alles immer vorab vorgelegt 
wird. Ich glaube nicht, dass wir als Parlament uns das gefallen lassen 
würden”. Katrin Göring-Eckardt (Bündnis 90/die Grünen), 17.07.2015. 
Finally, the discourse of the Linke party, which remained in opposition 
through the whole period of the analysis, also rejected the austerity policies as a solu-
tion due to lack of fairness and inefficiency of the measures.  
“Die Ergebnisse der Umsetzung der unsozialen und ungerechten 
Forderungen und der Politik der Troika sind: Arbeitslosenquote bei 
26,2 Prozent, Jugendarbeitslosigkeit bei 52 Prozent, Mindestlohn 
abgesenkt, Mehrwertsteuer auf 23 Prozent erhöht, Arbeitslosengeld 
gesenkt und auf ein Jahr begrenzt und, und, und. Da sagen Sie: 
“Griechenland macht Fortschritte“? Sie haben gesagt: “Diese An-
strengungen beginnen sich für die Menschen in Griechenland auszu-
zahlen”. Herr Schäuble, für die Menschen ist diese Politik in 
Griechenland, die Sie mit vertreten, eine Katastrophe”. Dietmar 
Bartsch (Die Linke), 18.12.2014. 
Strong democratic concerns were expressed by the representative of the Linke with 
regard to the crisis management and to the European Union generally. The solution 
offered by the Linke included targeted investment, eurobonds, and higher levels of 
taxation all over Europe. 
 
5.4.4. Sub-discourse of the Bundesbank 
The Bundesbank re-affirms its ordoliberal approach to the economic policy 
throughout the entire period of analysis. The institution emphasized that the root of 
the crisis lies in the differences in economic performance and policies among the Eu-
ro-zone member states, as well as the lack of competitiveness by some members 
compared to the others. According to the Bundesbank, in order to be successful, the 
common European currency requires a broad package of reforms, which would re-
store the competitiveness of certain member states. The institution supported the 
adoption of the Fiscal Compact as a step in the right direction; however, it was re-
garded as insufficient. The main goal should be the modernization of industry, ser-
vices, administration, and protection of the price stability. Stabilization of the EMU 
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was presented as a common European interest. The Bundesbank insisted upon the 
strict conditionality in exchange for the financial assistance to Greece because the 
country must be pushed to reforms.  
The personalities who led the Bundesbank during the period of analysis (Axel 
Weber until 2011 and Jens Weidmann from 2011) openly disagreed and criticized the 
ground breaking decisions of the ECB in the crisis management, including the pur-
chase by the ECB of the governmental bonds of the indebted members of the Euro 
zone from the secondary market and preservation of continuously low interest rates. 
The ECB was accused of overstreching its mandate and of mutualizing risks.  
„Meine Damen und Herren, das Mandat des Eurosystems lautet, Preis-
stabilität im Euro-Raum zu sichern. Es lautet nicht, die Solvenz von 
Mitgliedstaaten zu sichern, indem solche Haftungsrisiken über die No-
tenbankbilanz vergemeinschaftet werden. Über eine Vergemeinschaf-
tung von Haftungsrisiken sollten die dazu legitimierten politischen Ak-
teure entscheiden, also die Parlamente und Regierungen. Und bei die-
sen Entscheidungen müssen die Grenzen beachtet werden, die die Eu-
ropäischen Verträge in dieser Frage setzen. Außerdem muss die Geld-
politik Acht geben, nicht ins Schlepptau der Finanzpolitik zu geraten. 
Denn dann könnte ihre Fähigkeit, für ein stabiles Preisniveau zu sor-
gen, zunehmend beeinträchtigt werden“. Jens Weidmann, Präsident der 
Deutschen Bundesbank, 23.09.2015. 
In several statements, the Bundesbank confirmed a strong disagreement within the 
ECB’s board of governors, and that the ordoliberal position represented by the Ger-
man central bank is in a minority there. Jens Weidmann pointed out that the main 
problem of construction and of the latest development of the EMU was the separation 
of liability and control where the community takes over liability without having any 
control over the national economic development due to sovereignty. 
„Die Einheit von Haftung und Kontrolle ist nach meinem Dafürhalten 
aber zentrale Voraussetzung für eine stabile Statik der Währungsuni-
on... Der Ende Juni präsentierte Bericht zur Zukunft der Währungsuni-
on, den Kommissionspräsident Juncker mit den Präsidenten Tusk, 
Dijsselbloem, Draghi und Schulz verfasst hat, zielt nach meiner Ein-
schätzung eindeutig in Richtung Zentralisierung und Risikoteilung. 
Zur Übertragung von effektiven Kontrollrechten, gar Souveränitäts-
rechten sagen die fünf Präsidenten aber nichts – aus verständlichen 
Gründen, könnte man hinzufügen. Die Bereitschaft zu einem veritab-
len Souveränitätsverzicht ist unter den europäischen Regierungen näm-
lich sehr gering ausgeprägt. Und die nationalen Parlamente bestehen 
auf ihrem vornehmsten Recht, dem Haushaltsrecht. Man lässt sich 
eben ungern reinreden“. Jens Weidmann, Präsident der Deutschen 
Bundesbank, 23.09.2015. 
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According to Weidmann, the EMU can be successful without a political union if it is 
based on individual responsibility of the member states and a hard institutional 
framework, which goes beyond the measures of the Fiscal Compact.  
 
5.4.5. The German trade union association: Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) 
According to the association of the German trade unions, the crisis has its 
roots in the unregulated financial market and economic divergence in the euro zone.  
“Seit Gründung der europäischen Währungsunion ist die Kluft 
zwischen Nord und Süd immer größer geworden: Die Unterschiede in 
der wirtschaftlichen Leistungsfähigkeit sind gewachsen. Die 
zwangsläufige Folge sind steigende deutsche Überschüsse einerseits 
sowie steigende südeuropäische Defizite andererseits. Langfristig kann 
das nicht gut gehen. Früher oder später können die Defizitländer nicht 
mehr zahlen”. Claus Matecki, DGB-Vorstandsmitglied, 25.03.2010. 
The organization expressed its concerns about the austerity policies, which can 
lead the Euro zone members into a deep recession. The Troika policies were consid-
ered unfair and unsuccessful in the resolving the crisis. Moreover, the measures at-
tacked the labor rights and endanger the tariff autonomy protected by the German 
law.  
“Die radikale Zerstörung von Arbeitnehmerrechten der vergangenen 
Jahre muss rückgängig gemacht werden. Sie hat nicht zu Wachstum, 
sondern zu Armut und Ungerechtigkeit geführt. Wenn die Verein-
barung zwischen den Gläubigern und Griechenland jetzt eine “Über-
prüfung und Modernisierung der Verfahren für Tarifverhandlungen” 
fordert, dann müssen die in den EU-Verträgen vorgesehenen 
Grundrechte sofort wiederhergestellt werden”. Stefan Körzell, DGB-
Vorstandsmitglied, 16.07.2015. 
The DGB argues in favour of a European fund for growth and targeted in-
vestment that would provide impulses to end poverty. Sustainability and innovation 
were presented as the central ideas of resolving the crisis. Similarly to some other ac-
tors, the DGB supported the idea of debt restructuring in the first years of crisis but 
later spoke out against the debt cut in the case of Greece. Concerning the latter case, 
the trade union critizised the reform programs and demanded the elimination of per-
sistent corruption as well as creation of new opportunities for growth in Greece. 
“Mit Reformen, die an den tatsächlichen Problemen Griechenlands an-
setzen, hatte all dies nichts zu tun. Keines der strukturellen Probleme 
des Landes wurde gelöst, es wurden aber zusätzliche geschaffen. Es 
war eine Politik des Abbaus, nicht des Aufbaus….Wirkliche Struktur-
reformen machen ernst mit der Bekämpfung von Steuerhinterziehung 
und Steuerflucht. Wirkliche Strukturreformen bekämpfen Klientelpoli-
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tik und Korruption bei öffentlichen Aufträgen. Die neue griechische 
Regierung ist herausgefordert, ihre eigenen Wiederaufbau- und 
Entwicklungsprojekte vorzulegen, die Teil eines “Europäischen Inves-
titionsplanes” werden müssen, wie er seit langem von den Gew-
erkschaften gefordert wird, und die Voraussetzungen dafür zu 
schaffen, dass derartige Projekte Früchte tragen können”. DGB, 
2.02.2015. 
 
5.4.6. The German employers’ association: Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Ar-
beitgeberverbände (BDA) 
  According to the largest employer association in Germany, the BDA, it has 
been necessary to deal with the problem of growing public debt for a longer period 
already, and in the light of the crisis, it became an emergency. Therefore, budgetary 
consolidation and austerity programs were unavoidable and must have been imple-
mented as soon as possible. The main goal now would be winning back the trust of 
markets.  
Similarly, structural reforms were regarded to be essential in light of the 
strong necessity to revitalize the labor market. The association identified the source of 
the crisis partly in the growth of the unit labor costs and the resulting losses in com-
petitiveness.  
“Der massive Verlust an Wettbewerbsfähigkeit einiger Mitgliedstaaten 
durch zu stark gestiegene Lohnstückkosten ist Teilursache der gegen-
wärtigen Krise. Es ist daher richtig, dass das neue Verfahren zur Ver-
meidung makroökonomischer Ungleichgewichte auch die Beobach-
tung der Lohnstückkostenentwicklung in den Mitgliedstaaten vorsieht. 
Die Koordinierung in diesem Bereich sollte alle Faktoren der Lohn-
stückkosten, insbesondere auch Flexibilität, Produktivität, gesetzliche 
Rahmenbedingungen und Abgaben berücksichtigen. Sie darf nicht zu 
Eingriffen in die nationale Lohnfindung und die Autonomie der 
Tarifvertragsparteien führen”. BDA, October 2014. 
As the BDA constantly stated, competitiveness was the key to growth. Therefore, eve-
ry member state should introduce reforms in order to re-build its own competitive-
ness. In this situation, tax increases and higher social security would be counterpro-
ductive and should be avoided.  
As the stability of currency is a common European interest, measures must be 
taken in order to deepen and stabilize the EMU. These measures should include closer 
economic policy coordination and more control over the member state budgets.  
“Zur Sicherstellung des gemeinsamen europäischen Handelns müssen 
auch europäische Kontroll- und Eingriffsrechte akzeptiert werden, die 
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ein nationales Abweichen vom Weg zu Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und sol-
iden Staatsfinanzen nicht zulassen. Dazu gehören zum Beispiel 
verbindliche Obergrenzen für die Verschuldung der Mitgliedstaaten 
und automatische Sanktionen bei deren Nichteinhaltung. Niemand ver-
liert sein demokratisches Recht und seine nationale Souveränität, die 
Bedingungen nicht zu akzeptieren. Nur muss er dann die Konsequen-
zen auch alleine tragen und den „Club" verlassen”. Dieter Hundt, Ar-
beitgeberpräsident, 13.08.2012. 
Therfore, the president of the BDA claimed that the member states must carry respon-
sibility for their debt, and financial assistance should be provided in exchange for re-
forms only. Transfer union and eurobonds would eliminate the need for the national 
reform efforts.  
“Auch eine Transferunion zwischen den Euro-Ländern lehne ich 
entschieden ab! Weil das eine Einladung zum unsoliden Haushalten 
wäre. Zugleich würde der Wohlstand der Europäischen Union ge-
fährdet, weil die erfolgreich wirtschaftenden Länder bestraft und die 
Empfängerländer dauerhaft am Tropf hängen würden. Es muss 
vielmehr darum gehen, die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit aller EU-Länder zu 
verbessern”. Dieter Hundt, Arbeitgeberpräsident, 12.12.2010. 
Concerning democracy and inclusion, in its statements, the BDA affirmed that 
the member states of the EMU have already given up their sovereignty, and the social 
partners should necessarily be included in the European semester. Nevertheless, the 
association advised against the double structures in the inclusion of social partners on 
both the national and European levels. The existing Committee for Social Dialog 
should be used for inclusion at the European level. 
 
5.4.7. Summarizing the discourse analysis 
Analysing the discourse on EMU in the period from 2010 until 2015, only be-
tween 2010 and 2012 can a dominant and oppositional discourses be clearly separat-
ed. During this period, the dominant discourse was represented by the government of 
Merkel, the CDU/CSU, the FDP, the Bundesbank, and the BDA (ordoliberal coali-
tion). The oppositional discourse was promoted by the SPD, the Bündnis 90/die Grü-
nen, the Linke and the DGB (social democratic coalition). These two coalitions de-
scribed different sources of crisis and therefore also argued in favour of the different 
solutions. The ordoliberal coalition insisted that the overly high budgetary spending 
and the loss of competitiveness due to lack of reforms were the main sources of the 
crisis. It was therefore described as a national problem and national responsibility. On 
the other hand, the social democratic coalition regarded the European dynamic as be-
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ing at least partly responsible for the crisis because the European level lacks a mecha-
nism for conteracting the growing divergence of the economies in the EMU. Corre-
spondingly, there was a difference in the assessment of the measures, such as debt cut, 
further growth strategy, and eurobonds. The oppositional discourse therefore chal-
lenged a significant part of the agenda of the ordoliberal coalition. In 2012, these dis-
courses slowly started to converge towards the dominating discourse. There are sev-
eral reasons why the two discourses converged. First, the SPD sub-discourse changed 
slightly, absorbing certain demands of the ordoliberal coalition such as strict condi-
tionality for credits and demands of the structural reforms from the Greek govern-
ment. Second, certain demands were dropped or simply disappeared from the social 
democratic sub-discourse in 2012, as the decisions on the EU level have already been 
made, and the focus of the agenda shifted. This was the case with the eurobonds and 
demands of stronger economic policy coordination. Finally, dissenting too much from 
the dominating discourse was politically risky in light of the forthcoming elections 
and the growing scepticism of the population towards the European solidarity 
measures. 
Generally, the nodal points of the discourse were budgetary consolidation and 
austerity, economic growth, necessity of structural reforms, economic divergence 
among the member states, and possible European measures for the crisis resolution. 
As mentioned above, the dominating and oppositional discourses were different in 
their central assumptions on the origin of crisis and measures necessary to resolve it. 
Thus, the main points of contestation included the necessity of European measures for 
growth and employment as well as eurobonds and a debt cut. Also, the democratic 
aspects in the context of the crisis management were present and contested throughout 
the period of analysis.  
Concerning the interests that the discourses represent, the explicit references 
were quite abstract. The government often referred to the national interest (“Germa-
ny”, “our population”, “us”) and to the European interest. Yet the dominating dis-
course (including the governmental sub-discourse) was generally in line with the dis-
course of the private enterprises and capital owners that is also confirmed by the sub-
discourse of the BDA. Although the references to the German or European interest 
were present in the discourse of the social democratic coalition, it also often men-
tioned the labour and labour rights. 
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This period of analysis demonstrates stronger contestation and a higher degree 
of scepticism than the previous one, especially in the first two years, when two alter-
native visions of crisis and its solution were presented. Yet again, the ordoliberal coa-
lition, which included the government, represented the country during the negotia-
tions and was able to enforce its vision in the legislation. Although in the first phase 
of the governmental sub-discourse some signs of adaptation to the oppositional dis-
course can be identified (especially, concerning participation of private creditors and 
responsibility of the financial markets), it later returned to the classic ordoliberal 
agenda and remained stable thereafter. Simultaneously, as both the CDU/CSU and the 
SPD performed successfully in the parliamentary elections of 2013, together gaining 
over 67% of votes, it can be argued that the citizens’ attitude towards the position of 
these two parties and the government in the Euro zone crisis was neutral or positive, 
re-affirming legitimacy of those policies. 
The analysis of the domestic discourse in Germany showed that the moral dis-
course was substituted by a pragmatic discourse. This aspect has certain implications 
at the European level because it strengthens the economic nationalism and under-
mines the European identity and solidarity. Also at the European level, ordoliberalism 
was challenged and needed to re-establish its dominance. Generally, the discourse did 
not appear to be a dialog where the actors would search and find solutions together 
but a unilateral justification where one argued in terms of a general interest, while 
pursuing a specific one. It is an especially negative development that the dominating 
discourse gave no regard to the demands of the actors with important stakes in the is-
sue (such as the DGB) whose preferences were either ignored or claimed to be against 
the law. In terms of context, the dominating discourse and the policies it promoted 
will result in the further weakening of the labor, as the ordoliberal economic policy 
discourse puts this group of the population in the position of the main shock absorber 
and adjustment mechanism in uncertain times when the country faces economic chal-
lenges.  
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Chapter 6: Greece 
6.1. Economic and monetary policy in the Hellenic Republic before the EMU: the 
Greek state and economy 
6.1.1. The institutional context of monetary policy: a weak central bank and the cen-
tralized state 
The Bank of Greece (BoG) was first established by the League of Nations Fi-
nancial Committee in 1928 (Pagoulatos 2009: 161). In 1946, the Central Bank was 
brought under the authority of a governmental Currency Committee, which made the 
decisions on exchange rate, monetary, and credit policies. The Committee consisted of 
five Ministers and a Governor of the Central Bank. Therefore, the BoG did not repre-
sent an independent institution, being subjected to an extensive governmental interven-
tion where monetary policy represented an important tool in light of the government’s 
fiscal expansion (Oltheten et al. 2003). Money creation took place in order to finance 
the budget deficits and, indirectly, to operate the deficits of the nationalized enterpris-
es. This contributed to the inflation, which reached 19 % on average between 1981 and 
1990, being at that time almost three times higher than the EU average (Oltheten et al. 
2003). While price stability achieved mainly through the wage restraint was associated 
with the authoritarian post-war governments, “a considerable section of the Greek pub-
lic and body politic even positively identified a more lax and inflation-accommodating 
macroeconomic stance with progressive politics” (Pagoulatos 2009: 163). 
The periods of the monetary expansion were often followed by the attempts of 
macroeconomic stabilization. Although the Currency Committee was abolished in 
1982, the post-war interventionist dynamic remained until a slow process of deregula-
tion started in 1987. The bank was first granted its full independence in preparation to 
the country’s membership in the EMU in 1997 (Pagoulatos 2009: 162).  
Therefore, unlike the Bundesbank in Germany, the Bank of Greece was not the 
main actor, conducting monetary policies in Greece. In fact, monetary policy tradition-
ally served as an important tool of economic adjustment. Therefore, the nature of the 
Greek state and its dominating economic policy paradigm are essential for understand-
ing the process of definition and implementation of economic and monetary policies in 
Greece before the EMU.  
After the fall of the dictatorial regime of Colonels in Greece in 1974, the Greek 
state has been characterized by its over-centralized nature and concentration within the 
Athens area, with very little regional powers and autonomy (Ioakimidis 2001: 78). It is 
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a simple polity based on a unitary state structure and a majoritarian system of represen-
tation (Ioakimidis 2001). The decision-making was dominantly hierarchical, lacking 
transparency and with poor vertical and horizontal coordination (Ioakimidis 2001: 78). 
After 1974, a central feature of the Greek state was represented by the two-party polar-
ization of the socio-political life. The two main parties – Nea Demokratia and PASOK 
– were usually led by a charismatic leader, who determined the options and strategy 
within his own party (Lavdas 1997). In the 1980s, populism was established as an im-
portant strategy within both parties where policy goals have been subordinated “to the 
imperatives of a ruthless pursuit of electoral success” (Lavdas 1997: 148; see also Mar-
tin/ Dinas 2010).  
Although the state often dominated the arena of policy-making, several authors 
point to its lack of efficiency due to clientelism, over-regulation, policy discontinuity, 
conflicting inter-party relations, and ‘disjointed’ social dialogue (Ioakimidis 2001: 78; 
Featherstone/Papadimitriou 2008: 59; Sotiropoulos 1995: 7). Moreover, the Greek 
state generally lacked an elite civil service that could implement public policy with 
higher consistency and continuity (Pagoulatos 2009: 163). 
 
6.1.2. The Greek economic context: state interventionism and the key areas of econom-
ic activity 
Scholars with a historical perspective mention different reasons for the role of 
state in the country’s economic activity. As Tsoukalas argues, the democratic reforms 
representing the prototype of the Western industrial state substantially diverged from 
the dominant ‘pre-democratic’ and excessively pre-industrial economic and social 
structures of the early Greek state, and the private economic sphere was absent. Thus, 
the state role in the allocation of resources increased (Tsoukalas 1981). Louri and Pe-
pelasis Minoglou present their finding that “even at her industrialization peak, Greece 
did not have a large industrial sector and did not enjoy the per capita income level of a 
‚mature‘ capitalist economy has wider implications“, confirming that Greece has never 
been a typical capitalist industrial economy, and “de-industrialization started before 
industrialization was completed“ (Louri/ Pepelasis Minoglou 2002). Therefore, the au-
thors outline the structural continuities of the Greek socio-economic formation, such as 
a large public sector, the mainly commercial character of entrepreneurship, and „an 
incomplete transition from mercantile/family capitalism to the joint stock compa-
ny/corporate capitalism“ (Louri/ Pepelasis Minoglou 2002). 
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In fact, before the goal of the EMU accession, the biggest political parties in the 
country articulated in their programmes a spectre from ad hoc state interventionism to 
nationalisation (or “socialisation”) of banking and industries as well as state active in-
volvement in agriculture and regional development (see Clogg 1979). On the contrary, 
the liberal economic policies were often associated with the dictatorial rule of the re-
gime of Colonels in Greece (Dimitrakos 1979: 128). 
The state presence was quite intense and can be exemplified in a high employ-
ment in the public sector and the extensive regulatory role performed by the state, as 
well as its overwhelming participation in economic activities (Ioakimidis 2001). The 
state influenced economy through protectionism, transfers, and subsidies, but also di-
rectly through ownership. Tsoukalis summarized the forms of state involvement in the 
economy as: “(i) continuous investment in infrastructure; (ii) a long series of incentives 
and state aids to private industry; and (iii) provision of ample finance through the 
banking system” (Tsoukalis 1981: 34). In the agricultural sector, governmental influ-
ence was even more direct (Tsoukalis 1981: 34). Moreover, the Greek state fully con-
trolled the banking system (Pagoulatos 2009; Lavdas 1997).  
Strong state presence in the economic life in Greece was combined with its 
weak capability to collect taxes. This was the case due to a number of tax exemptions, 
lower rates, and also due to tax evasion (see Tsoukalis 1981: 36; Kazakos 2004). Rais-
ing the issue of the Greek tax system being unfair and regressive, Frangakis mentions 
the fact that about two thirds of the state revenues come from the indirect taxes and 
only one third from the income tax, whereas the latter is mainly based on salaries 
(Frangakis 2012). 
Some authors discuss the regressive impact of tax evasion and its consequences 
for redistribution. As Danopoulos and Znidaric argue, black economy and tax evasion 
in Greece limits “the state’s ability to reduce poverty and bring about a more equitable 
distribution of wealth“ (Danopoulos/Znidaric 2007: 83). Also, Matsaganis and Flevot-
omou came to the conclusion that the payoff of efforts to reduce tax evasion could be 
very substantial indeed: higher tax receipts, lower poverty, reduced inequality, and a 
more progressive tax system (Matsaganis/Flevotomou 2010). In fact, the welfare state 
in Greece has been highly selective, and support for a large number of the most vulner-
able was often rejected  (Matsaganis et al. 2003; Venieris 2013).   
And yet the state budget was investing heavily in the infrastructure and military 
spending as well as financing high levels of public employment. The combination of 
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low revenues and high budgetary spending resulted in the dependency of the state 
budget on the domestic and foreign borrowing. The attempts to stabilize the economy 
and curb the inflation have been inconsistent and strongly dependent upon electoral 
cycles (Lavdas 1997). 
Among the main economic activities and industries in Greece are shipping, 
tourism, construction, agriculture, textiles, and footwear. In its turn, the manufacturing 
sector and production are traditionally dominated by the small and medium-sized en-
terprises, often family owned (see Yannopoulos 1979: 61; Zambarloukou 2006: 218). 
They were therefore mostly oriented towards the domestic market and strongly de-
pendent on the domestic consumption. These enterprises faced serious challenges due 
to their growing dependence upon the external finance, lack of qualified personnel, and 
competition within a large market (within the EU) where economies of scale are cru-
cial (Lavdas 1997: 59-61). Another remarkable feature of the Greek economy are rela-
tively high levels of unemployment despite a prolonged period of growth (Karamessini 
2008: 51). 
 
6.1.3. Mode of governance and the competitive nature of the relations between the ac-
tors: disjointed corporatism and clientelism 
In the relevant literature, the mode of governance in Greece has been described 
in a variety of terms: statism, ‘state corporatism’, ‘parentela pluralism’, or ‘disjointed 
corporatism’. The tradition of statism exists in Greece, as it was used for the protection 
of cohesion of the country against unwanted ideologies and social cohesion by ena-
bling a higher degree of economic redistribution (Kalaitzidis 2010: 6), but to character-
ize Greece as statist state more than forty years after the fall of the regime of Colonels 
would be to neglect the amount of transformation the country went through in the time 
period since (Kalaitzidis 2010: 80). Moreover, an essential feature of statism – real 
state capacity to implement policy over the objections of key social groups – is poten-
tially missing in the case of Greece (Kalaitzidis 2010: 80). Although the government 
often adopted the reforms despite the informal veto points, the fact that the original 
content of reforms by the government experienced some modifications as a result of 
consultations with the socio-economic actors actually proves that the informal veto 
points did matter. Despite a quite centralized political system (Kalaitzidis 2010: 68) as 
well as frequent unilateralism and exclusion (Pagoulatos 2002: 202), I do not think that 
the statist description would be an accurate one in this context.  
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Especially during the early 1990s, trade unions became more autonomous from 
the government, and the liberalization of collective bargaining took place. In fact, the 
relations between government, trade unions, and employer associations also obtained 
some corporatist features, mainly “representational monopoly, incorporated into policy 
making as co-responsible partners” (Featherstone/Papadimitriou 2008: 45). Neverthe-
less, since the early 1990s, social dialogue had a ‘stop-and-go’ character, “discrediting 
it as a process and creating further mistrust” (Featherstone/Papadimitriou 2008: 47). 
Kostas Lavdas describes the state-society relations in Greece as disjointed and asym-
metric corporatism, “whose fragmented functioning constrained the liberal elements in 
the economic system while at the same time finding it difficult to broker social pacts 
and intersectoral agreements beyond wage negotiation” (Lavdas 1997: 86). He argues, 
“disjointed corporatism is the most appropriate for analysing the mix of sectoral corpo-
ratism and pockets of state corporatism and of pluralist arenas characteristic of the 
Greek policy pattern” (Lavdas 1997: 5). This type of corporatism “denotes the combi-
nation of a set of corporatist organizational features and a prevailing political modality 
that lacks diffuse reciprocity and remains incapable of brokering social pacts” (Lavdas 
1997: 17). 
Summing up, corporatism failed to establish a process of negotiation of social 
pacts in Greece for historical reasons, and tripartite became rather ad hoc (Lavdas 
1997: 87; Zambarloukou 2006: 220). Moreover, in the climate of strong competition of 
actors for the public resources, Featherstone and Papadimitriou emphasize the existing 
conflict of interests, antagonism, and distrust in the state-society relations that blocks 
consensus and a stable social dialogue (Featherstone/Papadimitriou 2008: 46-48, 201). 
Zambarloukou argues that the absence of a culture that would promote a dialogue and 
consensus is another reason why corporatism has not been established:  
„Social actors were accustomed to influencing the state through their 
particularistic ties with political actors rather than through official 
channels of consultation. For unions, reaching a compromise was made 
more difficult by the partisan divisions that run across the labour 
movement and the close connection between political parties and union 
leaderships“ (Zambarloukou 2006: 221). 
Greece represents a case of a strong fragmentation of interest groups where some key 
interests are underrepresented in the state-society negotiations (for example, small and 
medium enterprises, which actually dominate the Greek economy, Featherstone 2003: 
935).  
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In the literature, the Greek trade unions are often described as having quite a 
confrontational approach to the collective bargaining. For example, in an attempt to 
assess “will and capability of the national government to deliver on an agenda it has 
signed up to”, Featherstone and Papadimiriou scrutinized the process of the reforms in 
three important sectors – pension reforms, privatization of the Olympic Airlines, and 
labor market reforms (Featherstone/Papadimitriou 2008). They came to the conclusion 
that the government’s relations with the major social partners have been the key area of 
reform blockage where “the domestic system was structured in a manner that appeared 
to militate against consensus and delivery” (Featherstone/Papadimitriou 2008: 16).  
Nevertheless, the examples of trade union militancy co-exist with those of ac-
commodation. In the 1990s, the General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE) de-
cided for a more consensual and less confrontational strategy, mainly because of its 
desire to retain the political influence under changing economic and political condi-
tions (high unemployment, country’s EU orientation) (Zambarloukou 2006: 219). Alt-
hough this shift was not solidified and unchallenged (as, for example, the case of oppo-
sition to Gianitsis reform in 2001 demonstrates), it allowed for some structural and la-
bour market reforms (Reppas reform in social security in 2002, labour market reforms 
in 1998, 2000, and 2004, etc.). 
A number of authors mention patron-client relations and networks of ‘depend-
encies’ as a defining feature of the political life in Greece (see Pagoulatos 2009, Clogg 
1979, Lavdas 1997; Trantidis 2016). Clientelism is defined here as a distribution of 
resources by a political power through an agreement, which creates mutual obligations 
of reciprocity, and where politicians – the patrons – make the allocation of economic 
resources and social opportunities “dependent on the political support of the benefi-
ciaries – their clients” (Trantidis 2016: 6). Ioakimidis believes: “the state was used by 
political parties as a means of distributing favours in order to maximize their electoral 
appeal” (Ioakimidis 2001: 78). Another author emphasizes that clientlism represents 
“the predominant form of political mobilization and interest accommodation in 
Greece” (Trantidis 2016: 23). Through clientelistic exchange, both dominating parties, 
the Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima (Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνηµα or PASOK) and 
the Nea Dimokratia (Νέα Δηµοκρατία or ND), were able to build large and active sup-
port bases, reducing the degree of political contestation and protecting the political 
significance of both these parties from the ‘outsiders’ with a remarkably “stable pattern 
of political alignments” (Trantidis 2016: 225). In fact, the clientelistic practices 
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evolved from the individual to the collective level where a governing party ‘colonized’ 
the state apparatus, acting as the main agent of patronage and controlling the allocation 
of public resources (Lavdas 1997: 53).  
As it often happens, in the case of Greece, clientelism was accompanied by cor-
ruption where not only local but also foreign companies were involved (for example, 
cases of Athens stock exchange, Siemens, 2004 Summer Olympic games etc.; see also 
Spiegel 11.05.2010). In most these cases, corruption went unpunished. Polychroniou 
summarized the condition of clientelism and corruption as follows: 
“While practicing populist policies to keep voters content and pursuing 
strategies designed to appease the country’s vested economic interests, 
Greek governments since the reestablishment of democracy have, with-
out exception, been involved in various scandals of financial and politi-
cal nature by exploiting state resources to transfer wealth from the pub-
lic to the private and to redistribute wealth from the bottom to the top. 
Similarly, bribes and kickbacks represent an integral component of the 
way the nation conducts its business affairs and the only possible way, 
in many respects, that the citizens can speed up services in the public 
sector” (Polychroniou 2011: 11).  
Consequently, the practices of state involvement in economy adopted particu-
laristic character “with the state subject to a pervasive ‘rent-seeking’ behavior and fa-
voring certain sectors and interests” (Featherstone/Papadimitriou 2008: 51). As the 
Greek state fully controlled the banking system, the examples of clientelistic links be-
tween the public authorities and private interests included credit allocation, subsidiza-
tion, procurement, and elaborate price controls (Lavdas 1997: 187; see also Ioakimidis 
2001: 78). Greece was referred to as a “lawless country”, considering the state protec-
tion provided to the domestic business, industrial, and financial actors from the sanc-
tions for labor law violations, environmental pollution, illegal construction, etc. (Poly-
chroniou 2011: 36). 
The clientelistic practices discourage political actors to behave strategically, 
orienting them rather towards an immediate profit from the ‘today’s situation’. They 
also cause distrust of the population towards politicians that is reflected in the corrup-
tion perception in Greece14. The clientelistic arrangements of interest representation 
are often the preferred option, “where individuals, instead of forging horizontal ties 
with other individuals of comparable social class or status, seek personal patrons (and 																																																								
14 The public opinion research by the Transparency International (www.transparency.org) even shows 
political parties, parliament and legislature, and media as being the institutions most affected by corrup-
tion. 
	 163	
patrons recruit clients) in most aspects of social and political life” (Sotiropoulos 1995: 
4). In this situation, clientelism took over the representative function of civil society. 
The latter has been weak, with limited autonomy and is often dependent on the clien-
telistic relationships (Pagoulatos 2002: 202). 
The programs aimed at re-defining the role of state in society have existed in 
Greece at least since the 1980s (Mitsotakis government), and the attempts to imple-
ment the “less state” reforms often failed. Featherstone and Papadimitriou mention the 
contradiction between the pre-liberal societal structure and liberal reforms in the 1830s 
when there was lack of individualism, and traditional moral standards were based on 
group. In this context, the authors point out some parallels with the modern clientelism 
and corruption in Greece, as “attitudes towards corruption have been shaped by com-
peting notions of group loyalty” (Featherstone/Papadimitriou 2008: 40). Moreover, due 
to lack of bourgeoisie, there was no actor continuously promoting the ‘less state’ logic. 
Although the state and society underwent a significant evolution since then,  
“these historical traits – of the weakness of a ‘liberal’ state tradition; of 
the embedded culture of clientelism, patronage, and group solidarity; 
and of a strong elite desire to imitate ‘Europe’ being qualified by popu-
list reservations – are important in defining the structural legacy affect-
ing the mindset of contemporary actors” (Featherstone/Papadimitriou 
2008: 41). 
 
6.2. European integration and the reform programs between 1985 and 2010 
6.2.1. Reform programs before 2010 
The adjustment costs of European integration and especially of the EMU were 
higher for Greece than for Germany because both the mandate of the ECB and the con-
text in Greece diverged considerably from the EMU, which promoted market competi-
tion and sound finance. 
Both preparation for and then the accession to the European Community in 
1981 brought about certain transformation in Greece. These changes especially con-
cerned stronger formal autonomy of the social institutions as well as a formal introduc-
tion of further channels for inclusion of interest groups into policy making. The acces-
sion certainly redefined  
“the contours of public-private relations and the substance, instruments 
and limits of state involvement in the economy. Regulatory change, 
conceived as the redesigning of the rules governing public-private rela-
tions, has been associated with a shift in the modes of state involvement 
from ownership to regulation” (Lavdas 1997: 186).  
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The paradox of the Greek case is that, despite the elite consensus (with the exception 
of the communist party) and very high levels of public support15, Greece had one of the 
poorest records in implementing and upholding the EU legislation (Feather-
stone/Papadimitriou 2008: 5; Lavdas 1997: 155). The process of reforms itself also 
proves the difficulties of adjustment.  
Within forty years, the Greek state experienced direct or indirect interventions 
in its economic policy a total of four times. The reform programs were attached to the 
balance of payments support loan in 1985 and 1991, the conditionality of EMU mem-
bership in late 1990s, and the austerity program of the Troika in the Greek ‘debt crisis’ 
from 2010. All these programs were focused on economic stabilization through the re-
duction of public deficits and expenditures, including some measures of privatization 
and structural reforms.  
The Greek state appealed first for the assistance of the EC in 1985 due to the 
rapidly worsening fiscal position. The EC’s stabilization program was abandoned after 
two years, in 1987, in the face of mounting social pressures and was followed by an-
other wave of state economic expansion  (Ioakimidis 2001: 81; Pagoulatos 2001: 194). 
In 1991 the government under the leadership of the Nea Demokratia requested another 
balance of payments support loan from the EC. Again the Commission prepared an 
austerity program as well as a stricter surveillance mechanism. The 1991 stabilization 
program failed to achieve its goals, leaving the reforms incomplete and facing strong 
resistance of organized interests (Pagoulatos 2001: 197).  
Between 1993 and 1994, Greece prepared and gradually implemented its new 
convergence program, aimed at the reduction of the budgetary deficit, redefinition of 
state’s economic role, privatization, and complete liberalization of the banking system 
(Ioakimidis 2001: 81-82). Nevertheless, these reforms did not suffice in order to 
achieve the goal of the membership in the EMU. The main transformation happened 
between 1996 and 2004, when the policies in almost all areas, including education, 
training, unemployment, pension system, etc., have been adjusted according to the 
Maastricht and EU guidelines (Basios/Karayiannis 2012). In the 1990s, the govern-
ment under the leadership Simitis attempted to simultaneously implement liberaliza-
tion and fiscal responsibility with a sense of urgency. At that time, governmental mod-																																																								
15 The public support for the single currency in Greece was one of the highest in the EU from 1997 to 
2003 and reached 82% in 2003 (Standard Eurobarometer 33-69; see also Featherstone/Papadimitriou 
2008: 7). 
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ernization discourse was extended with the risks of exclusion from the EMU. Although 
this government was able to implement some serious reforms, they often exhibited 
path-dependent changes, largely following their pre-existing institutional patterns. 
Therefore, the reforms in Greece in light of the accession to the EMU included 
the institutional transformation of the Bank of Greece, budgetary consolidation, cuts in 
the budgetary spending, privatization, and structural reforms.  
First, concerning the new Bank of Greece, the law 2548 “Provisions Relating to 
the Bank of Greece” adopted in December of 1997 “established BoG independence 
from any government instructions or advice, exclusive authority in the exercise of 
monetary policy, a six-year renewable term for the governor and deputy governors, and 
a Monetary Policy Council (comprising the governor, the two deputy governors, and 
three additional members)” (Pagoulatos 2009: 173). Earlier, before securing its full 
independence, the BoG gained influence through its participation in the governmental 
efforts to achieve the economic stability. The normative framework of the European 
single market and the earlier elite networking within the expert community of central 
bankers through “numerous informal cooperation practices and networks, cultivating 
their mutual relations” are often regarded as important factors for the establishment of 
the monetarist paradigm within the Bank of Greece (Pagoulatos 2009: 170). After be-
coming a part of the Euro-system, the BoG focused on the banking supervision as well 
as research and information. 
Being an agent of the ECB in Greece, the BoG significantly lost popularity, as 
it promoted wage moderation and structural reforms, including liberalization and pen-
sion reforms (Pagoulatos 2009: 179-180).  
“In other words, the national central banks’s depoliticization, by way of 
independence from national governmental political objectives, has sub-
jected it to far greater political controversy than it had ever elicited dur-
ing its long period of supposed ‘politicization’. The answer to this ap-
parent paradox is, of course, that, for all its technocratic robustness, 
central banking orthodoxy is not distributionally neutral: it affects so-
cio-economic interests in different ways, it involves gains and losses” 
(Pagoulatos 2009: 180). 
Second, as in the case of any other member state, the EMU also separated the 
‘technical’ monetary policy from the ‘political’ economic policy in Greece. As a result, 
economic policy formally remained the competence of the national government. How-
ever, the SGP criteria put serious limitations and pressures of adjustment on the eco-
nomic policy in Greece as its indicators originally diverged from those required in the 
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SGP. The efforts to achieve budgetary consolidation resulted in a decrease of the debt 
and public deficit levels from 97,8% of GDP in 1995 to 93,9% in 1998 and from -9,7% 
of GDP in 1995 to -6,3% in 1998 correspondingly (OECD data). Yet despite all the 
efforts, the re-examination of the Greek budgetary deficit by the Commission in 2004 
led to the accusations of cheating and formally improving the statistic in order to se-
cure the membership in the Euro-zone (Featherstone/Papadimitriou 2008: 15; Poly-
chroniou 2011: 7). The revision of the calculations by the Greek government in 2002 
resulted in significant corrections, where surpluses turned into deficit (Kazakos 2004: 
908). 
Third, a privatization program was implemented in Greece. According to Lav-
das, the main objective of privatization was dealing with the deficit and public debt in 
order to meet the convergence criteria for participation in the EMU. Therefore, it was 
not part of the neoliberal policy ideas or party platforms (Lavdas 1997: 202). Kazakos 
argues further, “privatization in Greece seemed largely to take place under the confin-
ing condition that it must not disturb significantly the sclerotic and heavily politicised 
public-private networks and covert collusions” (Kazakos 2004: 910). It often took the 
form of partial privatization where some money was provided to the state, but the con-
trol over a ‘privatized’ company still remained in the hands of the state (Kazakos 2004: 
910). Finally, some structural reforms also took place. 
Summing up, the requirements of the EMU and the reforms it encouraged chal-
lenged the economic policy model in Greece where the state played a crucial role in 
economic growth and economic activity, which was mainly oriented on the domestic 
demand. As it was described in the previous chapter, the dominating mode of govern-
ance in Greece was characterized by a strong fragmentation of interest groups and cli-
entelism, with some features of corporatism. This mode did not only persist but, in my 
opinion, was even strengthened due to the increase in competition for resources be-
tween the stronger interest groups, especially in the light of the increasing pressures of 
economic policy adjustment. Subsequently, the system was biased; benefitting the bet-
ter-organized groups of population with a better access to the decision makers and dis-
advantaging the under-represented, weaker, yet legitimate interests.  
The assessment of the scale and depth of reforms vary significantly among the 
researchers. For example, Kalaitzidis drew a rather, in my opinion, too optimistic pic-
ture of Greece’s modernization, including “changing from a truly statist society where 
the political party dominated the government and produced policies to a more state-
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directed, liberalized, and Europeanized state” with the “economic growth rate signifi-
cantly up”, and “modernization discourse has overtaken the political elites of both 
dominant parties” (Kalaitzidis 2010: 176). On the contrary, Featherstone and Papadi-
mitriou while analysing the reform process in two case studies, claim that the achieve-
ments of reforms in both policy sectors were rather limited (Feather-
stone/Papadimitriou 2008: 19; see also Bitros 2013). As a combination of reasons, the 
authors mention the bad quality of administration (“institutionally weak government, 
with a large, low-skilled, and ill-coordinated bureaucracy”), clientelism, abuse of state 
resources by the prevailing interests, corruption, conflicting relationships with the so-
cial partners, and also “a number of embedded values, norms, and practices associated 
with the Greek identity” (normative objections) (Featherstone/Papadimitriou 2008). 
“The contrasts are stark: unrestrained leadership, but lacking implemen-
tational strength; liberal democratic norms and structures with ‘rent-
seeking’ behavior; social dialogue and distorted interest representation; 
and a small state facing daunting external challenges with a domestic 
structure not of consensus but of severe conflict” (Feather-
stone/Papadimitriou 2008: 201). 
Kazakos also confirms a slow, inconsistent, and fragmented character of structural re-
forms in Greece. Moreover, according to him, “there has been a clear tendency to take 
measures that have a lesser impact on well-established interest groups and a greater 
impact on outsiders” (Kazakos 2004: 911; see also Matsaganis 2013: 33-34). The au-
thor argues that the absence of strong political and societal coalitions in favour of re-
forms in this period was the main reason for such an inefficient reform process (Ka-
zakos 2004: 911). Generally, along with the stabilization measures, there was little 
done to improve the competitiveness of production structures (Frangakis 2012).  
Trantidis emphasizes that the reason why all of these reform programs failed 
lies in clientelism and “reproduction by adaptation” of Greece’s clientelist system: 
“In response to external pressures for reform, politicians in a highly cli-
entelist system will seek to mitigate the cost of its policies on client 
groups and will design a reform package that preserves clientelist sup-
ply as much as possible (clientelist bias in economic reform)” (Trantidis 
2016: 227). 
Therefore, Trantidis explains that measures such as new taxes or general wage freeze 
are preferred, as these measures diffuse the costs of fiscal consolidation across the 
population (Trantidis 2016: 227). Yet the author admits that ideology and political 
miscalculations due to the lack of full information about other actors’ preferences also 
play an important role (Trantidis 2016: 227).  
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6.2.2. Reform programs after 2010 
With the Euro zone crisis of 2010, Greece received the financial assistance in 
exchange for implementation of the reform programs offered by the Troika (the Euro-
pean Commission, the ECB and the IMF) in form of the Memorandum of Economic 
and Financial Policies (Memorandum). The implementation of these programs includ-
ed austerity measures, such as cuts in wages in the public sector, reduction of employ-
ment in the public sector, general spending cuts (in health, education, and social ser-
vices), cuts in pensions, increase in taxes, extension of the tax base to include unem-
ployment benefits, large family, and non-contributory disability benefits (Frangakis 
2013). Moreover, the labour market experienced a strong transformation as the Nation-
al Collective Wage Agreement increasingly lost its validity, and the statist approach 
intensified (Bratsis 2010): first, in the private sector, the definition of wages moved to 
the industry and firm level, as the wage rates below the ones in the National Collective 
Wage Agreement became allowed; and second, the government unilateraly sets the 
minimum wage. This development resulted in a 20-50 % reduction in wages in the pri-
vate sector (Frangakis 2013). While the debt cut was completely ruled out as an option 
in the first and third Memoranda, partial debt cut was present in the second Memoran-
dum through voluntary participation of the private sector.  
The economic crisis was accompanied by a deep political and institutional cri-
sis. While distrust and indifference among the population was growing, the differences 
between the two main political parties almost disappeared. The democratic crisis cul-
minated in the letters of intent, which members of the coalition government under the 
leadership of Lucas Papademos and the leaders of the two largest parties wrote to the 
IMF, confirming the intention to pursue the reforms despite the political pressures. The 
crisis of trust and legitimacy of the Greek elites did not appear out of the economic cri-
sis, but the former significantly intensified with the latter (Frangakis 2012; Mylonas 
2014; Tsakalotos 2010). This situation “complicates even further the idea of getting 
people to cooperate in the making and implementation of decisions” (Martin/Dinas 
2010). Additionally, Kritidis mentions de facto censorship in the media that was ena-
bled through the suspension of journalists and the cut of financial loans for the inde-
pendent newspapers (Kritidis 2013). 
The budgetary targets set in the Memoranda were often missed, whether due to 
the too-optimistic calculations of the Troika or the lack of action by the Greek gov-
ernment. In July 2011, the Ministers within the Eurogroup stated that “‘the responsibil-
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ity for resolving the crisis in Greece lies primarily with Greece’ but they also ‘recog-
nized the need for a broader and more forward-looking policy response to assist the 
government in its efforts” (Drossos 2011: 12). The one-sided austerity approach ig-
nores that the deficit problem in Greece is rather due to the missing revenues than high 
expenditures (Tsakalotos 2010: figure 5 and 6). It also overlooks that the public em-
ployment was meant to compensate for the underdeveloped welfare state. 
“The concrete functioning of the Greek political system … ended up to 
constitute the basic impediment for the national and economic devel-
opment; and not only: it became a vehicle of selling out the country, in 
exchange for the ability (of political system) to proceed to material giv-
ing’s in exchange for giving’s in votes. No constitutional or other legal 
disposition has imposed this outcome; but not impeded it either” 
(Drossos 2011: 27). 
 
6.3. The elite discourse on the EMU in Greece between the years 1997 and 2000: 
the contested dominance of the neoliberal competitiveness discourse 
6.3.1. Governmental sub-discourse: Simitis government 
The discursive period considered in this part of the thesis covers the term of the 
majority government of the Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima (Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό 
Κίνηµα or PASOK) led by Konstantinos Simitis, whose communications are analysed 
here. The central topics of the governmental sub-discourse of that time were European 
integration, future benefits of the membership in the EMU, and the reforms that were 
necessary in order to secure this membership. The EU stimulus reflected in the wish 
not to become an outsider in European integration was crucial in the discourse, legiti-
mizing the reforms and attempting to convince the population of the internal necessity 
and appropriateness of those reforms. The latter were also presented as an original po-
litical preference, corresponding the Greek interest. Such an approach in the discourse 
of the government differed from the previous years of reforms (see Pagoulatos 2001: 
199) when significantly more scapegoat rhetoric was employed.  
The government communicated an urgent necessity for Greece to remain at the 
core of European integration through its participation in the EMU, which was expected 
to provide a number of benefits for the Greek economy, including the significant re-
duction of interest rates and a better access to finance for the enterprises, price stabil-
ity, and elimination of the exchange rate risks.  
“Secondly, the significant reduction in interest rates, both for invest-
ment and for operational business needs. This reduction will favor pre-
dominantly Greek companies compared to businesses in the other EU 
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countries, and much more compared to the third countries…. From the 
reduction of cost of interest rates the state will generate significant sav-
ings, estimated at hundreds of billions a year. Therefore, the resources 
available for the provision of social and development policy will in-
crease significantly”. Konstantinos Simitis, Prime Minister, 21.12.1998. 
Therefore, the government emphasized that the reduction of interest rates would have 
advantages for both business activities and the state budget.  
Simitis promoted a ‘modernization’ discourse with a bias towards the economic 
aspects, while employment and social aspects were slightly less present. His ‘moderni-
zation’ discourse implied stabilization of the economy, reforms in the public sector and 
in the tax system. These reforms were argued to target reinforcement of competitive-
ness of the Greek economy, reduction of the tax evasion, as well as the general im-
provement of fairness in taxation (through overall reduction of the tax exemptions). By 
elimination of the uncertainties connected to the unstable exchange rates and to the 
lack of financing opportunities for the Greek enterprises, the common currency was 
also expected to benefit the growth. Therefore, the EMU was described as the answer 
to globalization, providing conditions for both growth and social justice.  
“The high growth rates in the new environment create a sound surplus, 
needed for the expansion of social cohesion and solidarity. Simultane-
ously, the EMU shields and promotes national interests, improving the 
new members’ international position. Within the EMU we have a shield 
against shocks of globalization”. Konstantinos Simitis, Prime Minister, 
9.03.2000. 
Within the governmental discourse, the membership in the EMU was constant-
ly equalized with stabilization, stable currency, price stability, and reduction of risks 
and uncertainty. In order to address the doubts about the real possibility of Greece’s 
accession to the EMU, the representatives of the government often emphasized the 
present success of the reforms, which resulted in a drastic reduction of public debt and 
inflation.  
Considering the issues of democracy and unemployment, the government stood 
under a permanent criticism from the opposition due to the aspect of full independence 
of the ECB and an absence of the employment criteria among the EMU’s economic 
policy criteria. Here, the Prime Minister argued that the European Council ultimately 
possesses the competence in definition of the exchange rates. Moreover, he mentioned 
a “European commitment to reduce unemployment” and presented harmonization in 
this field as ‘work in progress’: 
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“Ladies and gentlemen, in Vienna, following the Summit of Pörtschach, 
representatives of the member states decided, first of all, to support the 
policy for more employment in Europe and combat unemployment. 
There was an agreement on necessity of a European Employment Pact, 
but there were differences with respect to the content of the employ-
ment pact and this will be the subject of further meetings. But there was 
a determination to reduce unemployment and so, it will be necessary to 
implement new policies, particularly the strengthening of infrastructure 
and the development of trans-European networks”. Konstantinos Simi-
tis, Prime Minister, 16.12.1998. 
 
6.3.2. Parliamentary sub-discourse: PASOK, ND, SYN, KKE, and DIKKI 
To begin with the majority party, the PASOK, the communications of its repre-
sentatives accompanied and strongly converged with the governmental sub-discourse. 
Similarly to the governmental sub-discourse, the issue of reduction of the interest rates 
and its advantages was the central topic.  
“But monetary stability means reducing risk and interest rates. The 
drastic reduction in the cost of credit, interest rates on a stable low level 
means increased investment, economic growth and job creation. It 
means safer and sustainable business environment, it means for the citi-
zen, who now wish a mortgage, a real opportunity to house his family 
through getting a cheap loan; it means that an entrepreneur can borrow 
at 7% to 6% or less; it means a farmer, especially burdened today, can 
claim competitive prices and a higher income…. It means that the ac-
cession to the EMU reduces the public debt service costs, which will 
emerge from the reduction and stability of interest rates. For Greece and 
the Greeks whose public debt this year reached thirty-seven and a half 
trillion drachmas, it is of paramount importance and is directly connect-
ed to the burden on the Greek taxpayers, who pay the cost of govern-
mental borrowing”. Minas Stavrakakis, Rapporteur of the Majority, 
17.12.1998. 
Moreover, the official position of the party defended the privatizations and policies 
oriented to the macroeconomic stability, arguing that the reforms would have to be re-
alized independently from the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty. The party pro-
moted an anti-inflationary approach, and argued that macroeconomic stability would 
promote growth. Also, PASOK emphasized the issue of European integration and im-
portance of the membership in the EMU for Greece. Again, the EMU was equalized 
with more safety and certainty, improving Greece’s economic position in the world 
and providing an opportunity to address the challenge of globalization, especially be-
cause the membership would end the speculations on the Greek currency. 
“We live in a global economy where unimaginable volumes of money 
are moved around the clock. On the one hand, the national states are 
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predictable to some extent in their reactions: there are systems of law, 
international organizations, diplomatic consultation channels; but what 
provision/guarantee is provided by an individual, registered or anony-
mous speculator against the people, who is exclusively oriented on prof-
it and who is able to move without barriers huge amounts of money, en-
dangering economies, leading to a collapse of economies, leading to 
disintegration of social balances, leading to knocking down political de-
velopments in national crises, affecting directly the life of every citizen, 
wherever he is”. Minas Stavrakakis, Rapporteur of the Majority, 
17.12.1998. 
As the opposition often argued that the Greek economy did not actually con-
verge with the other EU members, the issue of convergence was also present in the 
sub-discourse of the PASOK. It was claimed that the development of both inflation 
rate and public debt in Greece in fact proves the convergence. It was then expected that 
the growth rate would increase the convergence even further. 
Concerning the social sphere, the party simultaneously promoted the liberal re-
forms in the economic sphere (including privatization, structural reforms, and debt re-
duction) and the triptych “stabilization – development – social justice”, which required 
a stronger welfare state and active employment policy. It was also argued that the 
common economic policy at the European level should be strengthened:  
“The features of economic policy that prevail in the European Union 
lack aspects of development policy, employment and redistributive 
mechanisms through the Community budget; the existing degree of la-
bor mobility is not sufficient to provide functioning of the EMU pro-
ject”. Minas Stavrakakis, Rapporteur of the Majority, 17.12.1998. 
It must be mentioned that the issues of social sphere occupied a much smaller part of 
the PASOK sub-discourse. In its communications, the representatives of PASOK often 
attempted to marginalize those who were opposing the reforms of the government, 
identifying them as “speculators”, “demagogues”, “beneficiaries of protectionism and 
clientelism”, “selfish groups in trade unions”, and “underground economy”.  
After the elections in 1996, the Nea Dimokratia (ND) became the largest oppo-
sition party in the parliament. The party supported the goal of membership in the EMU 
and promoted privatization, budgetary consolidation, structural reforms, and reforms 
aimed at reducing the size of the state and the scale of its interventions into economy.  
“Ladies and gentlemen, if the reduction of spending and the reduction 
of public waste is required, it is also necessary to reduce the actual size 
of the state, to take all necessary corrective measures that will enable 
the opening of the economy and markets and that will allow Greece to 
have a different perspective”. Georgios Voulgarakis, Rapporteur of the 
Minority, 17.12.1998. 
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Also, in the sub-discourse of the ND, economic aspects were dominant, and the 
central topics included the demands of administrative reforms. Therefore, the position 
of the ND was actually highly compatible with the policies of Simitis government. 
However, the ND criticized the governing party, mainly for not being able to achieve 
the real convergence with the rest of the EMU member states, for too late and often 
“not sufficient” reforms, as well as for cheating the data in order to achieve the goal of 
accession to the EMU. According to the ND, the government failed to prepare Greece 
for the years after the accession. Especially, it did not succeed in improving the com-
petitiveness of the Greek economy.  
“The competitiveness of the Greek economy lags dramatically. In a re-
cent report of the World Economic Forum Greece is ranked forty-fourth 
from a list of fifty-three countries. The productivity of the Greek econ-
omy is moving steadily below the European average, 1.5% to 1.9% in 
Greece, 4% in Ireland and 2% in Portugal. Of course there is an index in 
which Greece is ahead. It is the last indicator used too much in the liter-
ature, it is the index of misery. One indicator represents namely a com-
bination of inflation, income and unemployment all together. In this 
Greece is indeed ahead”. Georgios Voulgarakis, Rapporteur of the Mi-
nority, 17.12.1998. 
The ND recognized a tax reform and action against the tax evasion to be urgently nec-
essary for strengthening the Greek state. In this context, the social aspects were gener-
ally reduced to expressing concerns of high unemployment and stagnating wages.  
There were three smaller oppositional parties in the parliament – the Synaspis-
mos Rizospastikis Aristeras (Συνασπισµός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς or SYN, later 
SYRIZA), the Communist Party of Greece (Κοµµουνιστικό Κόµµα Ελλάδας or KKE), 
and the Dimokratiko Koinoniko Kinima (Δηµοκρατικό Κοινωνικό Κίνηµα or DIKKI). 
All three parties generally expressed a critical position towards European integration 
that was also reflected in their attitude towards the membership in the EMU. Moreo-
ver, in the discourse of these actors, economic and social aspects were better balanced 
than in the discourse of the two dominating parties.  
The main point of criticism by the SYN was the existing asymmetry of eco-
nomic and social policies in the EMU: 
“The EMU, which is being built in Europe, is a problematic EMU. It is 
EMU made in opposition and not by accommodating the demands of 
the left for a social Europe. It is a monetary union socially handicapped 
and institutionally misbalanced. Socially handicapped, because it is 
based solely on monetary and fiscal criteria. It is an edifice of a differ-
ent era, neoliberal inspiration, but had the support, the acceptance and 
approval of the European social democrats, that today are concerned 
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about the unemployment. It left outside every social and developmental 
criterion. And when the Coalition was trying to propose just the necessi-
ty to broaden the criteria, we faced a wall of opposition”. Ioannis Dra-
gasakis (SYN), 17.12.1998. 
The party expressed social, democratic, and economic concerns linked to the govern-
mental policies and the goal of membership in the EMU. First, it questioned the nomi-
nal convergence principle, which, according to the members of the party, would lead to 
the redistribution of income and result in deficits of social policy. Second, representa-
tives of the SYN argued that not only did the government act outside the democratic 
institutions, rejecting the parliamentary debate on convergence program, but it also 
implemented a budget that ignores the needs of society. Third, the governmental stabi-
lization policies were criticised for disregarding the unemployment problem, for their 
inability to solve the issue of external debt, and for achieving the decrease of inflation 
by the means of reducing the wages. Emphasizing the lack of action by the government 
in the domain of tax policies, the SYN argued that such inaction resulted in the persis-
tence of the regressive and unfair tax system. As an alternative, the SYN promoted 
economic policies that aimed at growth and employment, raising productivity, and 
structural reforms. Generally, the party claimed that Greece is not prepared to become 
a member of the EMU: 
“The Greek society enters the EMU with massive and chronic unem-
ployment; with an anachronistic administration; a huge, yet nonexistent, 
state; with widespread corruption; with expanding criminality of a new 
type; with a public health and education system that is in stagnation; 
with an unfair tax system, costly and inefficient”. Ioannis Dragasakis 
(SYN), 17.12.1998. 
Additionally, members of the SYN claimed that the large trade deficits and high levels 
of public debt would cancel out the possible benefits of the membership in the EMU. 
For example, the anticipated reduction of the interest rates would have a negative ef-
fect on the Greek economy in the long run.  
The KKE criticised both the Greek government and the European framework 
for promoting the interests of the owners of a large capital. The party’s further con-
cerns included the regressive and unfair tax system, as well as the degradation of the 
agricultural sector of economy, resulting from the governmental policies. Austerity and 
the unique focus on competitiveness were described as unfair and unable to provide 
growth.  
“And the state budget is deeply a class one, it is a budget of harsh uni-
lateral austerity, intensifying poverty for many, strengthening and en-
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larging the wealth of the few. It is a budget imposing taxes on the peo-
ple, ensuring profits for the plutocracy; socially unjust for the poor and 
middle class, devastating for the economy and the country”. Nicolaos 
Gatzis (KKE), 17.12.1998. 
The actual problems of the Greek economy have been described as a decline of pro-
duction and high levels of public debt. Additionally, according to the KKE, Greece 
suffered under high unemployment and unfairly low labour costs. Similarly to the 
SYN, the KKE emphasized the bias of the economic policy against social policy at the 
EU level where social aspects are neglected as a criteria of development: 
“Development criteria should be the type and the size of employment 
and unemployment, increase of income and living standards of the peo-
ple, education, health, welfare, creation of better conditions of work and 
residence of our people, protection of environment etc.” Nicolaos Gat-
zis (KKE), 17.12.1998. 
Finally, the KKE demanded public investments in education, manufacturing, health, 
and welfare that were considered essential for economic development. 
The DIKKI casted doubt on the future of the EMU, which lacked a robust polit-
ical structure: 
“The first observation is that for the first time in the World history, 
there is an experiment to create a currency not backed by some form of 
structured political power…. It is an example, for the first time in the 
World history, of circulation of money without pre-existing structured 
political power that supports it. And this is an uncertain future for the 
Euro by today's standards…. The question is, what happens when there 
are dilemmas. And dilemmas are always solved by the political power; 
depending on what goals it seeks to achieve. Controlled inflation and 
economic growth to reduce unemployment or monetary stability, eco-
nomic stagnation and rising unemployment?” Anastasios Intzes 
(DIKKI), 17.12.1998. 
The representatives of this party accused the government of failing to prepare a pro-
gram for economic development, and simply implementing austerity instead. The latter 
was described as anti-labour and unable to ensure the real convergence with the rest of 
the EMU member states. The DIKKI argued that the government shifts the burden of 
adjustment on to the low-income population. Finally, the members of the party specu-
lated about whether or not Greece would be able to achieve the goal of membership in 
the EMU, as the requirements of budgetary consolidation and public deficit had not 
been fulfilled. 
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6.3.3. Sub-discourse of the Bank of Greece 
The communications by the Bank of Greece (BoG) were focused on the aspects 
of economic policy and provided some additional explanations of the central features 
of the EMU. The key topic was the encouragement of structural reforms, price stabil-
ity, and budgetary consolidation. Also, the BoG promoted privatization and an increase 
in labour market flexibility. As the EMU would increase the competition, the institu-
tion urged the policy-makers to increase the competitiveness of the Greek economy, 
ensuring macroeconomic stability and a real convergence: 
“The pivot of the appropriate strategy for achieving sustainable and rap-
id growth within the euro area should be further strengthening of the 
Greek economy’s international competitiveness. This can and must be 
achieved by completing fiscal consolidation and implementing structur-
al reforms aimed at improving productivity and efficient functioning of 
the markets. To this end, a number of specific and difficult structural 
problems must be tackled. These relate to: social security system in 
view of unfavorable demographic trends; remaining rigidities in some 
markets, including the labor market; inefficiencies in public administra-
tion; and inadequacies of the educational system”. Lucas Papadimos, 
Governor of the Bank of Greece, 19.11.1999. 
In the sphere of taxation, a representative of the BoG advised a tax reform (in order to 
prevent the flow of capital to the lower tax countries) and implementation of measures 
against the tax evasion.  
“Tax reform is also needed to alleviate the tax burden, particularly, alt-
hough not exclusively, on wage earners and to bring the tax structure in-
to the line with that in the euro area, thereby preventing the movement 
of capital and labor to lower-taxed areas”. Nicholas Garganas, Deputy 
Governor of the Bank of Greece, 18.09.1999. 
According to the BoG, membership in the EMU would bring stability to Greece as 
well as stimulate deregulation and withdrawal of the state from the economy of the 
country. The institution promoted the idea that inflationary policies do not deliver 
growth and that monetary policies are generally growth neutral. Nevertheless, it argued 
that the stability-oriented policies would promote growth. It was emphasized that the 
membership in the EMU would provide the Greek companies with a better access to 
finance, stimulating trade and investment. However, high levels of unemployment and 
of public debt (despite a positive development) remain an obstacle on the way to the 
membership in the EMU. 
According to the governor of the BoG at that time Lucas Papadimos, independ-
ence of the ECB is crucial, but the latter is also committed to transparency, accounta-
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bility, and inter-institutional communication. Moreover, growth and high levels of em-
ployment were claimed to also belong to the objectives of the ECB:  
“Price stability is not, of course, the only important economic policy ob-
jective. Attaining sustainable and non-inflationary growth and a high 
level of employment are other important goals. The ECB is required to 
support the general economic policies in the Community and to contrib-
ute to the achievement of these goals, provided that price stability is not 
jeopardized. In my view, the maintenance of price stability and the at-
tainment of sustainable growth and high employment are not conflicting 
but complementary objectives in the long run and, in general, over the 
medium term as well”. Lucas Papadimos, Governor of the Bank of 
Greece, 22.04.2002. 
 
6.3.4. The Greek trade union association: the General Confederation of Greek Work-
ers (GSEE) 
The General Confederation of Workers (GSEE) demanded from the govern-
ment strengthening of employment policy. The organization generally expressed a pro-
integration position, although it simultaneously criticised some of the features of the 
EMU, such as the absence of employment as a convergence criteria. It forcefully re-
jected the idea of multi-speed integration in the EMU, fearing the downgrade and 
negative consequences for the Greek economy. The GSEE generally supported the pol-
icies of low inflation, macroeconomic stability, and structural reforms but opposed pri-
vatization, further increase in labour market flexibility, freeze of purchasing power, 
and abandonment of the autonomy of collective bargaining.  
In fact, the GSEE expressed great concern that the EMU enforces decentraliza-
tion of bargaining. The GSEE was alarmed about the high pressure to increase the flex-
ibility of the labour market in the EMU:  
“Due to the requirements of integration into the EMU and the common 
currency in terms of nominal convergence of the economies, current 
development in the employment sector proves the bias towards con-
stantly increasing its flexibility. It is expected that the policies of flexi-
bility of the labor market and further reduction of labor costs will take 
place and will be intensified in the countries, like Greece, trapped in the 
common currency with low levels of competitiveness, and qualitative 
indicators of its development will be deprived of the possibilities to in-
tervene with the policies of exchange rate tricks, aiming at the boost of 
competitiveness of the national products”. INE GSEE, June 1998. 
The organisation insisted on the view that the Greek labour market has already been 
flexible, and despite continuing efforts to make it even more flexible, the Greek econ-
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omy did not achieve the goal of stronger competitiveness, and unemployment actually 
increased.  
According to the GSEE, the EMU incorporates the bias of competitiveness 
against growth and the bias of the economic policies against the social policies: 
“The Maastricht Treaty setting the conditions for the path to the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union reproduces the central philosophy of the 
Community project, which aims to achieve economic goals, by respec-
tively downgrading its policy towards the social factor…. 
The adherence to the requirements of economic convergence by the def-
inition of national policies for achieving the objectives of the EMU is 
dominated by neoliberal-inspired options, combined with the narrow 
focus on the concept of competitiveness that is interpreted in essentially 
unilateral perception of the need to reduce the labor costs”. INE GSEE, 
June 1998. 
Therefore, it was argued that the strict application of the SGP criteria would inevitably 
lead to a recession. Moreover, the organisation criticised the unfair distribution of the 
burden of economic adjustment. The GSEE promoted deepening of integration and in-
troduction of a social agenda and social dialogue at the EU level, as well as European 
industrial policies. It also emphasized the necessity of democratization, especially 
through increasing the role and responsibility of the parliament.  
 
6.3.5. The Greek employers’ association: the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises (SEV) 
The Greek employers’ association, the SEV, emphasized that Greece should be 
at the core of European integration, and therefore greater reform efforts would be nec-
essary in order to secure the membership in the EMU. The SEV claimed that not being 
able to join the EMU would have serious negative consequences for Greece, including 
the decline of living standards, future currency crisis, and a decrease in competitive-
ness of the Greek economy: 
“Summing up, failure of the country to integrate in the EMU means au-
tomatically its degradation from what it is today – an equal member of 
the Union – to a second class member having some kind of special rela-
tions… That is why a final effort is necessary based on the right estima-
tion of risks and benefits, taking up responsibilities and adjusting be-
haviors to the needs of our time”. SEV, June-July 1998. 
The EMU is presented as being beneficial for economic growth and a great opportunity 
for the Greek enterprises in terms of trade and financing due to elimination of the ex-
change rate risks and reduction of interest rates. Moreover, at the national level, the 
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membership in the EMU was expected to establish strict fiscal policy, de-regulation, 
and a reduction of state interventionism.  
Yet it was argued that the success of the Greek economy would depend on 
competitiveness in the circumstances of increased competition within the EMU. Con-
sequently, the measures enhancing competitiveness, including structural reforms and 
labour market flexibilization, were recommended by the SEV. According to the organ-
ization, the reforms should be aimed at modernization of the Greek economy and soci-
ety. Simultaneously, a series of persistent problems were identified, including public 
debt, administrative barriers, state interventionism, and delayed industrial develop-
ment.  
 
6.3.6. Summarizing the discourse analysis 
This period of analysis proves the existence of a dominating and an alternative 
discourses in Greece in the period between 1997 and 2000. Powerful actors, including 
the majority government party PASOK, the biggest opposition party ND, as well as the 
BoG and the SEV, shared the dominating discourse. Three small parties in the parlia-
ment (the SYN, the KKE, and the DIKKI) as well as the GSEE embodied the alterna-
tive discourse.  
The dominating discourse coalition generally promoted neoliberal reforms and 
pointed out the necessity to increase the competitiveness of the Greek economy 
through the policies of macroeconomic stability, including austerity, privatization, 
structural reforms, liberalization, increase in flexibility of labour markets, and tax re-
form. All the actors from this group shared the assumption that stability would lead to 
growth. Simultaneously, all actors of the dominating discourse coalition, with the ex-
ception of the SEV, recognised unemployment levels to be problematic. Yet there cer-
tainly was some discord among the representatives of this discourse coalition. First, the 
PASOK and Kostas Simitis government promoted liberal reforms partly using the 
rhetoric of the left. Their discourse claimed growth, social justice, and stabilization to 
be the ultimate goals and emphasized the future perspective of profitable conditions for 
the state investment into social policies. Second, while promoting the same reforms, 
the other actors of this discourse coalition demonstrated some distrust towards the gov-
ernment’s ability to succeed with the reforms, and each of them identified some prob-
lematic issues where more reform efforts would be required.  
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The alternative discourse challenged the assumption that the reforms for mac-
roeconomic stabilization actually promote growth. The actors from this discourse coa-
lition constantly emphasized the bias of economic aspects of the EMU, especially the 
pressures of unilateral convergence, against the social policies. In this context, the ac-
tors generally recognised the necessity to reform and reduce the public debt. Yet it was 
argued that the reforms should focus on promotion of economic growth. High unem-
ployment rate was one of the central topics within the alternative discourse where ac-
tors demanded active policies from the government for increasing employment. Also, 
it was claimed that the reform of the “regressive and unfair” tax system was urgently 
needed.  
Summing up, the central points of contestation between the two coalitions in-
cluded the real effects of budgetary austerity and of liberalization of economic policies. 
The policies to increase competitiveness as the primary policy goal were contested as 
well as the assumption that stability automatically leads to growth. Finally, the bias of 
the EMU towards the economic policies was also a topic of discussion, as the actors of 
the dominating coalition emphasized universal benefits of the membership. Yet despite 
the strong difference in some definitions and policy goals, there was an agreement in 
identification of some problems across the discourse coalitions. The absolute majority 
of the actors recognised that the high level of unemployment is a problem of the Greek 
economy that must be solved. The actors also agreed on the necessity to reduce the 
public debt and implement a tax reform. However, the ideas of how to approach these 
issues often diverged significantly. 
Concerning the groups of population represented by each discourse coalition, 
the government and PASOK often argued in the interest of Greece or the Greek econ-
omy, Greek citizens, labour, and business, as well as the “future generations”. It was 
characteristic for the governmental discourse to present the membership in the EMU as 
beneficial for all citizens. The other members of the same discourse coalition often 
mentioned people or citizens and the Greek companies (business). The second dis-
course coalition, representing the alternative discourse, presented itself as defending 
the interests of society, people, labour, and the low-income part of population.   
From a democratic perspective, discourse in Greece proved the existence of a 
stronger social conflict and stronger scepticism than in Germany (in both periods). 
This is reflected in the fact that the domestic discourse clearly provides two alternative 
policy concepts on the same matter and therefore a persistently high degree of contes-
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tation. Although the economic problems are identified similarly across the actors, there 
was no consensus on a possible way to solve them. Moreover, despite the goal of 
membership in the EMU (which implies the implementation of the SGP), the govern-
ment and PASOK sometimes described the liberalization policies and austerity 
measures as a temporary necessity rather than a long-term political commitment. Both 
these aspects, the existence of a significant alternative discourse and some variations 
within the governmental sub-discourse, certainly raise the question of the future legit-
imacy of the EMU framework and its concrete implementation in Greece.  
In spite of the existence of an alternative discourse in Greece, this discourse 
was not compatible with the existing framework of the EMU (and, as the dominating 
discourse claimed, European integration in general). The goal of membership in the 
EMU and its requirements strengthened the reformers in Greece, and indeed a number 
of reforms could be implemented that would probably not be otherwise realized (or at 
least would have to face stronger resistance). Therefore, the reforms were at least part-
ly legitimized by the positive expectations from the membership in the EMU and the 
EU (future output legitimacy). This aspect also challenges the long-term legitimacy of 
both the EMU and the EU because if the expectations behind the future output legiti-
macy were not fulfilled, legitimacy can be endangered in times of economic hardship; 
and the policy preferences of the population can change beyond the norms within the 
EMU. 
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Table 6: Discourse analysis in Greece, 1997-2000 	
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Problem of unemployment ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	
Reduction of public debt ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	
Tax reform ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	
Structural reforms ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 !	 !	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	
Flexibility of labor market ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 !	 !	 !	 ✔	 ✖	 ✔	
Privatization ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 !	 ✖	 !	 ✔	 ✖	 ✔	
Budgetary austerity* ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✖	 ✖	 ✖	 ✔	 !	 ✔	
Liberalization of economic 
policies* 
✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✖	 ✖	 ✖	 ✔	 ✖	 ✔	
Increase in competitiveness 
as primary goal* 
✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✖	 ✖	 ✖	 ✔	 ✖	 ✔	
Stability promotes growth* ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✖	 ✖	 ✖	 ✔	 ✖	 ✔	
Active promotion of growth ✔✖	 ✔✖	 ✖	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✖	 ✔	 ✖	
Active employment policies ✔✖	 ✔✖	 ✖	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✖	 ✔	 ✖	
Bias of economic vs. social* ✖	 ✖	 ✖	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✖	 ✔	 ✖	
✔	-	agreed/	promoted;	✖	-	disagreed/	rejected;	!	-	not	central/	absent.	Points	with	*	-	issues	of	main	contestation.	
 
 
6.4. The elite discourse on the EMU in Greece between the years 2010 and 2015: 
enforced contestation and the failed dominance of the neoliberal competitiveness 
discourse in the times of crisis 
The second period of analysis, the years between 2010 and 2015, is the period 
of the Euro zone crisis, which directly affected Greece. It resulted in high political tur-
bulence in this country where three early general elections took place and four gov-
ernments changed within five years. Additionally and not surprisingly, discourse of 
some domestic actors experienced serious transformations during this period. There-
fore, sub-discourses of four Greek governments are scrutinized in this chapter. First, 
there was the majority government of PASOK led by Giorgos Papandreou, resigning 
and being replaced by an interim government in November 2011. Second, the interim 
government was created as a coalition government under the leadership of Loukas Pa-
padimos, which included the PASOK, the ND, and the Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos 
(Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερµός or LAOS). After the resignation of the Papandreou 
government, the early elections had been scheduled for May 5, 2012, and they had to 
be repeated on June 16, 2012 (after the attempts of the ND and SYRIZA to build a coa-
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lition government failed). After the double elections, the next government was created 
by the coalition of the ND, the PASOK, and Dimokratiki Aristera (Δηµοκρατική 
Αριστερά or DIMAR) where Antonis Samaras (ND) gained the post of the new Prime 
Minister. Finally, after another early elections on January 25, 2015, a coalition gov-
ernment was created, and this time it consisted of the SYRIZA and Anexartitoi Ellines 
(Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες or ANEL). Alexis Tsipras (SYRIZA) led this coalition gov-
ernment.  
 
6.4.1. Governmental sub-discourse: Papandreou government 
The PASOK majority government came into power after the elections of 2009 
and resigned in November 2011. Communications of the Prime Minister Giorgos Pa-
pandreou and of the Minister of Finance Giorgos Papakonstantinou reflected the offi-
cial position of this government. In June of 2011, Evangelos Venizelos became the 
Minister of Finance, and his communications were also included in the analysis below.  
The governmental sub-discourse of the Prime Minister Papandreou was filled 
with drama and appeals to patriotism of the Greek citizens: 
“The battle being fought is for the survival of Greece. This battle is not 
the battle that the Prime Minister or his government will win or lose. 
This is the battle that we either all win, all of us together – or we all sink 
together”. Giorgos Papandreou, Prime Minister, 11.09.2010. 
This sub-discourse went through two phases. In the first phase, it focused on the rea-
sons for the crisis and necessity of reforms. The crisis was mainly defined as the crisis 
of credibility caused by the excessive budgetary spending and by “the problems of the 
Greek state”, including clientelism, corruption, patronage, and poor administrative ca-
pacity.  
 “Let me quote what I said a year ago in a speech to bankers in Vienna. 
I said: “The Greek economy is not a poor economy. It was a misman-
aged one”. And if I translate that to the current reality, it meant a politi-
cal system built on clientelism, patronage, inequality and injustice, cap-
tive to special interest groups with special privileges, and along with it a 
huge, over-centralized, inefficient and bureaucratic state, lacking trans-
parency, meritocracy and accountability”. Giorgos Papandreou, Prime 
Minister, 17.05.2011. 
Subsequently, the government proposed the reforms of “revolutionary character” (Pa-
pandreou, 17.09.2011), which were aimed at revival of the Greek economy in a “so-
cially fair manner” (Papandreou, 2.05.2010) and would eliminate the perspective of the 
future state bankruptcy. The original list of reforms promoted by the government in-
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cluded austerity, structural reforms, privatization, and financial market regulation. Alt-
hough the adopted austerity measures were described as hard and painful for the citi-
zens, according to the government, it would be crucial to implement them: 
“I know that with the decisions made today our citizens must suffer 
greater sacrifices. The alternative however would be catastrophe and 
even greater suffering for us all. This is why we have decided not to 
back out. This is not a pleasant decision for me or for anybody. We are 
here however to take the correct decisions for our country. This was and 
remains our responsibility”. Giorgos Papandreou, Prime Minister, 
2.05.2010. 
However, acknowledging the hardship of reform, the government committed itself to 
distributing the burden of the economic adjustment fairly. 
The minister Papakonstantinou emphasized the severity of the Greek budgetary 
problems, stating that the state is nearly bankrupt. According to him, if bankruptcy 
would really happen, it would trigger decades of recession and impoverishment. Con-
sequently, the Memorandum program was presented as a better alternative to the bank-
ruptcy and a great act of European solidarity. The choice presented to the public was 
one of either implementation of the Memorandum reforms or exit from the Euro zone 
and recognition of the state bankruptcy. 
“The final result of rejecting the package of October 26th, either by ref-
erendum, or by elections, or through parliament, or due to not being 
able to implement it, – would mean abandoning the Euro. The non-
implementation of the package would mean, quite simply, ‘out of the 
Euro area’, we must comprehend this and make everyone aware of 
this”. Giorgos Papandreou, Prime Minister, 3.11.2011.   
The Prime Minister repeatedly appealed for a cross party collaboration that would ena-
ble an effective resolution of the crisis and provide credibility of commitment to re-
forms: 
“Right from the beginning of this effort, I have stressed the importance 
of collaboration and done my utmost to engage all the parties. I genu-
inely believe in collaboration. First, because now it is not the right time 
for a conventional opposition politics. Now it is not the right time for 
superficial politicking. Secondly, because in this Herculean effort we 
will be stronger and we will succeed faster if we work together in a spir-
it of national solidarity. It is one thing for the Government to fight with 
a broader consensus, and another thing for the government to be sys-
tematically attacked for reasons of petty politics. Thirdly, because right 
now Greece needs to demonstrate the broadest possible unity, decisive-
ness and seriousness to the rest of the world. We must show that we can 
be different, without being enemies. We must show that the national in-
terest is what unites us”. Giorgos Papandreou, Prime Minister, 
27.05.2011. 
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In the period between September and November of 2011, both the pressures of 
the Troika and social pressures grew, and the necessity of the parliamentary voting on 
the second Memorandum approached, shifting the focus of the governmental sub-
discourse towards democracy and the possibility of referendum: 
“In a democracy, political parties and the representatives of citizens rep-
resent the supreme expression of popular will and sovereignty. This is 
unchangeable as a principle. It is also a supreme democratic function to 
enable the will of each citizen to be submitted in a primary, authentic, 
direct and binding fashion…. That is what the referendum is, dear 
friends, where the citizen is called upon to voice a clear ‘yes’ or a clear 
‘no’. We must go to referendum for this new agreement. We must ask 
the Greek people to decide”. Giorgos Papandreou, Prime Minister, 
31.10.2011. 
Papandreou declared the primacy of the democratic principles in Greece, and that Eu-
ropean partners must respect the democratic right of the Greek population. However, 
the government also proposed an alternative to referendum – inclusion of political ac-
tors and achievement of a consensus with the opposition: 
“So we have a dilemma – true consensus or referendum. As I said yes-
terday coming out of the meeting, if there were consensus we would not 
organize a referendum. In the meeting this was stressed repeatedly. I 
said that “if the opposition comes to the table to agree on the agreement 
we do not need a referendum”. I also said that elections would be a 
third, though harmful solution”. Giorgos Papandreou, Prime Minister, 
3.11.2011. 
Simultaneously, the criticism of financial markets and rating agencies came in-
to the spotlight in the second phase of the governmental sub-discourse. The govern-
ment pointed out the necessity to regulate both of them. Also, the definition of crisis 
shifted from being uniquely a problem of Greece to being a European problem. The 
government began to defend an overall debt reduction, interest rate reduction, and 
longer time periods for serving the debt.  
 
6.4.2. Governmental sub-discourse: Papadimos interim government 
The coalition government formed by the PASOK, the ND and the LAOS was 
created after resignation of the PASOK majority government in November of 2011. 
This coalition governed the country until the next elections in May of 2012. Mainly 
communications by the Prime Minister Loukas Papadimos, who is a former governor 
of the Bank of Greece and did not formally belong to any political party, are consid-
ered in the analysis below.  
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During the six months of the interim government, the discursive focus again 
shifted towards the economic reforms. This government described its goals as achiev-
ing the restoration of Greece’s credibility and international prestige, the revival of its 
economy, as well as the strengthening of national and social cohesion.  
Papadimos identified the accumulation of high debt, budgetary deficit, and loss 
of competitiveness as the main reasons for the crisis and suggested dealing with these 
issues through structural reforms, fiscal consolidation, and the strengthening of coun-
try’s exports. The government argued that the reforms should target the restoration of 
confidence in the Greek economy and enhancement of its competitiveness. However, 
Papadimos also acknowledged that the decrease in incomes of Greece’s trading part-
ners challenged the attempts of export re-orientation of the Greek economy. Therefore, 
he argued, fiscal consolidation should be combined with the measures promoting 
growth.  
“Today’s financial crisis and concomitant uncertainty, as well as the 
generalized endeavor to push through fiscal consolidation elsewhere in 
Europe, have hit the incomes of our trading partners, thereby frustrating 
our efforts to return to growth by boosting exports”. Lucas Papadimos, 
Prime Minister, 6.12.2011. 
“Now for Europe in general, the implementation in a number of coun-
tries at the same time of fiscal consolidation measures implies, of 
course, a combined adverse effect on economic activity. The answer to 
this, in my view is to try to combine the necessary actions in order to 
achieve, to return rather, to prudent fiscal policies, with other measures 
that can help to foster economic activity”. Lucas Papadimos, Prime 
Minister, 15.01.2012. 
 
6.4.3. Governmental sub-discourse: Samaras government 
After the elections of June 2012, the coalition of the ND, the PASOK, and the 
DIMAR emerged as a government led by Antonis Samaras (ND). This government 
lasted until the next early elections in January of 2015. The communications by the 
Prime Minister Samaras and by the Minister of Finance Giannis Stournaras (until June 
of 2014) have been analysed as representative for this government.  
By the time this government emerged, the second Memorandum had already 
been adopted by the parliament (mid-February, 2012). In essence, the new government 
continued the discourse of the previous government. It promoted modernisation and 
implementation of in-depth reforms in the Greek economy. The Prime Minister Sama-
ras described Greece as the last “soviet economy”, “Jurassic Park with ancient dino-
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saurs”, and “stuck in the Middle Ages” (Samaras, 12.07.2014). Stournaras argued in 
favour of introducing a new production model in Greece, one oriented on export in-
stead of the previous one, which was based on consumption. Thus, the government fur-
ther argued for reforms focused on enhancing the competitiveness of the Greek econ-
omy. Additionally, it was pointed out that the liquidity of Greek banks must be re-
stored through their re-capitalization, as this would be another factor enabling the fast-
er recovery of the real economy.  
Although austerity measures were generally defended, it was stated that austeri-
ty contributed to the recession, and therefore it had to be balanced with the measures 
supporting the economic recovery: 
“The economic policy mix can therefore be changed: we do not have 
only austerity leading to persistent deficits and even greater frugality. 
We have measures that balance the cuts, which again put the economy 
to work, relieving the society, encouraging restart of our production ac-
tivity”. Antonis Samaras, Prime Minister, 17.04.2013. 
It was emphasized that the so-called “relief measures” would not contradict the poli-
cies of macroeconomic adjustment but rather support the society and economy. In this 
context, consolidation and recovery were meant to proceed in parallel: 
“A valuable lesson: that consolidation and recovery go together! They 
can go together. They must go together.... The adjustment and the re-
structuring do not need to dismantle the society in order to ‘clean up’. 
They can be combined with recovery measures. Or at least with 
measures that balance the recession and alleviate from its effects...” An-
tonis Samaras, Prime Minister, 17.04.2013. 
Therefore, this government demanded implementation of both types of policies – tar-
geting financial stability and growth.  
This government also recognized the hardship of reforms for the population of 
Greece but claimed that an alternative to the measures would be a much worse disaster, 
leading to international isolation, bankruptcy, and inevitable return to the former Greek 
currency – Drachma. It presented the choice between stabilization of the economy and 
democracy and bankruptcy accompanied by social explosion. The higher levels of tax-
ation as well as cuts in wages and pensions were described as necessary temporary 
measures, which would be reversed once the Memorandum was implemented and the 
goal of the primary surplus was achieved. Although the government reinforced the ne-
cessity of further reforms, a significant part of its sub-discourse emphasized the posi-
tive development and perspectives of the bright economic future for Greece.  
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6.4.4. Governmental sub-discourse: Tsipras government 
In the early elections of January of 2015, SYRIZA gained 149 seats (out of 
300) in the Greek parliament and got an opportunity to build a government together 
with the ANEL (13 seats). In order to be able to assess the continuity in the sub-
discourse of the SYRIZA, statements of the Prime Minister and the leader of this party 
Alexis Tsipras have been analysed below. 
The SYRIZA known for its open opposition to austerity and the Memoranda 
programs formed a government shortly before the negotiations of the third Memoran-
dum. Nevertheless, its discourse essentially remained the same compared to the previ-
ous years when the party was among the parliamentary opposition. Communications 
by the Prime Minister Tsipras still proved to have a strong emphasis on democracy and 
sovereignty. He demanded restoration and deepening of democracy as well as Greece 
to become an “active protagonist”, an independent and equal partner in Europe: 
“Greece remains at the center of the international interest, but this time 
in a positive way. As a protagonist and not as a supporting character. In 
the negotiations that finally began, Greece is tabling proposals. It does 
not accept commands”. Alexis Tsipras, Prime Minister, 8.02.2015. 
The new government urged to end the austerity, find a comprehensive solution to the 
debt problem, restore the social justice and labour rights, and implement the measures 
increasing competitiveness (based on innovation and production of high quality 
goods). The idea of fiscal balance and balanced budget was generally supported, but it 
should not be implemented through unilateral austerity. Also, the government promot-
ed radical reforms of the Greek state, including measures against corruption, waste in 
the public sector, abolition of privileges for public employees, and more justice in the 
tax system. Additionally, the demands of payment of compensation for the Nazi occu-
pation of Greece in World War II from Germany also represented an important part of 
the governmental sub-discourse. 
It has been repeatedly emphasized that the Greek crisis requires a European so-
lution. According to the Prime Minister Tsipras, Greece remains part of Europe, but 
the latter is not uniform and is characterized by ideological differences.  
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6.4.5. Parliamentary sub-discourse: PASOK, ND, SYRIZA, KKE, ANEL, Chryssi Avgi, 
LAOS, and DIMAR  
The PASOK formed a majority government until November of 2011 and par-
ticipated in both coalition governments between 2011 and 2015. Although the party 
has been one of two dominating parties for the whole period since the beginning of the 
Hellenic Republic, it drastically lost the electorate during the period of analysis, from 
43,92% in the elections of 2009 to 4,68% in 2015.  
Within the PASOK the crisis has been described as a European problem, and its 
durability was explained partly by the “persistent economic nationalisms in Europe” 
(Venizelos, 7.11.2012). Its sub-discourse was contradictive because on one hand its 
members tried to convince the public of the necessity to implement the reforms, and on 
the other hand, they emphasized the negative consequences of the measures. Structural 
reforms were generally encouraged, but from the end of 2011, austerity and Memoran-
da policies were claimed to lead the country into a deep recession, causing dramatic 
levels of unemployment. Yet it was argued that there would be no reasonable alterna-
tive to implementation of the Troika conditionality, except for the option to leave the 
Euro area and declare the bankruptcy.  
“The prevailing European policy is certainly shortsighted and wrong. It 
is a punitive policy in relation to the countries that did not implement 
countercyclical policies. That had not cut their deficits and did not make 
their debt sustainable in the period of high growth. Now, they impose 
on them, with the top example of Greece, but not just Greece, Spain, 
Portugal, Italy, Cyprus, all countries, France itself, the application of 
hard Troika policies that deepen the recession because they require a 
rapid reduction in deficits in the periods of recession. But, unfortunate-
ly, this is the current European policy and those are the only sources to 
finance deficit and the only safe debt restructuring process”. Evangelos 
Venizelos (PASOK), 7.11.2012. 
The leader of PASOK emphasized that political stability is essential for economic re-
covery. Finally, similar to the ND, there was a promise that once the primary surplus is 
achieved, redistribution to low-income population will be pursued.  
The ND was an oppositional party until November of 2011 and became part of 
the coalition governments between 2011 and 2015. Also the ND lost part of its sup-
porters, but far less than the PASOK. In 2015, the ND was still able to gain 27,81% of 
the votes. The position of the party evolved from rejecting the Memorandum program 
in 2010-2011 to generally supporting the policies in 2012. Originally, the party 
claimed that the Memorandum program would inevitably result in a severe recession. 
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It criticised the PASOK government for decreasing the role of the parliament in the 
process of crisis management and accepting everything proposed by the Troika without 
reservations or any attempt to promote its own initiatives. Yet the ND itself belonged 
to the strong apologists of privatization and budgetary consolidation: 
“You know already what we are voting for. We are voting for the sec-
tion to curb spending that coincides in many points with our proposal. 
This should have been done last year. Addressing excessive spending. 
Not to impose sacrifices only to the weak with horizontal cuts. Also, in 
the privatizations we will be particularly supportive, if the final deci-
sions of course are taken transparently and with respect to the invest-
ment dimension. Meaning, not solely motivated by revenue-panic and 
in any case, of course, the sellout”. Antonis Samaras (ND), 30.06.2011. 
Although the party originally demanded lower levels of taxation, it later defended the 
increase in taxation as a necessary temporary measure.  
The Coalition of the Radical Left SYRIZA managed to win the electorate and 
experienced an increase from 4,60% of votes in 2009 to 36,34% in 2015. Subsequent-
ly, from being a small opposition party before 2015, it succeeded in creating a gov-
ernmental coalition with the ANEL that year. As an opposition party, the SYRIZA cat-
egorically rejected the Memoranda programs: the measures were described as hard, 
unjust, and inefficient. According to the party’s position, the measures lead the country 
into a deep recession, cause humanitarian crisis, and finally make future bankruptcy 
unavoidable. The SYRIZA protested against the degradation of the parliamentary pro-
cess expressed in the urgent parliamentary procedure and decisions adopted under high 
time pressure: 
“The Prime Minister does not come to the Parliament to answer the 
questions that I submit to him. The Ministers devalue questions of op-
positional MPs. The Parliament has been transformed into an industry 
of voting bills that come the last day, are not produced in the offices of 
Ministers, as Minister had stated in the government six months ago. 
They bring them ready and blackmail for them to be adopted”. Alexis 
Tsipras (SYRIZA), 15.09.2013. 
On the contrary, it was emphasized that the development of political system and deep-
ening of democracy would be crucial in the circumstances of the crisis: 
“Our commitment towards the Greek people is hard renegotiation, the 
claim of the occupation payment, a plan to address the humanitarian cri-
sis, the design of production reconstruction, the change of the political 
system and democratization”. Alexis Tsipras (SYRIZA), 15.09.2013. 
The party continuously demanded new elections and a referendum on the issues of cri-
sis management. Its central proposals aimed at solving the crisis included placing a 
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heavier burden on the wealthy private sector, adopting the measures for reconstruction 
of production in the economy, increasing demand, and stimulating growth. Also, the 
leaders claimed that the debt levels were not sustainable and must be reduced. 
 The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) remained a relatively small opposition 
party throughout the period of analysis. According to the position of the party, the 
roots of the crisis in Greece are located in the global capitalist system, whose interests 
are currently promoted through European integration. The party rejected the Memo-
randa, describing them as unjust, hostile to labour and farmers employed in agriculture: 
“The brutality of these measures reaches a whole new level. For exam-
ple, what was absent before the crisis or was not as strong in previous 
years represents the exclusive attack, facing this time the largest part of 
wage labour and the poor farmers”. Alexandra Papariga (KKE), 
7.11.2012. 
The right solution to the crisis, according to the KKE, would be an exit from the EU 
and restoration of the devaluation instrument. 
The ANEL appeared in the parliament after the first elections of 2012, experi-
encing its major electoral success. In 2015, it became a coalition partner of the 
SYRIZA in the government. In the case of ANEL, the notions of national and popular 
sovereignty of Greece represented the cornerstone of its communications: 
“It is a commonplace – and I am closing my speech shortly – that the 
government legislates major changes for the Greek economy by exter-
nal instructions, implementing foreign business plans for exiting the 
economic crisis. It delivers without a fight the national sovereignty, it 
makes no resistance to multinational interests, lowering even more the 
expectations in the compact Greek entrepreneurship that is affected and 
destroyed by this policy”. Gavriil Avramidis (ANEL), 31.03.2014. 
The Memoranda measures were described as unsustainable, undemocratic, and adopted 
outside the democratic parliamentary process. According to the ANEL, the programs 
would lead the country further into recession. Therefore, the party advised “unilateral 
cancellation of debt”. 
The Chryssi Avgi also became a parliamentary party after the elections of 2012 
and has occupied between 18 and 21 seats since, always remaining in the opposition. 
Exclusive nationalist and Hellenist rhetoric characterized the communications of this 
party. It expressed its position against the Memorandum program, arguing that it leads 
the country to a deep recession and erodes the parliamentary process. The party espe-
cially warned against the reduction of the budget for the Armed Forces. 
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The LAOS was in opposition during the first years of analysis, but then the par-
ty became part of the interim coalition government for a short period in 2011-2012. 
This party did not gain any seats after the elections of 2012 and was absent in the par-
liament since. The LAOS spoke out against policies of the PASOK government and 
against the first Memorandum mainly because the latter was regarded as a source of 
further impoverishment of the population. According to the party, the root of the eco-
nomic problems in Greece lies in the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. Simultane-
ously, the party claimed that there was no real alternative to the Memoranda, and the 
country would otherwise have to face bankruptcy and an even more severe recession. 
The DIMAR was present in the parliament only between 2012 and 2015. It was 
part of the coalition government after the elections of 2012 but formally left the coali-
tion by the end of June 2013. The party argued against an exit from the Euro zone and 
mainly promoted structural reforms in the public sector. Simultaneously, it rejected the 
neoliberal model of competitiveness and argued that the Memorandum program lacks 
perspective for development and social sustainability: 
“We supported the idea of a renegotiation process that, on the one hand, 
will implement the adjustment program and, on the other hand, will 
amend it, for it to be an agreement with the partners with the goal of be-
ing cost effective, linked to the development and socially sustainable 
with a rational burden sharing, taking measures, alleviating burdens and 
relieving the socially weak population”. Fotis Kouvelis (DIMAR), 
7.11.2012. 
In this context, the necessity to distribute the burden of adjustment in a fair manner 
was emphasized as well as importance to restore the labour rights. Especially the fall 
of wage levels was argued to undermine the objective of fiscal consolidation. 
 
6.4.6. Sub-discourse of the Bank of Greece 
According to the Bank of Greece, the main problems of the Greek economy are 
the large deficit, the large debt, and erosion of competitiveness: 
“The only way out (of the crisis) is to restore confidence, by drastically 
reducing the deficit and the debt and by recovering the competitiveness 
that has been lost”. George Provopoulos, Governor of the Bank of 
Greece, 27.04.2010. 
The financial assistance and the conditionality for it have the goal of providing assis-
tance and ensuring the implementation of the necessary reforms that should have been 
carried out long ago in Greece. According to the BoG, the programs do not only secure 
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the funding but also facilitate the fiscal consolidation through provision of timetables 
and expertise. 
“Indeed, the financial support agreement has not only secured the nec-
essary funding, but also acted as a catalyst for a fundamental reorienta-
tion of economic policy in two main directions: rapid fiscal consolida-
tion and the implementation of structural reforms. This reorientation 
should of course have taken place years ago, when conditions were 
more favorable”. George Provopoulos, Governor of the Bank of Greece, 
18.04.2011. 
Therefore, it was argued that, in order to improve the competitiveness and restore the 
confidence in the Greek economy, it would be crucial to implement the structural re-
forms, budgetary consolidation, privatization, and increase the flexibility of labour 
markets. The idea of debt restructuring was mentioned as neither necessary nor desira-
ble. Instead, a combination of austerity and low taxes (as well as elimination of tax 
evasion) has been promoted as the right solution for Greece.  
The crisis was also defined as a failure of the previous growth model of the 
Greek economy.  
“The growth model that has exhausted its limits relied on domestic con-
sumption, both public and private, and was fuelled by borrowing. The 
business sector did not manage to sufficiently tap into the opportunities 
opened up by Greece’s participation in the euro area, while the boost in 
households’ expectations generated by this participation and the swell-
ing of the public sector encouraged consumerism. This led to negative 
net national saving from 2002 to the present day and to a continuous 
transfer of resources from the business sector to the oversized, public 
sector with low-productivity. This model favored present consumption 
at the expense of the future and was underpinned by the illusion that 
growth could be driven by the public sector ad infinitum…. The current 
crisis of the economy is the crisis of a growth model that could no long-
er be sustained. The cost that society is summoned to pay today is also 
due to the delay in moving to the new model”. George Provopoulos, 
Governor of the Bank of Greece, 18.04.2011. 
Therefore, the Greek government was encouraged to open the economy and to trans-
form the economic model from being based on consumption to becoming export orien-
tated. According to the position of the BoG, it would be equally important to support 
the re-capitalization of banks, which in their turn would enable the flow of credit to the 
real economy. 
The governor of the BoG mentioned that political uncertainties represent risks 
for the Greek economy, and therefore a minimum consensus among the political and 
social forces should be achieved. Attempting to provide an answer to the criticism that 
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the reforms do not lead to a positive development, it was stated that the reason why the 
Memorandum program has not delivered a positive development yet was because the 
governments have failed to succeed in implementing the necessary reforms. However, 
it was also recognised that the fiscal consolidation contributed to a deeper recession 
than was originally calculated: 
“Fiscal consolidation led to a recession that was deeper than expected, 
partly because it relied heavily on increases in tax rates and was not 
combined with structural reforms to boost growth prospects”. George 
Provopoulos, Governor of the Bank of Greece, 23.05.2013. 
Continuously high unemployment and incompleteness of the EMU were identified as 
further difficulties on the way to the recovery of the Greek economy. 
 
6.4.7. The Greek trade union association: General Confederation of Greek Workers 
(GSEE) 
The GSEE consecutively expressed its position against the policies demanded 
in the Memoranda. It was argued that the imposed austerity undermines the labour 
rights, being unfair, undemocratic, and anti-social: 
“Prompted by the crisis and the emerged need of loan in several coun-
tries of the South and not only, they seek to impose, extortionately and 
blatantly, a wild prolonged austerity program, deepening the recession 
and the crisis, and being ultimately a complete and permanent subordi-
nation of all European peoples to the two financially strong countries”. 
GSEE, 7.02.2011. 
According to the organisation, the measures placed an especially heavy burden on the 
labour and low-income groups of population, yet lacked any perspective for achieving 
the economic growth. The measures described in Memoranda were expected to be in-
effective and ultimately lead to an even more serious recession, as they would result in 
an increased tensions and popular discontent: 
“These neoliberal and doctrinal proposals extend the recession and the 
problems of the Greek economy, while triggering uncontrollable social 
and labor conflicts”. GSEE, 15.04.2010. 
Instead, the GSEE insisted on the necessity to re-negotiate the conditionality of 
the Memorandum and to shift the focus onto the realization of economic and social 
policies, which would be able to restore the growth. These policies should target the 
increase in cohesion, reforms of economic structures and the tax system, aiming at the 
reconstruction of production and of competitiveness through knowledge and innova-
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tion. The political agenda should be focused on one goal – to put the Greek economy 
back on the path of sustainable growth and social cohesion.  
“The workers and the ordinary citizens, who struggle, the young people, 
the pensioners, the unemployed, the whole our society require and de-
mand the implementation of a policy that will focus on people and their 
needs and not the markets and the profit”. GSEE, 5.05.2010. 
Moreover, the GSEE promoted the regulation of the financial markets.  
It was argued that the labour wages (which were claimed to be below the Euro-
pean average) and purchasing power should be urgently improved. Finally, the reduc-
tion of unemployment would be crucial for solving the consequences of the crisis. It 
was emphasized that the current programs only achieved the opposite effect, increasing 
the unemployment.  
 
6.4.8. The Greek employers’ association: Hellenic Federation of Enterprises (SEV) 
The sub-discourse of the SEV experienced some transformation through the pe-
riod of analysis, and therefore two phases can be identified. Until 2012, the SEV main-
ly urged to carry out modernization, which should include reforms in state bureaucracy 
and administration, structural reforms, dealing with the problem of tax evasion, and 
clientelism. The organisation promoted privatization, liberalization, and lowering the 
tax rates. Simultaneously, the leader of SEV warned about debt re-structuring, arguing 
that it would cause an even more serious crisis. 
“The partisan speakers and participants of the TV debates, they fail, 
however, to tell the public critical truth: that, whatever form the debt re-
structuring now takes, it inevitably entails even tougher measures, even 
heavier sacrifices, even greater deterioration of our living standards, 
even greater poverty for the vast majority of society. And if it ever can 
or should be in the framework of a broader European solution it will not 
let us out from the need of radical change and painful modernization of 
the economy and our society”. Dimitris Daskalopoulos, President of 
SEV, 18.04.2011. 
In 2012, the communications by the SEV became more critical towards the 
Memorandum policies. It was still argued that Greece urgently needed to implement 
the reforms; however, it was also pointed out that the Memorandum program did not 
address the necessary changes and undermined the economic growth. For example, the 
labour costs in Greece were described as much less relevant for enhancing the com-
petitiveness of the economy than the problems of the Greek state: 
“The Greek business is in the loop of extensive state intervention, bu-
reaucracy that builds up the complexity, the constant changes in the tax 
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system, the delay in the administration of justice, the broadly anti-
business and anti-investment climate. These are the main factors un-
dermining the competitiveness of the Greek economy and the possibil-
ity of creating jobs - far more than labor costs”. SEV, 25.01.2012. 
The budgetary discipline was generally encouraged, but it was emphasized that it 
should not be exaggerated: 
“The logic of horizontal cuts and tax increase has been proven socially 
unjust and economically hopeless”. SEV, 4.04.2012. 
According to the organisation, the mechanism of free collective bargaining should be 
respected. It was argued that the issue of high unemployment could only be resolved 
through achieving the economic growth. Therefore, both re-capitalization of banks and 
reconstruction of production should urgently take place. Moreover, the SEV supported 
the claim that the democratic aspects of decision-making should be strengthened, and 
the decisions should be based on a broad political and social consensus.  
The current crisis was described as a European problem, requiring a deeper co-
hesion at the EU level. Thus, the SEV demanded a solution at the European level – a 
Marshall plan for Europe would be necessary, as the unilateral austerity failed to solve 
the crisis:  
“Therefore, the root causes identified in the non-competitive production 
base in the South cannot be addressed at once by imposing extreme and 
prolonged austerity, with large cuts in unit labor costs, stifling illiquidi-
ty and leveling cuts in welfare benefits…. What should be done? We 
begin to realize that there is no real exit from the euro crisis if the North 
does not provide active assistance to the South, in the form of a Europe-
an Marshall Plan, which will provide liquidity, reduce lending rates and 
allow the deficit countries build a competitive production base, to lever 
private investment”. Dimitris Daskalopoulos, President of SEV, 
14.03.2013. 
Finally, further economic and political integration and debt restructuring were recom-
mended in order to overcome the crisis: 
 “A review of the government debt is required to re-launch the econo-
my: The Greek economy has eliminated largely the twin deficits (fiscal 
and current accounts). A favorable agreement between Greece and its 
international lenders on the public debt (according to the Declaration of 
Euro [group] for Greece, in November 2012) would remove all kind of 
skepticism towards the prospects of the Greek economy, it would im-
prove the position of the country on the international capital markets 
and make the Greek economy attractive to investors. Such a develop-
ment is in the interest of the European project as a whole”. SEV, 
15.01.2015. 
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6.4.9. Summarizing the discourse analysis 
This period of analysis is characterized by high complexity in terms of the 
number of actors and changes in their sub-discourses within five years. What Greece 
has been missing in these years, and what ultimately is reflected in the political turbu-
lence and in the pace of reforms, is the absence of a dominating discourse and of stable 
coalitions. During the whole period, no powerful stable discourse coalition emerged, 
defending certain policy principles against the others. At the same time, the original 
discourse of opposition proved to be relatively stable, succeeding in convincing the 
electorate and gaining the power in 2015. From my point of view, three phases of dis-
course can be identified in Greece between the years 2010 and 2015. 
The first phase lasted from 2010 until roughly the beginning of rule by the coa-
lition government of Samaras in 2012. This phase allows for the identification of a 
temporary and quite loose discourse coalition of the PASOK government with the 
Bank of Greece and the SEV. All of these actors emphasized the responsibility of the 
Greek government to solve the crisis, which, according to these actors, has exclusively 
domestic roots. They supported implementation of structural reforms, reforms of the 
Greek state, budgetary consolidation based on austerity, and privatization. Yet the 
PASOK framed the implementation of these reforms using the rhetoric of patriotic re-
sponsibility, social justice, and missing of alternatives to the Memorandum program. In 
its turn, the ND supported the idea of some of these reforms but criticised their con-
crete implementation by the PASOK government and fully rejected the Memorandum 
while being formally the biggest opposition party. Contrary to this coalition, three 
small opposition parties – the SYRIZA, the KKE, the LAOS – and the trade union as-
sociation GSEE opposed both the reforms and the Memoranda. These actors promoted 
an alternative discourse where European responsibility for the Greek crisis was also 
emphasized. The alternative discourse coalition criticised the lack of democracy in the 
process of definition of economic measures and emphasized the necessity to promote 
economic growth, social policies, and public investment, increasing innovation and 
competitiveness. There was an overall agreement among the actors that the competi-
tiveness of the Greek economy must be restored, but there was no agreement on which 
measures would achieve the improvement in competitiveness. 
The second phase of discourse in Greece took place from 2012 until the elec-
tion of the SYRIZA/ANEL government in 2015. The characteristic feature of this 
phase is the transformation of some sub-discourses and a change of focus by some ac-
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tors. In my opinion, it was exactly this dynamic that created the favourable conditions 
for the alternative discourse to grow stronger, culminating in the electoral success of 
the SYRIZA in 2015. In 2012-2013, the scepticism towards the success of reforms 
started growing. Although the SEV still promoted the necessity of reforms, it also in-
troduced criticism of the Memorandum policies as being the wrong medicine. Its in-
creasingly anti-Memorandum rhetoric was accompanied by a certain shift in the sub-
discourses of the ND and PASOK who were at that time coalition partners in the gov-
ernment. Compared to their earlier positions, now both actors started showing their 
support for the claims that growth related measures would be necessary in order to 
overcome the crisis; although they generally continued to defend the Memorandum 
reforms too, indicating the positive results of these policies. Consequently, the dis-
course, which previously focused on the promotion of the Memorandum and neoliberal 
reforms, adopted some claims of the alternative discourse, which was now represented 
by the SYRIZA, the ANEL, the KKE, the DIMAR, and the GSEE. In the new constel-
lation, only the Bank of Greece continued to demonstrate its blind support for the 
Memorandum measures that isolated its position from the other actors. In this phase, a 
relative consensus among the actors appeared on the topic of the real effects of austeri-
ty, concluding that the austerity and Memorandum policies lead to a further recession 
instead of economic recovery. The crisis here was increasingly defined as a European 
problem, which would require a common European solution. Finally, both structural 
reforms and the measures triggering a dynamic for growth were recognised as being 
urgently needed.  
Finally, in the third phase of discourse when SYRIZA experienced its major 
electoral success in the elections of 2015, the aspects of its policy concept had already 
gained the support and received the recognition among political actors who originally 
promoted a different discourse. Concerning the main issues of contestation, which in-
cluded the Memorandum policies, especially austerity and privatization, as well as ne-
cessity of debt relief, key actors either partly or completely adopted the position of the 
previously alternative SYRIZA-discourse. Therefore, the oppositional discourse to the 
policies promoted by the SYRIZA was not capable to efficiently challenge the core 
aspects of the new governmental discourse.  
Concerning the groups of population represented by each discourse, the 
PASOK government claimed to be representing the interests of the weak, the middle 
class, and the Greek citizens. The ND mostly referred to the “societal interests”. The 
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SYRIZA repeatedly mentioned representing the interests of labour, “people as a social 
majority”, and public interest. The KKE claimed to speak on behalf of labour and 
farmers. The SEV officially represented the interests of business, but the organisation 
emphasized that the interests of business and employees fully converge in the situation 
of crisis. In its turn, the GSEE claimed to defend the interests of labour, the people, and 
pensioners. 
The discourse in Greece in the period of economic crisis evidences the escala-
tion of the social conflict where the dominating discourse lost its legitimacy and was 
abandoned. The lack of legitimacy of Memoranda policies was reflected in the loss of 
influence among the dominating parties, party fragmentation, change of electoral pref-
erences, and political turbulence in general. The results of the referendum held in 2015 
(61,31% against the Troika proposal) also support this claim. Moreover, even when the 
discourse opposing the Memorandum became dominant in Greece, policy change was 
not possible. In fact, the SYRIZA government as one of the central opponents of the 
reforms since 2010 was made responsible for implementation of one of the toughest 
reform packages. The separation of policy definition from political process has nega-
tive consequences for democracy in the short-term and long-term, causing frustration 
and political apathy among the population and providing an agenda for both populism 
and radicalism, which could lead to disintegration of the country from the rest of the 
EU.  
Not only did the Troika reforms not show a positive effect on the welfare of the 
citizens in the short term but the dominating discourse at the European level also failed 
to convince the domestic elites in Greece. Interestingly, by the end of the second peri-
od of analysis, the domestic discourse against the Memorandum policies solidified, 
making the lack of legitimacy even more serious. The situation where both input and 
output channels of legitimization have been blocked leaves a vacuum and creates an 
atmosphere of coercion.  
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Chapter 7: Democratic deficit and the asymmetric nature of the EMU 
 This chapter sums up and provides the final analysis of the findings of the em-
pirical chapters from the perspective described in the theoretical chapters of this thesis. 
This perspective mainly focuses on how the simultaneous transfer of competences and 
preservation of formal autonomy of the member states in the EMU impacts the demo-
cratic sovereignty, understood in a positive way, as a definition of a certain concept of 
public good through the process of self-determination and expression of political free-
dom (Habermas 1996). It is democratic sovereignty located in a democratic procedure 
that guarantees inclusion of different interests in the definition of agenda on an equal 
base (Habermas 1996; Cohen/Sabel 1997). After a short comparison of the discursive 
data from the two case studies, democratic deficit and power asymmetries are discussed 
in this chapter. 
 
7.1. Monetary, economic, and socio-political discourses 
 The empirical part of the thesis is focused on the EMU discourse and the institu-
tional context of this discourse at the European level and at the member state level in 
Germany and Greece. While the European Economic and Monetary Union was original-
ly claimed to have the purpose of protecting the European economies through reducing 
risks and uncertainties (see part 4.2.1 of this thesis), only monetary policy has been 
formally brought under the supranational authority. Some contestation was identified 
concerning the terms of integration during the early negotiations of the EMU, and it re-
appears later, in the beginning of the crisis of 2010. Consequently, the original division 
between the member states who supported the idea of a common economic policy (eco-
nomic government) and those who rejected this idea, as well as the difference in opin-
ions concerning the status of the ECB (independent vs. subordinated under political au-
thority) proved to be persistent (see table 3, p. 104). Similarly, the demands of automat-
ic sanctions in the case of violations against the rules of the SGP and strict nominal 
convergence were both contested across the member states (see table 3, p. 104). The 
idea of the common European bonds was brought into the discussion in 2010 (Leuffen 
et al. 2013). The debate on the absolute priority of the budgetary discipline and of mon-
etary stability reflected in the SGP criteria was also renewed during the early years of 
the crisis. Some member states argued against the austerity measures, especially in the 
times of economic recession (Vail 2015). In spite of these points of contestation, which 
reflected the difference in approaches among the member states, both the originally ne-
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gotiated normative framework of the EMU and the norms added to it as the measures of 
crisis management reflect an exclusively neoliberal approach to economic policy. Sub-
sequently, the understanding of economic policy, prioritizing austerity, liberalization, 
and privatization was narrowed down; and the principle of national responsibility for 
economic performance of a member state was strenghtened (Schwarzer 2015). This ap-
proach has been promoted by the coalition of actors that included some member state 
governments (mainly from Northern Europe), the ECB, and the Commission. However, 
the analysis proves the existing conflict over the terms of the EMU. This conflict is 
deeply rooted in the different economic policy models (models of capitalism) estab-
lished due to the specific domestic economic capacities and structures in the member 
states. 
The country case studies, Germany and Greece, demonstrate the difference in 
economic policy dynamic. The first part of each case study describes the context and 
institutional framework within each of two countries selected for analysis. It supports 
the argument that the original context in Germany (although still different from the An-
glo-Saxon model) was better adapted to the competition pressures at the European level 
after the introduction of the common currency than as was the case in Greece (see parts 
5.1 and 6.1). Germany already had an independent central bank with the goal of price 
stability, which was widely supported among the population and among the societal ac-
tors (Young 2014, Verdun/ Christiansen 2000, Woll 1991). Moreover, the ordoliberal 
approach reflected in the concept of social market economy with its orientation to com-
petitiveness and increase in exports has been a central element in the defining of eco-
nomic policy measures in Germany after the World War II (Crouch 2000a). Finally, the 
inclusion of social actors within corporatism and its generally cooperative character le-
gitimized such order (Crouch 2000a).  
The case of Greece is quite the opposite. The country represents an example of 
late industrialization where small and medium manufacturing enterprises still dominate 
today and are mostly oriented towards the domestic market (Louri/ Pepelasis Minoglou 
2002, Yannopoulos 1979, Zambarloukou 2006). In this context, the state occupied the 
main position in economic life of the country that expressed itself in the control of the 
banking system, in subsidies to agriculture and businesses, as well as in the fact that 
monetary policies represented a key tool of economic adjustment (Ioakimidis 2001). 
The central bank in Greece was traditionally under the governmental authority (Oltheten 
et al. 2003). The latter aspect resulted in the high levels of inflation (Oltheten et al. 
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2003). Moreover, the country experienced transition to democracy in 1974 that required 
the re-establishment of its weak democratic political institutions and political culture. 
The case of Greece was traditionally characterized by a strong fragmentation of interest 
groups, competitive relations among the social partners, and clientelism (Ioakimidis 
2001; Featherstone/Papadimitriou 2008). These aspects influenced and sometimes even 
determined the process of reforms and economic adjustment. The government had to 
face simultaneously the administrative problems and bigger economic challenges, re-
sulting from the lack of industry and the country’s dependency on the foreign capital 
(see parts 6.1.2 and 6.1.3). Therefore, in terms of context and institutions, Greece was 
much less prepared for the competition enforced by the creation of the common market 
and especially by the common currency. Consequently, a chance of an asymmetric 
shock was higher in Greece than in Germany from the very beginning. 
Despite the fact that the German case demonstrates a better match with the con-
text of the EMU, it would be wrong to assume that there were no adjustment pressures 
on Germany. The ordoliberal position of the German government during the negotia-
tions of the EMU and the future EMU framework disrupted both the balance of ordolib-
eral and Keynesian (social) policies (Dyson 2009b, Dyson 2003) and the connection 
between the monetary policies and development in the real economy (see chapter 5.2). 
Moreover, through the strengthening of the ordoliberal and austerity discourses, the ne-
gotiating position of labor was weakened (Baccaro/Howell 2011, Bieling/ Lux 2014), 
and the adjustment pressures shifted on wages. 
The second part of the case studies presents the analysis of discourses in these 
two countries. In the period between 1997 and 2000, the discourse on the EMU in Ger-
many was more consolidated than in Greece, as, in Germany, the majority of actors (in-
cluding the government under Kohl, the government under Schröder, the CDU/CSU, the 
FDP, the SPD, the Bündnis 90/die Grünen, the DGB, and the BDA) shared a positive 
attitude towards the integration and emphasized the benefits of monetary integration in 
the EU. Similarly, the representatives of the dominating discourse shared the idea that 
the stability of the new currency must be secured. Nevertheless, the discourse was not 
homogenous, and two discourse coalitions, the ordoliberal and social democratic, within 
one dominating discourse could be identified there. The two discourse coalitions dif-
fered mainly in their general approach to economic policy and in their preferences con-
cerning harmonization in the policy fields related to the EMU, such as employment, 
taxation, environmental policies, and social policies (see chapter 5.3, especially table 4, 
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p. 134). Also, the issue of how strict the convergence criteria should be interpreted was 
debated between the discourse coalitions in Germany (where the government under the 
leadership of Kohl, the CDU/CSU, the FDP, the Bundesbank, and the BDA argued in 
favour of the strict interpretation; and the government under the leadership of Schröder, 
the Bündnis 90/die Grünen, the PDS, and the DGB – against it). In terms of interests, 
the dominating discourse benefited the German exporters, industry, and capital because 
it promoted the framework of EMU that encourages stagnating or lower wages, taxes, 
and other contributions. Simultaneously, it creates a better conjuncture for the industry 
and exporters to export to the countries with the weaker or internationally less competi-
tive industries inside the EMU. 
In the same period, in Greece, the dominating and alternative discourses were 
identified (while the dominating discourse encouraged the neoliberal economic reforms, 
the alternative one opposed them). On one hand, there was some agreement among the 
actors considered in the analysis that the government should deal with the problem of 
unemployment, reduction of public debt, and tax reform (see chapter 6.3, especially ta-
ble 6, p. 182). On the other hand, there was no consensus among the actors on how ex-
actly these problems should be resolved. Moreover, all the measures by the government 
aimed at increasing the convergence with the other EMU members and at reducing the 
public deficit were contested and challenged by the alternative discourse coalition. The 
points of contestation included the effects of the budgetary austerity, liberalization of 
economic policies, and the debate on growth vs. competitiveness as the primary goal 
(where the government represented by Simitis, the PASOK, the ND, the BoG, and the 
SEV promoted austerity, liberalization, and competitiveness-oriented policies; and the 
SYN, the KKE, the DIKKI, and the GSEE disagreed with these policies). The alterna-
tive discourse questioned the view of the government that stability would ensure eco-
nomic growth in Greece. Simultaneously, the idea of an active involvement of the gov-
ernment in promoting growth and employment policies was very often present in the 
communications by different actors (with the exceptions of the ND, the BoG, and the 
SEV who opposed such an involvement). 
The comparison of the two discourses of that period of time clearly shows the 
difference in concerns in the two countries. While the discourse in Greece proved to 
have a relatively thin European dimension, its main concerns were of a domestic nature, 
including the issues of high unemployment, an unfair and inefficient taxation system, 
and the necessity to reduce the public debt (table 6, p. 182). The focus on these topics 
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alone speaks for high vulnerability of the Greek economic situation. Simultaneously, the 
notions of budgetary consolidation, austerity, as well as stability and competitiveness - 
which were all parts of the dominating discourse in Germany, being generally accepted 
there - were highly contested in Greece (see table 8, p. 209). Therefore, although the 
dominating discourses in Germany and in Greece generally promoted similar policy 
types, in Greece these policies and the concepts behind them did not represent any kind 
of consensus but were constantly challenged by the alternative discourse (table 6, p. 
182). The discourse analysis proves that, although both countries expected benefits from 
the membership in the EMU and were aware of the reform requirements for the mem-
bership, the content of these expected benefits varied significantly. While in Germany 
the expected benefits included a more favorable environment for the enterprises and ex-
port industries (and indirectly labor), as well as higher competitiveness (table 4, p. 134); 
in Greece, the dominating discourse had a stronger social dimension, claiming that the 
reforms are necessary for the membership in the EMU, which in its turn would ensure 
the favorable conditions for the future re-distributive policies (for example, “The high 
growth rates in the new environment create a sound surplus needed for the expansion of 
social cohesion and solidarity”, Simitis 9.03.2000). These expectations had a very thin 
foundation and could hardly be fulfilled, as the EMU itself does not have a social di-
mension. Therefore, I think that the risk of disappointment among the population and of 
loss of legitimacy was always higher in the case of Greece. 
The second period of analysis, from 2010 to 2015, reveals a dominating 
(ordoliberal) and an alternative (social democratic) discourses in Germany. The latter 
discourse essentially merged into the dominating discourse beginning in 2012. The al-
ternative, social democratic, discourse slowly disappeared from the agenda in the 
changing political circumstances both at the European and at the domestic level. The 
two discourses originally presented two different visions concerning the root cause and 
necessary measures to resolve the EMU crisis. While the dominating, ordoliberal, dis-
course presented the crisis as exclusively a problem of one or some member states, an 
alternative discourse claimed it to be at least partly a European responsibility (see chap-
ter 5.4, especially, table 5, p. 155). As the former discourse mainly promoted enforce-
ment of the status quo, the latter demanded new measures, including a debt cut, intro-
duction of common European bonds, European growth and employment policies (table 
5, p. 154). At the same time, the majority of actors in Germany still shared a generally 
positive attitude towards budgetary consolidation and austerity (with the exceptions of 
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the Linke and the DGB). Comparing the discourse in Germany between two periods, 
from 1997 to 2000 and from 2010 to 2015, we can observe that the main topics certainly 
changed as the circumstances changed. Essentially, the political cleavages and the ex-
pressed policy preferences of the actors in Germany concerning the EMU remained the 
same compared to the earlier period of analysis (compare the tables 4 and 5). However, 
the strengthening of the ordoliberal discourse at the European level through adoption of 
legislation led to the weakening of the alternative discourse in Germany (see p. 152-
153). Therefore, a direct influence of the European discourse on the quality of the do-
mestic discourse in a member state can be observed.  
In Greece in the period between 2010 and 2015, three phases of discourse can be 
identified. The dynamic of this period demonstrates how three discourses in the first 
phase at least partially converged towards the alternative (anti-Memoranda policies) 
discourse in the third phase. The skepticism towards the Memoranda policies as the 
measures capable of solving the crisis grew slowly when the original optimistic expecta-
tions have not been fulfilled (see chapter 6.4). The actors who defended the Memoranda 
measures at the beginning of the crisis recognized some of their failures later. In fact, in 
the third phase, an absolute majority of the actors considered in the analysis (including 
the ND, the PASOK, the SYRIZA, the ANEL, the KKE, the DIMAR, the SEV, and the 
GSEE) agreed on the necessity of growth related measures, whereas further austerity 
was regarded as counterproductive (see chapter 6.4). Compared to the previous period 
of analysis in Greece, the first phase of discourse between 2010 and 2015 strongly re-
sembles the period between 1997 and 2000, when the dominating discourse defended 
the idea of debt reduction through austerity and neoliberal reforms (compare tables six 
and seven). As mentioned above, the case study shows that this discourse later lost its 
dominant position to the alternative discourse. However, in the second half of 2015, 
several important events happened, including the failed attempt by the government to 
re-negotiate the central terms of the Memorandum after the early elections in September 
2015. Ultimately, the responsibility for implementation of the third Memorandum was 
transferred on the government, whose discourse strongly opposed the Memoranda poli-
cies earlier (representing the alternative discourse coalition). The later period of time is 
not included in the analysis within this thesis. Therefore, it is unclear whether the dis-
course, which dominated in the third phase, was able to preserve its dominating position 
in the same form, or whether it evolved, further absorbing some elements of the dis-
course, which dominates at the European level. Generally, the resistance to accept the 
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reforms and the increased contestation during the years of crisis indicate the increasing 
loss of legitimacy of the EMU policies in Greece (see table 7, p. 200). 
Comparing the discourses in both countries between each other and with the 
dominating discourse at the European level, the following conclusions can be drawn. In 
both countries, the discourse analysis on the topic of the EMU proves the existence of a 
political conflict between the owners of large capital on one side and labor and groups 
of population with low income on the other. This conflict becomes obvious in the points 
of main contestation (see tables 4-7 and table 8). Yet the intensity of such conflict is dif-
ferent in the two countries considered here, as, in Greece, there was always an estab-
lished alternative (anti-liberal) discourse, challenging the key notions of the dominating 
(promoting liberal reforms) discourse and telling an alternative ‘story’. Lack of political 
consensus signalized by the existence of a stable and significant alternative discourse 
essentially determined lower legitimacy of the European policies in Greece. Further-
more, while the main points of contestation in Germany between 1997 and 2000 have a 
strong European dimension (focusing on the question which features the EMU should 
obtain, see part 5.3.7), the latter is almost entirely missing in Greece, except for the gen-
eral declaration of the wish to belong to the European ‘family’. This aspect of discourse 
draws a division between the two countries, as one of them defines the ‘rules of the 
game’ at the European level, and the other one must follow the rules in order to not be 
left out. However, between 2010 and 2015, the European dimension became central for 
discourse in both countries, especially in Greece, where the coalitions argued mainly 
along the divide for or against the Memoranda policies (table 7, p. 200). 
Also, in the second period of analysis an opposite trend can be observed – the 
moment the discourse started to converge towards the dominating ordoliberal discourse 
in Germany, the dominating discourse with ordoliberal elements in Greece started to 
transform and later lost its dominating position to the alternative (anti-Memoranda poli-
cies) discourse. Both transformations happened in 2012, after the member states have 
achieved an agreement about the reforms of the EMU at the European level, and after 
the second Memorandum for Greece had been negotiated. As described in the fourth 
chapter of this thesis, the reforms of EMU expressed strengthening of the existing 
norms and procedures, whereas the role of the community in economic policy was re-
duced to surveillance, coordination, and control (see p. 92-93). Thus, the closure of ne-
gotiations on the reform of EMU and adoption of the second Memorandum, which at its 
core continued the logic of the first, coincide with the shift of discourse in Greece away 
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from the European demands; the fact that opened an opportunity for the alternative dis-
course to rise later in Greece. In this case, the transformation of discourse expresses the 
loss of legitimacy and stronger protest. While the issue of economic divergence and in-
equality across the EMU member states is strongly present in the discourse in Greece, 
this divergence is defined within the dominating ordoliberal discourse in Germany as 
divergence in management (good vs. bad administration of economic policy). 
Generally, while in Germany there was a relative consensus on the necessity of 
austerity and budgetary consolidation, this was a point of major contestation in Greece 
(table 8, p. 209). The majority of actors (including the ND, the PASOK, the SYRIZA, 
the ANEL, the KKE, the DIMAR, the SEV, and the GSEE) even represented the view 
that austerity leads to a recession rather than helps to overcome the crisis. Therefore, the 
Memoranda measures, especially privatization and further flexibilization of the labor 
markets, were strongly criticized (table 7, p. 200). There was an agreement among the 
actors in both countries that the policies must achieve an increase in competitiveness, 
but there were different approaches to how exactly this should be done. In Germany, the 
dominating ordoliberal discourse promoted structural reforms, austerity, and stabiliza-
tion, whereas in Greece, the actors argued for structural reforms, tax reforms, and 
measures promoting growth (see table 8, p. 209). There was also a different description 
of the nature of the crisis in these two countries. In Germany, it was claimed to be a na-
tional problem, while in Greece, crisis was described at least partly as a result of the Eu-
ropean economic divergence (see tables 5 and 7). Because the reforms in Greece were 
highly controversial among the main political actors, the aspects of democracy also had 
a stronger presence in the discourse in Greece than in Germany (table 7, p. 200). 
Finally, regarding the dominating discourse and norms at the European level, 
some contestation is present there, as the discourse analysis confirmed the existence of a 
discourse with the contesting visions of the EMU (see table 3, p. 104). Also, these con-
testing visions indirectly reflect the preferences within different member state discours-
es and preferences of different groups of population. Therefore, at first sight, the criteri-
on of representativeness appears to be fulfilled. Yet these features exist within the cir-
cumstances of a hegemonial discourse at the European level. The quality of contestation 
at this level does not challenge the basic assumptions of the hegemonial discourse as 
possibly wrong or ideological. Also, looking at the norms produced as a result of nego-
tiations, one discovers that they reflect an exclusively ordoliberal vision of economic 
policy.  
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Table 8: Overall summary of the discursive elements by actor 
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Further privatization                + +   +     +  + 
Further liberalization               +    + +     +  + 
Economic policy surveillance                            
Stability oriented financial 
and economic policy  +             +    + +     +  + 
Strict implementation of the 
SGP principles  + +    + +    +  +              
Currency stability                            
Budgetary consolidation / 
austerity               + + +  + +     +  + 
Strict nominal convergence   +                         
Competitiveness as primary 
policy goal               +    + +     +  + 
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coordination    +     + + + + +               
European employment poli-
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Social policy coordination    +     + +   +               
European policy for economic 
growth    +     + + +  +               
Inclusion of social partners at 
the European level                            
Flexibilization of the SGP    +     + +                  
Impulses for growth/ targeted 
investment                            
Eurobonds         + + +                 
Active employment policies                            
Active growth policy                            
Restoration of social justice                            
Crisis as a result of European 
dynamic                            
Financial market regulation                            
Restoration of labor rights                            
Competitiveness through in-
novation                            
Establishment of balance in 
the bias of economic vs. social 
policies                     
+ +    +  
+ contested principle; principle not contested  
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For instance, the preferences of the Greek discourse shared by some of the member 
states’ governments have been continuously blocked in the negotiations at the EU level, 
while the results of these negotiations turned out to be very close to the preferences of 
the dominating discourse in Germany.  
The principles of the EMU do not represent a consensus among the political 
elites in a broad sense. These principles are claimed to be the expression of the univer-
sal, common interest, while remaining ideological – ordoliberal. While some might ar-
gue that the procedure corresponds with the democratic principles, its results still lack 
legitimacy because they are pre-determined by the power asymmetries during the nego-
tiations. That means that a policy concept can be introduced at the European level with-
out gaining the support of the majority or convincing the population but just because it 
was promoted by certain actors. Equally, the later actors can veto policies even if these 
policies correspond with the interest of the majority. The circumstances where econom-
ic policy agenda is narrowed down to some policy options violates the right of demos to 
choose among the alternatives and leads to growing distrust, skepticism, different forms 
of civil protest, and civil disobedience. 
 
7.2. Implications for democracy 
This research provides evidence that the shift of authority expressed in the rea-
lignment of some competences between the EU and its member states with simultane-
ous recognition of sovereignty undermines democracy. The elite discourse on the issues 
of the EMU does not fulfill the basic requirements of deliberation in order to channel 
and reflect the democratic sovereignty, and there is a significant democratic deficit in 
the decision-making framework. Based on the analysis of structures of the EMU and 
discourses on the topic of the EMU at both the European and member state levels, two 
dimensions of democratic deficit can be identified. First, the failure of deliberation re-
sults in an undemocratic nature of the discourse at the European level. Second, there are 
substantial gaps in the throughput legitimacy in the EMU, mainly concerning the break-
age of the link between the political process in a member state and the policies within 
the EMU as well as the exclusion of social partners from the decision-making.  
This thesis represents an attempt to assess the deliberative procedure (under-
stood as a normative concept of procedural popular sovereignty in a transnational set-
ting, Habermas 1992) on the basis of two criteria – functional representation and the 
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contestation of ideas and policy concepts (see chapter 2.3 and chapter 3). The concept of 
democracy presented in the theoretical chapters is inclusive, demanding participation of 
citizens and political actors in the definition of agenda as well as in a specific policy-
making. It requires an equal opportunity for all the actors and has a goal of adopting 
policy measures based on a consensus or at least on a compromise (Eriksen/Fossum 
2012). 
However, under the circumstances of the hegemonial discourse, the intensity and 
visibility of contestation is generally low, with peaks of contestation lasting relatively 
short periods. Also, the analysis indicates a lack of functional and of discursive repre-
sentativeness in the decision-making at the European level of the EMU. This makes dis-
course at this level exclusive rather than inclusive because the contested discursive re-
alities are not represented at the European level equally. The analysis of the discursive 
data proves that, although there is no solid agreement on economic policy priorities in 
the national discourses of the two member states, the nominal convergence and stability 
policies formally remain the absolutely dominating policy goal. While the differences in 
approaches to economic policy and the definitions of the ‘right’ measures remain unex-
pressed, the existence of a political conflict and antagonistic interests is fully neglected. 
Summing up, the democratic deficit in the EMU is rooted in prohibition of any econom-
ic model except the one described above and in the missing channels of communication 
and deliberation on what would be the right economic policy decision for a certain 
member state and the EMU as a whole. 
The dynamic of economic and monetary integration now substantially defines 
the economic policy framework in the member states, although it formally still belongs 
to member states’ exclusive competences. The differentiation and realignment of the 
competences between the EU and its member states that resulted in the current form of 
the EMU undermine democracy, as the limits are put on the scale of deliberation, reduc-
ing the latter to those policies which are compatible with the current form of the EMU. 
This limitation is more obvious at the EU level, but the discourse analysis in this thesis 
demonstrates that it is also strongly present at the member state level. Under the circum-
stances of hegemonial discourse at the European level, the proceeding of difference 
with legitimating outcomes does not happen. The vision shaping the EMU clearly does 
not represent a consensus. On the contrary, a clash of concepts of justice and societal 
values can be observed. In fact, in the case of Greece, the local elite had to implement 
the Memoranda policies often without believing in or defending the content of these 
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programs (especially, since 2012, see part 6.4). The measures were even often described 
as wrong and harmful (table 7, p. 200). 
The discursive diversity at the European level is constantly suppressed through 
the ongoing constitutionalization of the ordoliberal ideas. Therefore, the hegemonial 
discourse constrains one of the principles of democratic sovereignty – self-
determination. Furthermore, the hegemonial character of the EMU discourse is 
strengthened because, once adopted, the norms and pillars of the EMU are no longer 
open for contestation. Once the legislative framework is created, it crucially influences 
the future discourse, and any violation against the existing norms becomes ‘against the 
principles of the EMU’ and can be subject to sanctions. In other words, the fact that 
some principles have been fixed in the legal domain represents the act of constitutional-
ization of the ‘right’ economic policies (Bieling 2011; Hueglin 2002). As a result, the 
other policy options are excluded from the discourse as ‘wrong’, being ‘against the ex-
isting principles’ (see, for example, Merkel 17.05.2015). It is crucial to emphasize that 
such constitutionalization did not result from either consultations with the societal ac-
tors, or from a public vote, or does it depend on elections. These principles ignore both 
changes in governments and the transformation of the dominating discourse in the 
member states, as the case of Greece proves. Simultaneously, there is no one who can 
be made accountable and carries responsibility if these principles fail to deliver the re-
sults corresponding with the expectations of the citizens. 
As chapter 2.1 of this thesis argues, there are two different understandings of 
freedom and popular sovereignty simultaneously present in any European state in a dif-
ferent degrees – a liberal and a republican (see also Scharpf 2012). It is argued there that 
such coexistence forms a legitimate fundament whereon political actors can further dis-
cuss and compete with their ideas on different policy questions, without questioning the 
existence of the polity itself. The discourse analysis and the study of the EMU within 
this thesis reveal the critical difference: some member states (for example, Germany) 
externally promote the liberal understanding, and the others (for example, France and 
Greece) – a republican one. Independently of the reasons behind these perspectives, 
they delegitimize the political order if not addressed properly through an open discus-
sion and deliberation. Simply ignoring this difference would lead to the skepticism 
about the existing norms, institutions, and procedures (which can be observed in the 
discourse in Greece). 
Political frustration and strong disagreement resulting from the lack of legitima-
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cy of the policies within the EMU is clearer in the case of Greece. For instance, the fact 
that the SYRIZA with the protest discourse undermined two established parties in a 
short period of time and gained popularity enough to be able to participate in the coali-
tion government expresses political discontent within the population. Similarly, the last 
elections in France where two dominating parties lost the elections to a young political 
party that strongly gained influence within a short period of time indicates distrust and 
disappointment about the economic policies of the two previous governments. Interest-
ingly, the case of Greece also casts doubts on the argument that democratization of the 
EU represents a threat to efficiency (see Majone 1998, Moravcsik 2002). In fact, ne-
glecting the democratic deficit is at least as much a threat to efficiency in the mid and 
long term. In my opinion, high legitimacy is crucial for the efficiency of policies within 
the EMU. 
The second dimension of democratic deficit in the EMU concerns the gaps in the 
throughput legitimacy (Schmidt 2013) expressed in the erosion of the basic principles of 
the democratic political process as well as in the increasing exclusion of the social part-
ners from the decision-making process. Throughput legitimacy is crucially important 
because its lack would constantly undermine the perceptions of legitimacy of the EU 
governance, regardless its efficiency (see Schmidt 2013). The EMU undermines the re-
gime of political responsibility through establishing the structures where the two closely 
related policy fields have been artificially separated between two levels of governance. 
In a democratic political system, responsibility for the policy measures should be placed 
upon those who make the decisions. Yet in the EMU, the real location of authority be-
comes unclear. Democratic elements such as equal and effective inclusion, representa-
tiveness in the process of agenda setting, authorization, control, and contestation are all 
missing. Instead of the collective will-formation and co-decision, there is imposed legis-
lation and disagreement in the discourse. In fact, Greece represents a case where the 
domestic context and process of preference building was ignored in the Memoranda. In 
this case, the institutionalized circular relationship between governors and the governed 
was damaged; while elections representing the explicit authorization of the decision 
makers by the citizens were de facto irrelevant for the economic measures required in 
the Memoranda. In the case of Greece, political instability and a frequent change of 
governments in the reality did not change the budgetary and fiscal policies, therefore 
strongly restricting the right of the population to determine both the budgetary strategy 
and priorities through the exercise of their democratic rights. Moreover, the weakness of 
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the Greek parliament was revealed too (see Pollak/ Slominski 2012, Benz 2013, Auel/ 
Hoeing 2014). 
Additionally, some interests recognized as legitimate at the national level are 
neglected at the European level. Analyzing the discursive data, it becomes clear how the 
disagreement by some important actors is not channelized in any way at the European 
level. The fact that the social partners (the DGB, the SEV, and the GSEE) signalized 
their disagreement and discontent with the Memoranda policies decreases the legitimacy 
of these policies. Generally, the policies within the EMU are not embedded in any polit-
ical context of modes of governance and societal power relations where competing val-
ues could be balanced. Therefore, another principle of democratic sovereignty – co-
decision – is violated too. 
The description of the EU as an empire of a new type is adopted here with the 
focus on the diversified polity where supranational and national modes of governance 
co-exist (Bieling 2010; Zielonka 2006). Therefore, the conceptualization of the EU as 
an empire emphasizes the fact of recognition of its member states as sovereign. Yet it is 
also suggested that the supranational modes of governance despite their formally ‘soft’ 
regulative nature represent the mechanism that is able to put serious constraints on the 
national policies (Follesdal 2011; Hueglin 2002), mainly through establishing and 
strengthening a certain type of discourse (see pp. 32-35). Therefore, the existing power 
asymmetry among the member states and societal actors is crucial here, as more power-
ful interests get the chance to enforce the agenda, which either benefits them or requires 
from them less adjustment effort. The modes of governance employed by the empire 
enable domination through discourse. Fixing the terms of discourse raises serious dem-
ocratic concerns if some legitimate interests are constantly excluded and neglected in 
the discourse at the European level. The legitimacy and effectiveness of the decisions at 
this level finally depends on the acceptance and naturalization of the European dis-
course in the member states. 
The neoliberal coalition, which included the German government, was able to 
achieve the implementation of the ‘technical’ project of the EMU due to its negotiating 
power, thus establishing the foundations of the future EMU discourse. Once the frame-
work of the EMU has taken the form of the ordoliberal vision, formal rules (incorpo-
rated in the SGP) were established, putting an obligation on all the member states to 
comply. Yet as the case studies show, the circumstances in the member states were very 
different, often requiring fundamental changes in the priorities and values for the sake 
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of adjustment. 
The reason why deliberation fails is rooted in the power asymmetries or in other 
words the unequal relations of economic and political power among the member states 
and the mode of decision-making in the EMU. The foundation of asymmetric power in 
the EMU lies in the different socio-economic conditions, different policy models, legit-
imation (socio-economic embedding of economic and monetary policies), as well as the 
structures of the EMU themselves. In fact, the socio-economic differences determine 
unequal sensitivities and vulnerabilities among the member states of the EMU. As some 
actors are able to create powerful coalitions, they are capable of successfully promoting 
their preferences without carrying formal responsibility for the results of the policies. 
Such coalitions may include the member states’ governments, supranational, and private 
actors. Those who do not possess comparable power resources within the current 
framework of the EMU turn into periphery doomed to follow the recommendations of 
‘best practices’. The persisting difference in the economic development remains un-
addressed at the European level and is in fact neglected within the dominating EMU 
discourse. The constrained sovereignty of the periphery is expressed in the inability of 
the latter to set the agenda and policy priorities either domestically or at the European 
level.  
At the core, negotiations with veto power combined with ‘soft’ modes of gov-
ernance remain the central decision-making procedures in the EMU. The supranational 
modes of governance do not formally carry responsibility for economic development in 
the member states and therefore do not formally require the inclusion of societal actors. 
As there is no formal framework for inclusion of societal actors, this inclusion is rather 
selective. In fact, the discourse analysis proved not only the difference in the dominat-
ing domestic discourses in the two member states but also that the discourse promoted 
by the economically more powerful member state and owners of large capital correlates 
with the one dominating in the EMU. The policies within the EMU are penetrated 
through control over the discursive articulation at the European level. The lack of dis-
cursive representation and contestation at the European level will constantly re-produce 
the favorable conditions for domination.  
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Conclusion 
Attempting to approach the broader issue of partial integration (and its persis-
tence) within the EMU where the monetary and fiscal policies have been separated and 
attributed to different levels of governance, despite functional and political arguments 
against such separation (Alesina et al. 2010; Beetsma/Debrun 2004; Bell 2003; Crouch 
2000a; De Grauwe 2013; Mulhearn/Vane 2008; Wessels/Linsemann 2002; Scharpf 
2013), this research focuses on the democratic implications of the membership in the 
EMU. The analysis attempts to scrutinize the coexistence of supranationality and de-
mocracy. It raises questions concerning the mutual relationship between the suprana-
tional political process and democracy in the member states. How does the supranation-
al politics influence the democracy in the member states, and how do democracies in the 
member states influence the supranational politics and policies? The research has an ob-
jective to provide a better understanding of the EMU structures through analyzing the 
discourse. It offers democratic criticism of the EMU from a discursive and partly from 
institutional point of view. It is suggested here that due to economic divergence, the ex-
isting differences in approaches to economic policy across the member states, and the 
dominance of the intergovernmental mode of cooperation at the European level the su-
pranational political process takes the form of center-periphery relations. In this context, 
some policy concepts have a higher chance of being implemented not because of their 
ability to convince the majority, their argumentative quality, their values, or rationality 
but simply because of their origin in the center. Therefore, democracy and the domestic 
political process in the periphery become partly irrelevant, as the periphery loses the 
equal rights to actively participate in the agenda setting and in decision-making. As the 
framework of the EMU has not been the result of a European consensus, and the domes-
tic political consensus does not play the key role in the process of policy definition an-
ymore, gaps in legitimacy appear. These gaps persist, becoming larger under the cir-
cumstances of economic hardship. They do not only potentially damage the efficiency 
of policy measures and de-stabilize the political system but also endanger the democrat-
ic process itself, spreading civil frustration, apathy, a feeling of fatalism, radicalism, vi-
olence, and disintegration.  
As it was stated at the very beginning of this thesis, European integration has a 
potential for strengthening the democratic quality of its member states under the condi-
tions of globalization through projection of national interests beyond the state (Haber-
mas 2011). The transfer of monetary policy to the European level without defining the 
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features of a common economic policy formally leaves both freedom of definition and 
responsibility for the latter to the member states. However, the intergovernmental dy-
namic and new modes of governance de facto set the agenda of economic policy in the 
member states, leading to alienation of the monetary and economic policies from the 
political process. Being the result of negotiations, the main pillars of the EMU do not 
reflect the difference in approaches to economic policy which the case studies proved to 
exist. In these circumstances, and regarding the unequal economic and political power 
relations, economically stronger states and private actors are able to promote their agen-
da, despite the resistance. The separation of monetary and economic policies proved to 
be quite symbolic because the EMU not only significantly reduces the alternatives for 
economic policy in the member states in the mid and long term but also disregards the 
right of the local actors to agree on the goals and instruments of economic program. As 
long as intergovernmental negotiations and the new modes of governance dominate the 
economic part of the EMU, the more powerful actors will be able to effectively promote 
and implement their agenda. Therefore, the case of the EMU demonstrates how its 
structures (being a result of negotiations rather then a broad consensus) hide the persis-
tent asymmetries.  
In the EMU, asymmetries in power are reflected in the center-periphery rela-
tions. Such asymmetries create a situation where citizens in the peripheral countries and 
disadvantaged social groups across the member states do not have an opportunity to par-
ticipate directly in the decision-making and cannot choose from alternatives (as the 
hegemonial discourse fixes the agenda in the ordoliberal terms). Consequently, these 
asymmetries are against the principle of democracy and sovereignty of people. For ex-
ample, in Greece, the results of an exclusively European discourse and of the massive 
loss of legitimacy are expressed in the strong political turbulence and radicalization in 
both the right and left directions of the political scale. In fact, this case demonstrated 
how the hegemonic discourse failed to naturalize itself (due to a widespread skepticism 
within the Greek political discourse about the European economic policy recommenda-
tions) and started loosing its hegemonic status in the second phase of the discourse 
analysis in Greece (see part 6.4.9). 
The fact that eurosceptic populism and the agenda of dis-integration (Ep-
pler/Scheller 2013) gained influence across the member states of the EU should be re-
garded as the result of legitimation crisis too, when both globalization and European 
integration limit the policy alternatives for articulation by the political establishment in 
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the member states. Especially the introduction of the European currency and the Maas-
tricht Treaty split the European public into euroenthusiasts and eurosceptics. As Hei-
senberg argues, Maastricht marked the end of the civil permissive consensus, and part 
of the public started questioning their future inside the European project, especially due 
to the post-Maastricht years of fiscal austerity and the public perception of democratic 
deficit (Heisenberg 2006: 234). According to Scharpf, two challenges remain un-
addressed in the EMU structure: the challenge of lost competitiveness and the challenge 
of counterproductive interests rates (Scharpf 2013: 130 ff). Both of these challenges re-
flect divergence among the member states which is not recognized or addressed within 
the structures of the EMU. In order for the EMU to become democratic and increase its 
legitimacy, it is crucial to achieve the real convergence of economies within the EMU. 
Common economic policy should not be bound with the results of negotiation, treaties, 
and ‘expertise’ or ‘good practices’ but should include social and political actors (stake-
holders) from the member states on an equal basis. Similarly, the decision-making insti-
tutions responsible for the definition of economic policy must be sensitive to the de-
mands of the citizens and must be accountable to them. 
The fact that the European core is able to control the policies in the peripheries 
is the direct result of the originally unclear arrangements in the EMU. If the EMU 
would not be treated as a technical project but a political one, if the EMU would be a 
topic of open and public deliberation instead of negotiations, if citizens in the member 
states were made aware of the possible consequences of the membership in the EMU, 
then the original agenda of negotiations would have to be modified too. This is history 
now, and we will never know how it would end. Yet I suggest not only that such proce-
dure would be more democratic but that it would also deliver democratic and legitimate 
results. 
This research provides a perspective on the European Economic and Monetary 
Union, especially in the circumstances of a crisis, with the focus on asymmetries of 
power among its member states and on the democratic effects that such asymmetries 
have. It attempts to contribute to the conceptualization of the EU as an empire of a new 
type (Cooper 2002, Posener 2007, Zielonka 2006, Bieling 2010) through revealing the 
mechanism and nature of asymmetries between two member states as well as through 
assessing the hegemony of certain discourse at the EU level. Simultaneously, this thesis 
is about the relationship between supranationality and democracy. Extending the exist-
ing research on democracy in the EU (for an overview see Schaefer 2006) and the exist-
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ing research on the effects of the supranational governance on the democratic institu-
tions in the member states, for instance parliaments (see Benz 2013; Auel/Hoeing 2014) 
and courts of justice (see Hoepner et al. 2010; Streinz 2009), this thesis focuses on the 
legitimizing discourse(s) and its constraints. It is aimed at exposing the apolitical and 
undemocratic side of the EMU because of the fact that the meanings in the discourse are 
fixed, and there is no space for their re-articulation. This thesis also contributes to the 
constitutionalization logic, which is used to describe the development of the EMU, es-
pecially during the EMU crisis since 2010 (Bieling 2011). Against the literature arguing 
for the deliberative models of democracy and demoicracy as a benchmark for the EU 
(Habermas 2011; Eriksen/Fossum 2012; Neyer 2006; Fabbrini 2011; Nicolaidis 2013; 
Cheneval/Schimmelfennig 2013), this thesis emphasizes the aspects which seriously 
hamper the implementation of those models. Extending the already existing research on 
the formal and institutional features of the EMU (Mulhearn/Vane 2008; Beetsma/ 
Debrun 2004; De Grauwe 2013; Benz 2013) and on the gaps in the crisis management 
(Heinrich/Jessop 2013; Meiers 2015; Meyer-Rix 2013; Overbeek 2012; Radice 2014; 
Scharpf 2013; Becker 2014), this research offers a different perspective and provides 
the discursive data. This data, for example, also contradicts McNamara’s explanation of 
the integration within the EMU based on the convergence of beliefs among the Europe-
an elites about the right monetary policy (McNamara 1998). 
Summing up, the EMU is neither exclusively supranational nor intergovernmen-
tal but in fact shares the features of both in a complex framework of center-periphery 
relations. Therefore, this research questions both supranationalism and intergovernmen-
talism. First, neither the preferences of supranational institutions nor those of the state 
actors can fully explain the dynamic of integration. One should rather consider their 
ability to form coalitions with each other and other actors. Second, the European author-
ity undermines state sovereignty of some member states stronger than that of the others. 
In fact, in the EMU we observe a higher capacity of a member state to implement its 
agenda when compared with another member state, despite postulated equal positions of 
both. A core coalition is able to implement its agenda regardless of the resistance due to 
the asymmetry in economic and political resources across the member states. Finally, it 
is worth mentioning that the intergovernmental mode does not represent a democratic 
principle in the case of EMU; it does not ensure an equal participation of each member 
state in the decision-making process but further increases asymmetries instead of 
providing a base for convergence.  
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Moreover, against the central claim of the new intergovernmentalism, this thesis 
attempts to prove that deliberation and consensus do not represent the cornerstone of 
decision-making in the EMU (and in the EU as a whole, against Bickerton et al. 2015). 
Negotiations rather than deliberation represent the main modus operandi in the EMU. 
Against demoicracy, the case of the EMU clearly indicates that the accommoda-
tion of differences would only be possible unto a certain degree, as such accommoda-
tion in this policy field quickly becomes inefficient and even pointless. Furthermore, 
two core ideas of demoicracy are questioned in this research: transnational non-
domination and mutual recognition (Nikolaidis 2013). What originally seemed to be 
mutual recognition due to the lack of consensus turned into harmonization through dom-
ination, especially in the course of the EMU crisis.  
The methodology of this research has an objective of examining the conflict and 
difference in the economic policy dynamic and in the legitimizing discourses (which 
transport the definitions of values in the member states). The findings from the case 
studies are then compared with the European level of the EMU in an attempt to assess 
how responsive is this level of decision-making to the domestic ideas, values, and jus-
tice perceptions in the member states. In this context, the discourse analysis is aimed at 
examining the ideational and relational (actor dimension) aspects of discourse. The re-
search is focused on elite discourse because it is more narrowed down (than a public 
discourse) and plays the decisive role in the decision-making. Revealing the limits (in 
terms of ideas and actor coalitions) of the dominating discourse on economic and mone-
tary policy at the European level allows us to draw the conclusions about the democratic 
implications of integration within the EMU and generally about the political nature of 
integration.  
At the same time, this research has its limits. Concerning the supranational level, 
this research could benefit from a more in-depth look at supranational modes of govern-
ance, focusing more on the discursive divisions among the different member states, Eu-
ropean institutions, and the connection (networks) of private and supranational actors. 
Moreover, although the position of the ECB is affiliated with certain interests in this 
thesis, further research is needed in order to explain certain shifts in its policy, for ex-
ample the OMT program. Adding more case studies of member states and analysis of 
other policy fields would certainly verify the logic of this research. Similarly, while this 
research is focused on labor as a social group disadvantaged within the EMU, further 
research could certainly examine the suggested approach focusing on other groups of 
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population, such as gender groups. In my opinion, women as a social group are un-
derrepresented in the decision-making too, yet would have to face bigger challenges in 
the member states of periphery (especially, under the conditions of economic crisis and 
budgetary austerity). 
From the critical point of view, the method of discourse analysis can raise some 
questions. First, the analysis has a goal of observing the content and dynamics of the 
discourse by each actor over two periods, covering over seven years in total. Therefore, 
in order to make the analysis feasible, the total amount of communications had to be 
reduced. The sources used for the discourse analysis represent samples rather than every 
communication by an actor during the whole period under consideration. Thus, despite 
all the efforts to address this issue, there is still a chance that some important communi-
cations were not included in the analysis. Second, the research assumes that the divi-
sions within the public discourse would be in line with those of the elite discourse. Yet 
the public discourse itself was not included in the analysis, as it would certainly increase 
the scale of this research by shifting its borders. Further research would be necessary in 
order to prove the relation between these two dimensions of discourse on the EMU. De-
spite the limits of this research, it raises an important issue of legitimacy of the Europe-
an policies in the economic and monetary spheres that will hopefully encourage further 
discussion and research on this topic. 
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